

# THE CHRISTIAN REVIEW.

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## ARTICLE I.—DOCTRINE AND LIFE.\*

THE history of Christian doctrines has come to be one of the most attractive fields of modern theological inquiry. Though less than a century has passed since it first became a distinct branch of history, it has yet drawn to itself some of the highest learning and ability in Germany. With the exception, however, of the meagre compend of Muenschler, the only history of Christian doctrine that until very recently has found its way into English is that of Hagenbach; who, though the master of a fine style in German, and a diligent *compiler*, has evidently derived his materials in too many instances from second-hand sources. But he has been a most useful guide to American and English students; more serviceable perhaps, and certainly more acceptable, than would have been abler, but less orthodox scholars. The lectures of Neander on the "History of Christian Dogmas," "which," Jacobi tells us, "he took special delight in delivering," and for which he was specially prepared by his unequalled learning and his most loving spirit, are hereafter to be our highest authority. Translated by the practised hand of J. E. Ryland, they are destined to be extensively read, and to exert no incon-

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\* Dr. A. Neander's *Christliche Dogmengeschichte*. Herausgegeben von Dr. J. L. Jacobi, ordentlichem Professor der Theologie zu Halle. Zwei bände. Berlin: Verlag von Wiegandt und Grieben. 1857.

Lectures on the History of Christian Dogmas. By Dr. Augustus Neander. Edited by Dr. J. L. Jacobi. Translated from the German by J. E. Ryland, M. A., translator of Neander's *Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, etc. etc. In two vols. London: Henry G. Bohn. 1858.

siderable influence in our American churches. Their influence, independently considered, is not, perhaps, to be coveted ; but regarded as correctives of dangerous and unavoidable errors, we welcome them to our language, and are glad to know that an American reprint of them is soon to appear.

Neander's *History of Dogmas* is a more readable book than his *History of the Church*. The difference is attributable, perhaps, partly to the easier style of the lecture-room in which the *History of Dogmas* was originally conceived ; partly to the livelier minds of the hearers, from whose notes the work has been constructed ; but chiefly to the pen of the editor, Dr. Jacobi, who tells us in the preface that it was "indispensable to correct, for reading, the somewhat loose and monotonous quality of the style, which is more easily tolerated in oral delivery." The vivacity and vigor of the preface give evidence of his competency to retouch and vivify the heavy style of his revered teacher. It must also be admitted that Mr. Ryland, though not unfrequently failing in the apprehension of the nicer shades of the author's meaning, has yet given us flowing and intelligible English in his rendering of the lectures, comparing in this respect very favorably with Prof. Torrey, who, in his translation of the "*History of the Church*," has sometimes marvellously succeeded in transferring to his English not a little of the clumsiness, complexity and monotony of the style of the original.

It is no part of our present design to enter on an extended review of Neander's "*History of Christian Dogmas*." Our purpose in introducing it is to make it the occasion for expressing our earnest dissent from the growingly popular depreciation and disregard of Christian doctrines ; a disregard which, we are sorry to say, the productions of Neander, and especially this last, so far from opposing, will possibly promote. The source of the evil was not, as some imagine, with such writers as Neander, but with those to the poison of whose writings the works of Neander are an effective antidote. We can only wish, as respects the relation of doctrine and life, he had accorded to doctrine (his "dogma") a higher importance and authority. Returning again to his conception of that relation, let us



glance here for a moment at the views of it now prevailing in this country.

The older Deists regarded even the distinctive teachings of Christianity, and especially the creeds of the churches, as impertinent attempts to supplement the teachings of nature. They paraded the well known stanza of Pope's "Universal Prayer"—like him who had it inscribed over the portal of his imposing tomb at Mount Auburn—as the sum total of their faith. They denounced Christianity as a system of dogmas, and ridiculed Christians as wranglers about creeds. Their successors, with new faces and voices, are repeating substantially the old charge. Theodore Parker, by whom the old deism has been reflavored and relabelled, just as New-England rum is said to be transmuted into best Jamaica spirits by doubling Cape Horn, is never more scornful than when denouncing the creeds of the churches. In announcing the fundamental principle of his system (a borrowed principle as we shall see), he declares with all the emphasis of italics, that Christianity, as taught by Jesus, "was not a system of theological or moral doctrines, but a method of religion and life; a religion which lays down no positive creed, and sets out from nothing external and limited, but from the spirit of God in the soul of man."

This is not exclusively the cant of the sceptic; many a pulpit and platform resounds with it, and many a popular volume echoes it. Coleridge said, "Christianity is not a theory or speculation, but a life; not a philosophy of life, but a life and a living process," and ten thousand changes have been rung upon his words. Christ has been proclaimed as the originator of a new life, in contradistinction from teacher and witness of the truth; and his apostles as conduits of the spiritual efflux as opposed to heralds of doctrines. Preachers and writers of the most opposite sects and divers schools of theology, are harmonious in the denunciation of "merciless dogmas," "straight-laced creeds," "worn-out and thread-bare confessions," and "dead formularies." Certain popular preachers of our day are said to be never more eloquent than when launching their anathemas against the "worm-eaten creeds," and the "stuffed skins of truth." To credit their assertions, one must believe that doctrines are worthless or dangerous in proportion to their age;

that the church confessions of all times are snares for the unwary ; and that salvation is by some other process than by "belief of the truth." Their notions of the relation of doctrine and life are strangely analogous to those of the sceptic. Both take singular delight in selecting as objects of their attacks those doctrines most humbling to man and most honoring to God.

To dwell on all the causes of this repugnance to doctrines, would be aside from our purpose. We can do no more than allude to some of them, as we pass to the notice of the one which we regard as deepest and most dangerous of all. Sometimes this repugnance springs up as a natural reaction against an excessive and superstitious regard for doctrinal forms. One man, whose religious ideas and tastes are an amalgam-product of a spurious philanthropy, a false theology, and heretical associations and education, may be worried by heresy hunters, till, driven to the wall, he turns in desperation, and tearing into shreds the creed of his sect, denounces all doctrines as the dogmas of men. Another, undisciplined in intellect, and incapable of exactness in thought or expression, but skillful in harangue and popular as a leader, though redoubling on his track in his pulpit teachings like a hunted hare, will vociferate against doctrines and creeds as devices of the devil for the entanglement of the weak. Another, whose piety is superficial and noisy, to whose consciousness have never been revealed the well-defined outlines of separate truths, into the depths of whose being have never shot the pure rays of clearly stated doctrines, will look upon his soberer and more staid fellow-christians as cold and formal, because fettered by their doctrines. Another, still, conscious of heretical tendencies, but elated at supposing himself a reformer in theology, restive at the thought of testing his teachings by the standards of orthodoxy, emboldened by his hold on the popular mind, and anxious to justify his heresies to his own conscience by appeal to the manifest results of his ministrations, will attribute the comparative unsuccessfulness of others to a slavish regard for dead formularies, and a perpetual hammering and re-hammering of the orthodox doctrines. But all these are only evanescent and accidental causes, working in limited spheres and controlling

no wide-spread party. Another and historical cause might be found, especially in New-England, in the natural reaction against that excessive formal regard for the "platform" and the catechism, once so characteristic of New-England, but now so irrecoverably passed away.

A more subtle and dangerous source of mischief is in a false philosophy and an associated false theology; a philosophy elaborate and deeply laid, and a theology laboriously and dexterously wrought into system. The primary source is in that idealism which reduces all knowledge to the simple contents of consciousness; which identifies knowing with becoming; which ignores any other God than the sum total of human consciousness, and knows no higher source of knowledge than the intuitions of the human soul. A theology pervaded by such a philosophy, could have but little occasion for doctrines. It can regard them only as intellectual formulas for the expression of intuitional thoughts and self-originated emotions. It makes Christianity itself to be a subjective revelation, naturally and logically evolved from human consciousness. The notion of an authoritative external revelation is ruled out as unphilosophical and impossible. The beginnings of the effects of such a philosophy first revealed themselves to the English mind in the writings of Coleridge, who, on his return from Germany, proceeded at once to filter and dilute for Englishmen the idealism he had brought with him from abroad. Its matured fruits have shown themselves in the opposing theories of the Puseyites and of Arnold, of Maurice and of Newman, the sceptic.\* Grotesque, indeed, was the system of Coleridge, "grounding," as Mr. Morrell, in his History of Modern Philosophy, somewhat pompously tells us, "the great doctrines

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\* This is no injustice to Coleridge. Consistent with himself, his view of the Church should have made him a Papist or a Puseyite; his notion of inspiration, a sceptic. A great intellect that could pronounce "Redemption an *opus perfectum*, a finished work, the claim to which is conferred by baptism," and, at the same time, write the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," could, as Carlyle says, "procreate strange Centaurs, spectral Puseyisms, monstrous, illusory Hybrids, and ecclesiastical Chimeras—which now roam the earth in a very lamentable manner."



of Christianity upon a philosophical basis"—a very copy of Nebuchadnezzar's image, "its head of fine gold, its breast and arms of silver, its belly and its thighs of brass, its legs of iron, its feet part of iron and part of clay;" a system which could be necessary and possible only in an age of intellectual nightmare! Manifold have been the products of the "Coleridgean Philosophy;" its *chef d'œuvre*, however, when revived by fresh infusions of German idealism, being that most mock-philosophical and fallacious and futile of books, Mr. Morrell's "Philosophy of Religion."

But there is one man from whom Theodore Parker and Mr. Morrell have both borrowed the fundamental principles of their systems, to whom, more than to all others, the growing depreciation of the authority of doctrines is traceable—Schleiermacher; of whom, at the tidings of his death, Neander remarked, "The man is departed from whom will be dated in future a new epoch in theology," and by whom, more perhaps than by any other man, were moulded and colored the views of many of those German divines whose writings are now having currency and influence among us. Platonist, pantheist, calvinist, neologist; orator, philosopher, theologian; nursing at heart from childhood the mystical piety of the Moravians, and maturing in intellect under the icy atmosphere of Rationalism, he grasped the conflicting theories of his day, and out of them constructed that marvellous bridge, which, resting at one end on the barren shores of Rationalism, stretched away with the other to the warm and fruitful fields of supernaturalism. Over that bridge traveled Neander, Müller, Ullmann and Nitzsch, into the gardens of the Lord; but they carried with them not a little of the idealism of the wizard architect. According to Schleiermacher, religion consists essentially in feeling. Its origin is in immediate self-consciousness; *i. e.*, not in a consciousness which is generated by reflection, but a consciousness ascribable directly to the immanence of God in the soul; a consciousness synonymous with "feeling of absolute dependence on God." In strict accordance with this theory, Christian doctrines were only formal descriptions of religious attitudes and states; mere propositions of what, intuitively perceived, had moved the soul

and revealed itself from within. The authority of an objective revelation became a variable quantity, dependent entirely on the subjective processes of its critics. The idea of religion as a form of doctrine, a norm of belief, (*norma credendorum*,) was excluded. The doctrines and confessions of the churches were treated as the cast-off vestments, or the dead forms of a departed life.

Schleiermacher's immediate disciples, whose influence, now wide-spread and resistless in our American churches, it is idle to lament, pushed onward from the goal of their master into a sounder and more scriptural theory. But the marks of his moulding hand were still on them; his idealism was still their solution of the problems of theology. With them as with their master, the beginning of Christianity was not in the communication of ideas, but of life. According to Ullmann, it was not by "thought," but by "a system of glorious facts, that Christianity spread, and filled with new life the spiritual consciousness of men;" says he, "this is its proper original force; the doctrine follows afterwards, only as the representation of what God has done. Doctrines, as such, have no power to generate life. This springs only from the presence of a higher life, already derived in the teacher himself from Christ. His teaching is but the experimental expression, we may say, of this life."\* According to Nietzsche, Christianity is not a supernatural revelation of "fixed conceptions more or less above the reach of reason," but is a disclosure and a communication of salvation, not to individuals, but to humanity.† According to Neander, "Dogma (doctrine) does not form an original part of Christianity, but is derived and secondary. The essence of Christianity consists not in a system of ideas, (*begriffe*, definite conceptions,) but in a determinate direction of the life. ('*In einer Richtung des inneren Lebens*,' not 'tendency of the inner life,' as Ryland has it.) It is a pregnant saying of George Haman, that 'the pearl of Christianity is a hidden life in God, consist-

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\* See Preliminary Essay in Nevins' "Mystical Presence," or "Studien und Kritiken, for 1845."

† See his "System der Christlichen Lehren," § 23.

ing neither in dogmas, nor ideas, nor ceremonies.' Dogmas are only the form, obtained by thought and definite apprehension,—of that life which is rooted in God. (*'Form jenes in Gott wurzelenden Lebens,'* not 'that form of life rooted in God,' as Ryland renders it.) They may exist where the essence of Christianity is wanting, though without it their origination would have been impossible. Hence dogmatic differences may exist among men who, in virtue of the essence of Christianity, are perfectly at one. (*'Vermöge des Wessens des Christenthums einander gleich stehen,'* not as Ryland, 'who, in the essentials of Christianity, stand on an equal footing!') If Christ had originally established a definite system of ideas, as constituting the essence of Christianity, we should require in all Christians an identity of ideas. This, however, was not his intention. He himself spoke of Christianity as a leaven; that is, a divine power taking root in the soul. This leaven, deposited in the hearts of men, gradually transformed all the powers of the soul, by working outwards from within."\*

Neander, as will be seen at a glance, has more nearly freed himself from the trammels of idealism than many of his German contemporaries. This becomes even more apparent in his histories, notwithstanding the alleged want of objectivity in his conception of the Church. In his history of the "Planting and Training of the Church," he recognizes expressly "one article of faith, which constituted the essence of Christianity," and "one article," which "included the whole of Christian doctrine, though as yet the consciousness of its contents was not distinctly developed." Indeed, there is a kind of contradiction between the theory in the History of the Church, and the theory in the History of Dogmas; but it is a contradiction easily explained. In the first, he would account for the existence of an objective institution, the Church; and he must needs trace it in some way to the objective life of Christ, its Founder. In the second, he would follow the history of dogmas, (doctrines,) which must have existed in some form subjectively, before they existed objectively in the scientific forms of dogmatic statements; and

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\* See General Introduction in "History of Dogmas."



as he would oppose the heartless Rationalism that resolves the whole of Christianity into simple statements for the intellect, he seeks to ground it in the deepest consciousness of our being, making its essence to consist not so much in "definite conceptions," doctrines, "dogmas," as in "a determinate direction of the inner life."

There was, however, in the mind of Neander a latent recognition, though not formally expressed, of a distinction between doctrine (*Lehre*) and dogma. Precisely what that distinction was does not clearly appear. Sometimes the two terms plainly appear to be synonymous; sometimes doctrine seems intended to denote all the teachings of Christ, whether by example, by word, or by spirit; and dogma, "the mere human apprehension of divine truth." With this distinction agrees his definition and derivation of the term dogma. Contrary to most authors, he makes its original meaning, both etymologically and historically considered, to have been *an opinion, a notion*. In historical support of his meaning, he cites no authority from the fathers, but from Plato, from Sextus Empiricus, and from a quotation by Eusebius of Cæsarea, from Marcellus of Ancyra. Not entirely conclusive, it must be admitted, in the face of so great an array of patristic authorities quoted in defence of another meaning.\* The fathers evidently meant by dogmas, the ground truths or first principles of Christianity. But Neander wanted some term to distinguish between "the contents of revelation," as first communicated by Christ and his apostles, and the same as afterwards wrought by believers into doctrinal forms. Neander was too little trammelled by any system of philosophy, too true to the Scriptures, not to perceive the necessity of something to be communicated to the mind as the vehicle of spiritual life; though of that vehicle, it must be confessed, he speaks with indistinctness and perplexing uncertainty. Ullmann, as we have seen, distinguishes between

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\* See note on *δογμα*, in the *Dogmengeschichte* of Baumgarten Crucius; Kling on *Dogmengeschichte*, in Herzog's *Real Encyclopædie*; Nitzsch, *System der Christlichen Lehre* Aufl. 6, § 17, 3, ss. 52, 53. See *δογμα*, in Suicer's *Thesaurus*; also, the Catholic distinction between Dogma and Opinion in Möhler's *Symbolism*; Intro., Part I.

the "system of glorious facts" by which Christianity has diffused the "new life," and the doctrines (Neander's dogmas) by which that life has been represented. Both Neander and Ullmann (Twisten, with many others, might be included) agree in depreciating the value of dogmas or doctrines; both unite in exalting the "divine life," and both in recognizing some kind of indefinable *tertium quid* by which that life is to be communicated.

The immediate occasion of this school and its theory was rationalism; but the corner stone of its foundation was idealism. Neander rested in no distinctive metaphysical system; was at the farthest remove from Pantheism; but he was not unaffected by the prevalent idealism of his day. Hence his indefiniteness and apparent uncertainty in speaking of the original "contents" of the Christian Revelation. The *facts* to which this school constantly refer as communicating the divine life to men, we must recognize as unquestionable, and as constituting the immutable basis of Christianity. The Logos incarnate was a fact indisputable; His death on the cross was another fact; and so on to the end of the catalogue. Through these facts the new life was undoubtedly communicated to men. But by what process communicated, is the question? We answer unhesitatingly, by that process through which the facts conveyed to the mind some distinct conceptions; some ideas, more or less clearly defined. We regard it as a fundamental principle, both in a sound philosophy and in a true theology, that the soul of man possesses just so much precisely of positive knowledge as is awakened from without, and no more. No matter now for the theory of perception by which the knowledge comes; it still must be traceable to an objective world, and it can become knowledge only when coming distinctly into consciousness as thoughts. The mind accumulates knowledge only by thoughts; it thinks or works only by thoughts. It takes into itself a fact only as a thought, is moved by it, and reasons from it only as a thought. In truth, all facts,—that is, things done,—first exist as thoughts in the mind of the doer, and as thoughts are perpetuated among men. Thus the facts of Christianity first existed as the thoughts of

God, and alone as his thoughts are effective with man. And they are effective because they are distinctive thoughts and definite doctrines. By so much then as the facts of Christianity were distinguished above all other facts in the world's history, by precisely so much are the thoughts conveyed by them to men distinguished from all others as clearly defined doctrines.

When, therefore, Neander tells us that the essence of Christianity consists in a "determinate direction of the inner life," that it is a "leaven," and a "divine power taking root in the soul and the inner life," we ask, by what means was the direction given, and were the leaven and power communicated? Was it by sympathy? Was it by a holy contagion diffused by moral contact? No, would Neander reply, but by the "announcement of redemption" in the person of the "Redeemer of humanity, whose life must be viewed as a new creation in humanity." But the question still returns: by what process was this new created life communicated and perpetuated? "Born of the spirit," were not the disciples "begotten by the word of truth," "purified in obeying the truth through the spirit," and "born again by the word of God?" Both John the Baptist and Christ came *preaching* the kingdom of God, not personally communicating the spiritual life of that kingdom. Christ Jesus, while on earth, was pre-eminently a *Teacher* sent from God. He *taught* men before he baptized them with the Holy Spirit. He first indoctrinated his apostles, and then, after his resurrection and ascension, vivified his instructions by baptizing them with the life-giving Spirit. To Nicodemus he insisted on the doctrine of regeneration, and, as distinctly as could then be done, announced also the doctrine of His atoning death. These, with other cardinal truths, were the doctrines that, employed by the descending spirit at Pentecost, became in the hearts of the first Christians the regenerating power of God. It is still the distinctive doctrines of the Gospel that, made effective by the Holy Ghost, are the true leaven of humanity. As addressed to the intellect, Christianity is a form of doctrine; as addressed to the heart, it is a mode of life; to the one a "system of ideas;" to the other, an "inner life;" but it is a life that goes in by the under



standing as conviction, and nestles as living faith in the affections.

But there often lurks a treacherous ambiguity in the word doctrine; it should be determined what we mean by it. We suppose it to be used to denote a principle, a truth, an idea, an opinion, a tenet and a dogma. Primarily employed in the Scriptures to denote the mere act of instruction, then the style, manner or spirit of the instruction, it came gradually and naturally to stand for the truths taught. And as in process of time and of controversy there came necessarily to be a progressive scientific reduction of these truths into exact and logical statements, the natural designation of these was also doctrines. But theologians have differed widely in their conceptions of the truth. Hence the diversity of meanings to the word doctrine, when denoting their conceptions, being equivalent, now to truth, now to opinion, now to dogma. Many of the fathers, as we have seen, made a distinction between dogmas, or unquestionable truths of the Bible, and opinions, or the supposed logical deductions from the Bible. Dogma in their sense could be applicable only to the most limited number of first truths,—the mere elements of Christianity. But the very elements themselves became subjects of controversy and of differing interpretation; and it is not improbable that the attempt to dogmatise on these “elements,” to affirm them as axiomatic and incontrovertible, gave rise to that double meaning of the word, which has perpetuated itself through all theological literature, and shows itself in our language, in the almost exclusive restriction of the term, to an offensive meaning. We use the word doctrine in this article in its broadest sense, as expressive of all distinctive ideas of the Christian revelation, from those simply stated or implied, to those most accurately framed and sharply defined in the creeds.

There is also ambiguity in the phrase “spiritual life.”\* We

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\* It is surprising what progress has been made by theologians in their appreciation of the subjectivity of Christianity. The external objective treatment of theology by all the older Protestant theologians, Lutheran and Calvinist, is suggestive enough of the origin of the Mystics and Pietists. An attempted definition of spiritual life is one of the rarest things among the older writers. We

here use it as conveniently designating the totality of a Christian's emotions, will and affections. It denotes not merely a state of existence, but specially of satisfied existence, and pre-eminently a conscious satisfaction in the character, the provisions, and the requirements of God. Spiritual *death* in the New Testament is dissatisfaction and woe; spiritual life is joy and peace in the Holy Ghost. It consists of conscious thinking and conscious loving. Without thinking there is no loving; without an object of thought, there is no object of love; and without love no life. Life, as simple existence, is a profound mystery, wholly unknowable in its principles, discoverable even only by its phenomena, and when these are taken away, itself to us ceasing to be. So spiritual life consists for us solely of thoughts, will, emotions, affections. Remove these, and you take away all that we know of it; you extinguish it.

What, now, is the connection of this life with Christian doctrine? A connection there unquestionably is, but of what kind? That there subsists a relation intimate and inseparable between the Word of God and the salvation of the soul,\* is admitted on all hands. That the truth is the instrumental cause of both our regeneration and our sanctification, will be disputed by no one. On this point the Scriptures are explicit and emphatic. To become a Christian, *some* knowledge of Christ is indispensable. It might be bold to assert that no one becomes regenerate without the Word of God; it would be bolder to assert that any one can be saved without some apprehension, however feeble, and some perception, however faint, of Christ as a Saviour. Of the relation of Christian life to doctrine, as exact formal statements of truth, the most opposite views now prevail. Believers who hold the same doctrines and rejoice in a common life, differ both in their estimation of the value of doctrines and in their exposition of the relation of the doctrine to the life.

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append only one, and from Stapfer, vol. I., § 860. "Consistit vita animæ spiritualis in hoc, quando per communionem Entis actuosissimi ipsa etiam in operibus bonis actuosissima redditur, in summa Dei sapientia se oblectat et in fruitione sensus communionis ejus lætatur."

\* "All the words of this life."—Acts v., 20.

Spiritual life, analyze it as we may, presupposes some degree of knowledge. Life is made up of thought, love and joy; these necessitate an object to be thought of, and loved, and rejoiced in. Thus we find, that in the first consciousness of personal redemption there is always perception and love of the superhuman Redeemer; and the fervor of the love corresponds precisely with the distinctness of the perception; perception itself being dependent on antecedent doctrinal beliefs. True, before He is revealed in the soul He must be believed on, trusted, received. But *as whom* is He to be believed on and received? As merely human, or as also divine? Can He be believed *on* before He has in some sense been believed *in*? Could a Socinian, immovably grounded in the doctrines of the Racovian catechism, and a Presbyterian, imbued with the teachings of the Westminster standards, ever believe in the same Christ, and so become sharers of the same spiritual life? Can any one ever believe in Christ to the salvation of the soul till he has first a doctrinal conception and conviction of Christ as one able to save? The Apostles and first Christians believed on Christ to the salvation of their souls, but not till they had witnessed his miracles and accepted the doctrine of his superhuman dignity. They sought, too, at his hands the forgiveness of their sins, but not till they had first believed the doctrine of their sinfulness. Indeed Christianity, in every step of its progress among men, in every stage of its dealings with an individual soul, sends forward its doctrines in preparation for the coming of its life.

It must be admitted, that the doctrines as first taught were not scientifically defined, nor were they systematically arranged. Definition and systematic arrangement were a subsequent work, and a work of the human understanding, but a work which the progress of the race and the conflict of error with truth made a necessity. Under the guidance of finite and erring reason, opposing systems and belligerent creeds were inevitable. Surely the essence of Christianity consisted not in these systems and creeds. It is not these that we insist on as containing that essence. It is not these that Neander pronounces "not an original part of Christianity." He excludes



"ideas," or "definite conceptions" (*begriffe*); an exclusion unauthorized, we think, even if we restrict the origin of Christianity to the personal ministry of Christ, and totally unwarrantable if we take into account the ministry of the apostles. Surely the apostles preached "ideas," "fixed conceptions," and a definite "system of ideas;" a system so definite as to be distinctively styled "*the word of truth*," "*the word of faith*," "*the word of God*," and the "Gospel of Christ;" a Gospel with a system of ideas so definite, that if any man preach another, "let him," says Paul, "be accursed."

But is not the curse for those only who deny the *essentials*, or the fundamental truths of Christianity? Why insist on uniformity and precision in any extended collection of doctrines? Let us have freedom of opinion, so that we hold the essentials and possess the spirit of Jesus. What, then, are the essentials? Who shall determine them? Shall Calvin? According to his catechism, the fundamental principle of Christianity is a knowledge of God in Christ (*fundamentum ac principium est, eum in Christo novisse*); and the sum of this is to be found in the Apostles' creed. (*Hujus cognitionis summa in fidei confessione vel potius in formula confessionis quam inter se commune habent Christiani omnes, continetur. Eam vulgo Symbolum apostolorum vocant.*) The Heidelberg catechism, the highest authority with the German reformed churches, in like manner finds all in the Apostles' creed. Socinians and Rationalists have found all their essentials in the same. The latest Socinian neophyte has pronounced it "in his judgment the best short creed which he has ever seen." (See Sheldon's *Sin and Redemption*, p. 260.) Time would fail to enumerate the heresies that have ensconced themselves beneath it. Locke would resolve all essentials into the single declaration, "Jesus is the Christ." (See his *Reasonableness of Christianity*.) German theologians of the Neander school find all in the single article, "Christ is the only ground of salvation." Dr. Emmons, with a larger schedule, would first determine the "scheme of divine grace," and then include as essential "all the doctrines which are essential to compose this scheme." Whoever would see the formidable array of Cole-

ridge, let him read Aphorism seven, "on Spiritual Religion," in the "Aids to Reflection;" and if any one wishes a larger list still, let him open to the classification of Knapp, in section five of the Introduction of Lectures on Christian Theology. Or shall we all settle down on the nine simple articles of the Evangelical Alliance? Essentials there doubtless are, but what and how many they are, is yet to be determined.

But suppose the essentials of Christianity to be determined, still a system of doctrines must *necessarily* be evolved from them. A system of dogmatic ideas is an invariable condition of progress and vital energy. It is at once a cause and an effect of progressive intelligence and discipline. Faith demands progressive knowledge,—ever urges the intellect to clearer and more exact statements of what is believed. In proportion as Christianity has shot its roots deep into the heart of the race, it has brought forth the fruits of pious deeds and Christian doctrines. The historian Schaff profoundly remarks, "it is in the most active and fruitful times of the church that we find divinity (doctrinal theology) most flourishing." Equally true is it, that the times of greatest activity and precision in doctrinal theology are the most fruitful in Christian enterprises. It was the doctrines of the Reformation that gave it its power. It was immediately after the virus of Unitarianism had worked its way to the surface, and a reviving regard for purity of doctrine had warmed the heart of American Christians, that the spirit of American missions was begotten. And as with the race, so with the individual. In proportion to his practical obedience will be his knowledge of doctrines; and in proportion to the distinctness of his doctrinal conceptions and convictions will be the vigor of his piety. Thus by mutual reaction his faith and its object render aid to each other. His faith grows implicit as his doctrines take fuller form and sharper outline; and by a happy necessity his creed gains precision and completeness as he rises towards maturity of character.

Again, the fundamental principles of Christianity necessarily contain a system of truth. Truth, pre-eminently that of Christianity, is a unit, and any essential element of it must imply the existence of every other. Thus the divinity of Christ in-

volves the doctrines of the Trinity, the sinfulness of man, redemption, and justification by faith. Other essentials are equally pregnant. Indeed systems of all kinds are nothing more than the unfolded and adjusted contents of fundamental principles. There may be more or less completeness with proportionate error in the details, but no true system can contain more than its first truths logically require. Given the first truths of Christianity, and there can be but one just system of its doctrines. State the truths in general terms, let each one interpret them to his liking, and you have systems in conflict. But the New Testament uses no ambiguous phraseology in propounding them. To mistake them, therefore, is not so much to misinterpret as to pervert Scripture, and to betray a fatal obliquity of will. But it may be said, to evolve from these a heterodox system may not be to pervert but to misunderstand them; may betray not so much obliquity of will as confusion of thought and deficiency of logic. Why not then so stretch the mantle of our charity as to cover with its folds the shoulders of every subscriber of the Apostles' creed, heretic though he be? Why be so illiberal as to exclude from our fellowship the Pelagian, the Arian, the Socinian, the Universalist? Why send men to the abyss for insufficiency of logic? They hold the essentials; let us regard them as servants of the common Master. Let us, like the great and good Neander, treat the heresiarchs of the past, and the honest, though misguided errorists of to-day, as "fellow-helpers to the truth." For why make invidious distinctions? Why, in times of theological quiet, disturb the repose of the churches by the useless agitations of theological controversy? Why not especially be quiet just at this moment, when skilful operators in low earnest tones are conferring in preparation for that most astonishing of all horticultural feats in the history of time, wherein a slender shoot of the now decaying trunk of Unitarianism is to be deftly severed from the parent stock, and cunningly inserted in a vigorous branch of ancient orthodoxy, there, according to the law of the fruit-tree, to flourish renewedly, but to bear unmistakably the well-known fruit of the ingrafted scion? Why spoil the experiment by disturbing the nerves of the operators?



All this would be reasonable, liberality and charity would be in place, provided there were no distinction between truth and error, provided the distinction were not a question of life and death, and above all, provided there were any other test of the presence of the essentials so easily applied and unerring as one's doctrinal formulas. The truth is, a man's doctrines are the surest criterion for ascertaining his acceptance or rejection of the essentials. Not the sole criterion, surely, to the exclusion of the tests of morality, but incomparably the most reliable and decisive. The outward life or conduct may be one test; one kind of fruit by which the quality of the tree is to be known; but not an infallible one, aside from profession upon conscience of the doctrines believed. Spinoza and Hume might be faultless in outward life and blasphemous in belief. But an honest expression of belief is always an index of the interior life. The language of the doctrinal forms may be man's work and not God's; but his work so wrought as to reveal his fundamental conceptions and hidden springs of action. His creed is his systematic interpretation of the doctrines he has received. Each article of his creed is the exponent of his experience of a doctrinal truth, the index of a power in his soul. That power, the moving truth, lifted up by consciousness from the obscure regions of the emotions to the clear atmosphere of reflection, is described in the language of science, and the description is labelled "doctrine." But it was as doctrine that it first found its way through the understanding to the heart, and from the heart it returns as doctrine to the understanding, more intelligible and capable of a sharper definition. It has been felt and tested. We believe and write down axioms because we intuitively feel them to be true. Our doctrines in philosophy are our convictions of philosophic truth. So our Christian doctrines are only more or less accurate statements of our Christian experiences. As statements, they are invaluable in determining the ground of our experience, and the quantity and quality of the doctrines by which the experience has been produced.

Thus there may be a vast difference between a doctrine as first believingly received, and the same doctrine as subsequently reduced to a scientific formula. But the difference is purely

one of degree in precision and qualification. Becoming acquainted with doctrines in their relations, we gradually so define and adjust them as to furnish, at last, in our creed the totality of our faith. So has it been in the history of the race; so is it with every individual. Diverse and conflicting creeds have been written and fought for, and causes innumerable have contributed to the diversity. Some men are constitutionally Augustinian and others Pelagian—some Calvinists and others Arminians. A defective education, a false method of philosophy, and the collision of partisan interests, all may affect and mar our final definitions of doctrines which at the first we implicitly and heartily received. Schleiermacher, bred in the intelligent but child-like faith of Zinzendorf, yet blinded and bewildered by Rationalism and Pantheism, could propound a series of doctrines which were false to the life within him. So, too, to-day, there stands in one of the pulpits of New-England a professed Unitarian of commanding influence, and in the estimation of many, of true piety (reminding one of the saying of Coleridge, "Unitarianism is not Christianity, though Unitarians may be Christians"), who in childhood stood by the knee of a godly mother, but who, educated at Cambridge, emphatically proclaims and defends the heartless creed of Socinus. Thus there may be misapprehension and misstatement of the truths that have moulded our inward being. But without some conscious, discriminating, and saving reception of these truths at the outset, there can have been in the soul no true Christian life.

Why, then, lay so much stress upon doctrinal formularies, and make a man an offender for a creed? Why not rely on those nameless but unmistakable signs of the inward life, which the Christian instinct so readily recognizes as evidence alike of its presence and power? But this instinct, if it be merely human, like any other instinct belonging to rational creatures, should be under the guidance of reason; and if it be supernatural, still we are not, like Christ, "of quick understanding in discerning the fear of the Lord." We need helps and tests. For one who is ever with us, the nameless, numberless signs of the indwelling life are more assuring than creeds.

But for a generation, a denomination, we need some reliable gauge of the inner life; this gauge the creed alone can furnish. When we would determine the original type of piety in a denomination, it is to its confession that we can appeal as an infallible criterion. Individuals may subsequently misunderstand or wilfully belie it; whole sects may finally repudiate it, like the French Reformed, but that a whole denomination will deliberately perjure themselves, is impossible.

Nor does it suffice to say, that the creed or confession is most commonly the work of a single mind, and, therefore, cannot express the piety and the convictions of a great denomination. Individuals cannot be so isolated from their generation and sect. One man, be he ever so great in intellect or heart, is not so much a *controller* of his generation and sect, as he is their mouth-piece for speaking out the common conviction. He is prominent and a leader, only because the volcanic power of underlying conviction has thrown him, with his larger endowments and livelier sensibilities, above the common level of his day. But mere personal distinction can make no one man's confession to become a denominational standard. It would be absurd to speak of the creed of Lord Bacon as the confession of his contemporaries. Both Zwingli and Calvin wrote formularies of faith that never attained to the dignity of symbols or public confessions.\* No confession can become symbolical unless it mirror the common experience. Mirroring that experience, no formal act is requisite to give it authority; just as the catechisms of Luther, though never formally proclaimed as authoritative, were yet so revered as to be styled, in the epitome of the formula of concord, the "Bible of the Laity," (*"eos quasi laicorum Biblia esse censeamus."*) So, too, with the Heidelberg Catechism, written by Ursinus; a production which some of the older German Reformed authors attributed to a species of divine inspiration. It could attain its high authority only because, as Dr. Nevin of Mercersburg has said, "Ursinus, in the preparation of it, was the organ of a religious life far more general and

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\* There would be much instruction on this whole subject in the history of the terms, Creed, Symbol, Consensus, Confession, Standard, Formulary, Articles of Faith, Platform, &c.



comprehensive than his own." To determine, then, the piety of a denomination or of an individual, an indispensable criterion is the standard of faith.

It serves also as a safeguard to the pulpit. It is a crucial test for the detection of the incompetent and the unworthy. No church ever preserved a sounder faith or a purer piety than the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and of America. None was ever more scrupulous in exacting from its ministers agreement with its standards. The Church of England has been as much less successful in self-protection as its articles are less sound than those of the Presbyterian "standards," and its polity more attractive to the ambitious and worldly. The fate of a church without a creed is legible to all men in the present impotency of the Reformed Church of France, whose repeated declarations for a century past have been, that it "rejects all confessions of faith," and "that the Holy Scriptures are its only rule of belief, and there is no infallible interpreter of this rule on earth." The same fate, in perspective, may be seen in the hopeless confusions of the Unitarians and the Campbellites, whose watchword has ever been that insanest of shibboleths, "no creed but the Bible." As Baptists, let us profit by the warning. For ourselves, we never hear a man prating about the trammels of a creed, that we do not at once suspect shallowness of piety, or muddiness of intellect, or heresy of faith. Christian experience, which is a testing of revealed truth, will be deep or superficial, in proportion to the strength of our doctrinal convictions, and these again to the clearness of our doctrinal conceptions. A man of piety, clear-headed and sound in the faith, should need no urging to express in language the most exact, the doctrines that have moulded his character.

When our vapid declaimers grow warm against the creeds, do they know what they are assailing? Have they ever be-thought themselves of the origin or significance of a Confession? When grave men wrote down their beliefs, deliberately signed to them their names, ready to defend with their blood what they had tested and treasured in their hearts, they wrote what all men should respect. We are wanting in language to express our disgust for the unseemly flippancy with which their

confessions are assailed. Preachers who grow sentimental, as well as patriotic, when they descant on the Declaration of American Independence, become ungracious and unchristian when they speak of the declarations of men to whom truth was dearer than life.

A man's confession, moreover, has a mighty power of reaction on his heart. We mean, of course, by confession, not that which, as Mr. Carlyle has it, is "from the mere argumentative region of him," but that which he "does practically believe and know for certain." There springs from the heart no thought embodying itself in words, that sways not with mysterious energy the depths from which it springs. Immeasurable is the power of thoughts that look towards eternity. Such thoughts or doctrines react on the conscience and the affections, and multiply their kind. No doctrine, be it true or false, ever roots itself in the soul, that does not in due time, like the banyan tree, cover the whole area of the heart with its thousand trunks, every one of which but strengthens and multiplies the original stock. How subtle the power of a catechism over one who lovingly learns it from childhood! That was a remarkable meeting at Edinburgh, in 1843, in celebration of the Bicentenary of the meeting of divines at Westminster; but nothing in that meeting was more remarkable, than the enthusiasm of the speakers whenever they touched on the catechism and the confession. No language seemed too strong for their emotions. All that was tender in the religious associations of childhood, all that was hallowed in the memories of Christian experience, seemed to hang around those precious symbols. There was no depreciation or forgetfulness of the Bible; but the great doctrines of the Bible, set in the exact language of the symbols like fixed stars in their spiritual firmaments, had shed a benign radiance on their spirits through every bitter night of their pilgrimage. Who shall measure the power of that catechism and confession on the heart of the Scottish people?

The value of doctrinal digests or confessions in our day, cannot be determined by an appeal to the period preceding their historical development. The first victories of Christianity may have been won without the weapons of exact doctrinal formu-

las, but not without some kind of doctrinal weapon. The first Christians used such as their day afforded and required; but they never waged battle without them. They made no speeches, wrote no letters, to Jews or Gentiles, in which they did not, with all possible zeal and accuracy, evolve and condense for their hearers and readers the doctrines of the facts of Christianity. In the light of progressive science, and under the double pressure of false philosophies and heretical theologies, successive generations have but proceeded in the work of reducing to formal statements and systematic order the doctrinal teachings of the apostles. The work has been necessary alike as a discipline of the mind and heart of believers, and as a protection of the church against the enemy within her border. The invariable and necessary accompaniment of the Bible now, is a system of doctrines. It is idle and absurd to think of now reading it without an immediate, and a more or less distinct, doctrinal conception of its teachings. The most rampant declaimer against creeds and dead doctrines carries ever with him his formulas, which he stretches upon the texts he reads, and determines, as precisely as he may, the doctrinal contents of each. Dr. Emmons was right when he startled a New England audience by declaring that every man read the Bible with his creed in his hand. It is absurd, therefore, to decry doctrinal forms because not found in the New Testament.\* They *are* there to every intelligent modern reader. No intelligent man in a Christian land, begins the Christian life where the first Christians began.

The Baptist denomination has no one formulary,† and never

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\* See Archbishop Whately, "On the omission of a system of articles of faith from the Scriptures;" Essay six, in his "Peculiarities of the Christian Religion."

† There is a collection of articles, commonly known as the "New-Hampshire Confession," and frequently referred to by other denominations, as the "Baptist Symbol." This is an entire mistake. It is repudiated by a great many ministers and churches, even in the limited portion of our country where alone it has been adopted. It is a discredit to us; it is the creed of Mr. Facing-both-ways. It is a Calvinistic formulary, with an Arminian undertone of interpretation; "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." We are sorry to see this Confession reprinted, and helped into notice, in Dr. Hiscox's excellent "*Baptist Church Directory*," recently published.



can have. Our ideas of church independency preclude its possibility. A kind of traditional confession we undoubtedly have ; but, as with the English constitution, individuals differ in their understanding of it. Single churches have published their confessions ; associations of churches have done the same. It was done by seven Baptist churches in London, in 1643 ; by an association of delegates from one hundred Baptist churches, in 1689 ; and afterwards by the Philadelphia Baptist Association in this country. But neither of these is now entitled, if, indeed, it ever was, to be called the symbol of the Baptist denomination. No complete collection of its articles could now be made that would secure unanimous assent. A compilation that could command a majority in one half of our country would not be received in the other. And yet no denomination in this country is more united in its faith.\* Our union, moreover, has been attributed directly to the absence of a denominational standard. Not a very satisfactory explanation, surely. The truth, rather, is, that with all our church independency, our doctrinal purity has been preserved by a double influence ; partly by our inflexible adherence to the principles of " baptism and church membership only on profession of personal faith in Christ," and partly by an incidental protection from the symbols of our neighbors, the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists, who, taking organic form at about the same time with ourselves, have more steadily than we kept their confessions prominently in sight, as authoritative standards. Though we have rejected infant baptism, infant church membership, and presbytery, we yet in other respects have tacitly and substantially adopted the Westminster confession.

In New-England, the Cambridge Platform, which was only a slight modification of the Westminster Confession, has, through the Congregationalists, affected materially the faith of the Baptists. As the New-England Congregationalists have stepped off their Platform, in various squads, under the guid-

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\* "How do we (the Presbyterian church) get along with our extended confession? We could not hold together a week if we made the adoption of all its propositions a condition of ministerial communion." Dr. Hodge, in the Princeton Review. July, 1858.

ance of Hopkins, and Emmons, and the younger Edwards, so Baptists have furnished their quota of adherents to the several parties. In New-England, a large proportion of our churches and pastors have gradually adopted the New-England theology, while in the Middle and Southern States, the great majority have harmonized, in all principal points, with the Old School Presbyterians, or with the Westminster Confession. Having no one authoritative standard of our own, we have too often listened to the magisterial tones of those who have.

Our want of an authoritative standard is often seen in our councils for ordination. We apply our traditional tests, and too often questions are propounded by individuals, quite as much for the purpose of finding out the opinions of the council, as of the candidate. We have seen candidates utterly bewildered by a curiosity that cared but very little for their individual opinions. A concise, complete, orthodox symbol, would be both a guide and a shield to the candidate, as well as a test in the hands of the council. We advocate the introduction of no binding, compulsory instrument; the thought of one would be idle and absurd. We would exercise in the use of the best that could be drawn up, a license larger, even, than Luther gave, when, in the preface of his smaller catechism, he enjoined on the clergy a rigid adherence to its forms in popular ministrations, but bids them use their liberty when speaking among the doctors. (*Alia autem ratio est, si in turba doctorum hominum evangelium doceas.*) We would advocate no such broad distinction as Presbyterians make, between the doctrinal qualifications of candidates for the ministry, and those of candidates for church membership. In requisites for the church, we regard them as dangerously lax; in requisites for the ministry, as injuriously rigid. Their only qualification for *communion* is *sincerity of discipleship*—a qualification that could be successfully pleaded by every heresiarch in Christendom. And requisites for the ministry which shut out of the pulpit, but not from the church—which distinguish between a communion of the clergy, and a communion of the laity, we hold to be unscriptural, and injurious. That was a spectacle for men to wonder at, and long remember, when the Old School assembly

of the Presbyterian Church, whose clergy shrink not from breaking bread to Pelagian and Papist, Episcopalian and Puritan, Socinian, Arian, Universalist, Spiritualist, so they be, "in the judgment of charity, the sincere disciples of Christ,"\* deliberately declined an invitation to communion, from their brethren of the New School assembly, who hold and teach the same confession and catechism with themselves.† As Baptists, we distinguish in degree, between what is requisite in the candidate for baptism, and what in the candidate for ordination ;‡ but we do not regard as fit for the first, the man who is *heretically* disqualified for the second. When we eject from the pulpit, we exclude from the church. To hold in the bosom of the church a heretic who is too dangerous to be allowed to speak his sentiments in public, is inconsistent and dangerous. It only conceals the poison, it does not eradicate it.

Never was there an age when sharply defined doctrines in the pulpit were more needed than now. They never were more needed, because they were never more rarely heard. We may lull ourselves into quiet, and doctrinal laxity, under the impression that the revivals now current, those indubitable phenomena and signs of a great religious revolution, are the legitimate fruits of latitudinarianism ; but it will require no lengthened period to show us, that without careful indoctrination of Christian men and women, without creeds sharply defined, and rigidly interpreted, our Christian churches will become an easy prey to the clear-headed dogmatists of the physical and metaphysical schools of scepticism.

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\* See declaration of the General Assembly, in 1839, the year following the great division.

† This actually took place, in Philadelphia, when the Old and New School Assemblies happened to meet there at the same time.

‡ A distinction between *norma credendorum*, and *norma docendorum*, is well-founded, and ancient, but it is a distinction in degree, not in kind. The deliverances of the General Assembly on things allowable in their members, are instructive ; they "must be subject to the discipline of the church," "not Universalists," "not Sabbath mail-stage proprietors," nor "postmasters that officiate on Sunday." Infant baptism may be omitted, or intoxicating drinks used, as the session "shall decide, in view of all the attendant circumstances." See Assembly's Digest ; Baird's Collection, pp. 32-33.



## ARTICLE II.—PLATO.

HE who stands on the Acropolis of Athens, sees, at the distance of nearly a mile and a half to the northwest, an extensive grove of olives stretching across the plain. Near the border of this grove rises a small hill, from whose summit gleams the white shaft of a marble monument. This hill is the site of the ancient Colonus, the birth place of the poet Sophocles. The marble structure which surmounts it is the tomb of Karl Ottfried Mueller, who, a few years ago, was sun-struck while making excavations at Delphi, and lies fittingly buried amidst the scenes to whose illustration he brought the genius, taste, and erudition of the accomplished scholar. Scarcely more than a hundred yards distant from this hill is a spot which, from as early as the fifth century before Christ, through all the fluctuations of succeeding time, has borne the name of Academia or Academy. It was anciently enclosed by a wall, laid out in shaded walks and gardens, planted with olive and plane trees, and adorned with altars, temples, and statues. All these have been swept away. Garden and walk have disappeared; temple and statue have crumbled or been removed; and some scattered marble fragments are the only relics of its architectural and sculptured beauties. But the limpid Cephissus still pours through it its half-moaning waters; the olive groves still shed over it their luxuriant and fadeless green; and the nightingale, the Attic bird, still

“Trills her thick-warbled notes the summer long,”

as sweetly as when they blended with those strains of divine philosophy which flowed from the lips of the great master of the academy. That master was Plato. We are treading the precincts of that celebrated school which, under successive transformations, continued until terminated by Justinian in

the sixth century of our era, but whose doctrines still hold, as they held anciently, divided empire in the realm of philosophy. Of its illustrious founder we propose to sketch, in brief outline, the life, literary character, and philosophical opinions; after which we shall endeavor to follow those opinions as they have entered into the philosophical and theological thinking of the world.

Plato was born in Athens (according to some in Ægina), in May (7 Thargelion), 430 years B. C., just at the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war; and died at the advanced age of eighty-two, in 348, ten years after Philip had ascended the throne of Macedon, and just, therefore, when the conscious close grapple was commencing between the rising genius of Macedon, and the waning, but still splendid fortunes of the Athenian Republic. His birth coincides with the moment when the Athenian Empire had reached its climax, and Athens was in the full flush of her political supremacy. His ripened youth witnessed the temporary complete prostration of Athens at the feet of her great rival, Sparta. His manhood saw the vigorous and successful struggles by which Athens retrieved her disastrous fortunes, and partially reasserted her former dominion; and his old age beheld—whether with prophetic foreboding we know not—the gathering of those elements of danger on Greece's northern frontier, which, though held in check for a time by the eloquence and statesmanship of Demosthenes, burst forth at length in a resistless storm of conquest and subjugation, on the plains of Chæronea.

But, though Plato had “fallen on evil days” with respect to the political greatness of Athens, it was otherwise with her intellectual. Her military supremacy was convulsive and short lived; but she held her intellectual state with the calm majesty of a legitimate title and conscious power. Her material greatness culminated with the age of Pericles; but her intellectual glory went on deepening and broadening through succeeding generations, and threw its most brilliant lustre over the twilight of her political decline. In the days of Plato Athens still stood fresh and beautiful as when she emerged from the hands of Phidias and his fellow artists; her stage

still shone with the lustre shed over it by her great tragic triumvirate; while history, eloquence, and philosophy, the latest in ripening, and the most important and enduring of the products of a nation's intellect, now developed their noblest elements of power, and gave its fitting consummation and crown to the splendid career of Grecian genius.

Plato could boast an illustrious ancestry. He traced back his paternal lineage to Codrus; his maternal to Solon. His original name was Aristocles, which was changed to Plato (*Πλατὺς*, *broad*), whether from the amplitude of his shoulders, his forehead, his chest, or his diction, the antiquarians seem not fully to have decided. His subsequent renown clothed his infancy with prophetic wonders. A parentage from Apollo was alone worthy of the divine philosopher, and bees settled on his infant lips, portending the honeyed sweetness of his style. His education was conducted, probably, under the ablest masters of education that his age produced. Gymnastics and music—under music being included grammar, poetry, and elegant literature—trained his body and mind into a symmetrical development. Cratylus, a distinguished Heracleitan, made him thoroughly conversant with the doctrines of the celebrated Ionian; and the eager and careful study of Anaxagoras, gave him the latest and best results of the pre-Socratic physics. The exuberant fancy which he subsequently lavished on the subtleties of dialectics, at first overflowed in poetical essays, epic, lyric, and dramatic. But he burned his epics on comparing them with Homer, and when in his twentieth year he fell under the influence of Socrates, he yielded his whole soul to the spell of that great intellectual enchanter, and devoted himself to philosophy, with the conviction that he was here dealing with that essence and soul of harmony of which rythmical numbers are but the sensuous and shadowy embodiment. He was a pupil—undoubtedly an intimate and favorite pupil—of Socrates during the last eight or nine years of that great reformer's life, and became alike thoroughly imbued with his high ethical principles, and master of his searching and potent dialectics. Plato alone, of all the disciples of Socrates, seems fully to have appreciated the



intellectual greatness, and seized the scientific conceptions of his master. Hence, while others, looking at single aspects of the Socratic teaching, framed one-sided systems which rather caricatured than fairly represented it, Plato was able to seize its germs in all their scientific fulness and fruitfulness, and to develop them into a system in which, while admitting elements that Socrates would undoubtedly have disavowed, his fundamental method and principles were yet faithfully adhered to and splendidly illustrated.

After the death of Socrates, Plato repaired to Megara, where Euclid, a former fellow disciple, had opened a school, in which he sought to engraft the Socratic ethics on the stock of the Eleatic idealism. To the ideas and impulses here acquired, we owe very probably that group of more strictly dialectical dialogues, in which he seeks to establish, against the Heraclitean doctrine of absolute multiplicity, and the Eleatic assumption of absolute unity, the true idea of science. From Megara he visited Crete, Egypt, Magna Grecia, and Sicily. His residence in Egypt yielded apparently no large contribution to his stock of philosophical ideas. In Magna Grecia, however, the original home of Pythagoreanism, and where it still mainly flourished, he seems to have made himself thoroughly conversant with the tenets of that philosophy. From this system he drew that large element of mathematical physics which so essentially characterized it, his tendency to political speculation, and in part, doubtless, his love of mythical and allegorical imagery; while its doctrine of unity developing itself in multiplicity, admirably coalesced with, and mediated between, the sensuous fluctuations of Heracleitus, and the rigid ideal unity of the Eleatics. His visit to Sicily we pass over as philosophically unimportant. Thus, after about ten years of foreign residence and travel, in the ripeness of early manhood, Plato returned to Athens, and opened a school in his garden near the Academy. From a mind so richly endowed by nature, early imbued with the best Grecian culture, trained for nearly ten years in the severe logic and lofty morality of Socrates, stimulated and enriched by leisurely and extensive foreign travel, during which it had successively surveyed and

compassed all the great classified forms of the wisdom of its age, great results might rightfully be expected. That Plato himself appreciated his position appears from that recorded saying, in which, with the Greeks' characteristic ungallantry, he congratulated himself that he was born a human being, and not a brute; a man, and not a woman; a Greek, and not a barbarian; and, above all, an Athenian of the age of Socrates. That he met nobly the claims of his position, the history of the world bears witness.

The life of Plato flowed henceforth in an even tenor, broken only by two visits to Syracuse, neither of them attended by very flattering results. One was made in the hope of realizing, through the newly crowned younger Dionysius, his ideal Republic. But the tyrant proved himself of refractory mettle, and the perfect Commonwealth still slumbered in Utopia. Plato never married, never mingled in public affairs, and seems to have regarded the constitution and character of his native city with disfavor, and almost despair. He spent a tranquil old age, surrounded by favorite disciples, partly employed in teaching, partly in composing and correcting those immortal works, to which, far beyond his oral instructions, he owes his influence and fame. In 348 B. C., he sunk peacefully into that sleep of which he, perhaps, beyond any other Pagan, indulged the hope that it was the soul's awakening to a purer and more perfect life.

The writings of Plato were favorites alike with Pagan and Christian antiquity, and hence have come down to us in a state of unwonted completeness and textual purity. Indeed, his name seems to have been the cover under which some lesser authors have chosen to take their chance for immortality; for a few, perhaps half a dozen, smaller pieces incorporated with his works are undoubtedly spurious. German criticism, indeed, with that sagacious, perverse, overreaching ingenuity, which it has shown in manipulating Homer and the Bible, has sought to strip Plato of a much larger portion of the works which bear his name. Until, however, the invaders of the Platonic territory come to some sort of an understanding, as to the real point and grounds of attack,—so long as one stoutly defends

what another fiercely assails,—the peace-loving student of Plato may safely leave their battles to themselves, satisfied that they are more likely to demolish each other than to wrest from Plato any considerable section of the territory which antiquity has assigned to him. His writings bear nearly all the form of dialogues. Their composition extended, doubtless, over a large portion of his life, and are to be judged rather as marking different stages of philosophical development, than as expositions of a perfectly matured and formal system. True, the care which Plato ever expended on his works, would lead him naturally to retouch his earlier compositions, with reference both to their literary merits, and still more to the harmonizing of their doctrines with his more matured convictions. Still, this process could be but partial; and the more so, as Plato himself probably never attained to a complete and rounded system, and to the last regarded himself less as having “attained,” than as a questioner, an experimenter in the school of philosophy.

This places us in the right point of view for estimating the Platonic writings. It guards us against the one extreme of looking upon them as the incoherent fancies of a magnificent dreamer, and the opposite extreme of seeking in them a perfectly adjusted and complete system. Both assumptions are equally impossible. The former is impossible because Plato was a philosopher, with a philosopher's ceaseless striving after truth and unity. The latter is impossible from the nature of the problem which he undertook to solve, that, viz., of first settling the proper method of science; and then, of moulding into harmony the manifold and warring elements of Greek speculation. Not, perhaps, that Plato formally and consciously set himself to this task. But such was the breadth and many-sidedness of his mind that he could not refrain from grasping and drawing within his sphere of inquiry, every distinctly marked train of speculation. To the end of his life, therefore, Plato's dialogues were, in part indeed, expositions of certain great central truths on which he felt himself securely planted; but in part, illustrations of a method, trials of the force and temper of his dialectics, hesitating incursions into a



territory which he could not yet claim to have subjugated. Some smaller dialogues on specific ethical points are probably to be referred to his more strictly Socratic period. His residence in Megara produced, doubtless, the noble tetralogy of the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Parmenides*; and finally to the period after his return from his travels with his accumulated stores of thought, belong those splendid compositions, the *Phædrus*, the *Symposium*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phædon*, the *Philebus*, the *Republic*, the *Timæus*, and the *Laws*; though in what order it is impossible to decide, except that we may naturally regard the *Phædrus* as the earliest work of this period, while the *Laws*, by universal admission, is among the latest. This general arrangement seems to spring almost necessarily out of the course of the Platonic development. It assigns to the period of his pupilage under Socrates those dialogues which discuss specific ethical doctrines, and expose the pretensions of the sophists in the purely Socratic spirit. It assigns to the next stage, when, withdrawn from the direct teachings of his master, he felt the influence of the Megaro-Eleatic speculations, the dialogues which determine the conception of science, and develop his doctrine of ideal forms. And finally, it reserves the more constructive dialogues, in which physics, ethics, politics, appear united, pervaded, and controlled by this central doctrine, and tinged by the ascetic spirit, and the mythical and mystical tendencies of Pythagoreanism, to that later period when he had felt the full influence of that school, and when his ripened intellect was naturally seeking to harmonize all the varied elements of its culture.

Plato is one of the most fascinating writers that ever undertook to expound the enigmas of philosophy. He spreads the exuberance of an exhaustless fancy over the subtlest controversies of the dialectician. With the profoundness of the sage he combines the brilliancy of the poet; with the severity of the earnest votary of truth he unites the laughing playfulness of the child. That Plato could have written the *Iliad* is doubtless as impossible as that Homer could have produced the *Theætetus* or the *Republic*. But in the field of philosophy he displays

the noblest characteristics of the great epic bard whom, after wreathing his head with flowers and burning incense to him as a god, he exiles from his ideal Republic. The same boundlessness of invention, the same exuberant overflow of joyous imagery, the same sweet and transparent flow of diction, the same rapid alternation of simplicity and grandeur, the same Greek vivacity and Greek garrulity which are conspicuous in Homer, shed a perpetual charm over the pages of Plato.

And while Plato is scarcely less epic than the great master of the Epos, he is even more dramatic than the great masters of the drama. He adopted the form of dialogue primarily, no doubt, as springing directly from his conception of the true philosophic spirit and method; as representing most perfectly his attitude of an inquirer, and his favorite method, inherited from Socrates, of following out truth by close, continuous question and answer. In dialogue he could throw objections into the mouths of his speakers which would justify repetitions of statement, and a diffuseness of illustration, hardly compatible with the graver form of the essay. But whatever its primary origin, Plato could not but be drawn to it by the scope which it gave for his unrivaled dramatic powers. This is doubtless, beyond any other single element, the secret of Plato's fascination. Cicero's dialogues are essays under the dialogue form—mere dry skeletons of conversation. Plato's dialogues seem sections cut out from the actual discourse of living men, and these men Greeks, with Greek acuteness, wit, vivacity and intelligence. A few graphic lines bring the scene distinctly before us. The characters are portrayed and individualized by a few slight but effective touches. The subject of discourse is introduced in that easy, circuitous, seemingly unconscious manner, in which a company of intelligent persons glide imperceptibly into a discussion, the predetermined theme being made to hang on some accidental remark, or spring from some casual association. As in actual life, too, the conversation plunges into the very midst of the subject, and is then gradually forced back by the exigencies of the argument to the preliminary topics, so that the first in the logical order is liable to appear last in the discussion. How utterly unlike are Plato's method and Aristotle's,

may be seen by comparing their two treatises on the soul. The work of Aristotle is one of the dryest of abstract discussions; the work of Plato is one of the most animated and picturesque of dramas.

And the same life-like, conversational character which marks the opening of the dialogue, follows it to its close. It drifts, it lingers, it winds along in an easy and graceful current; it turns aside at the beck of any incidental thought; it gives to the dryest abstractions coloring and warmth from the living personality of the speakers; and finally, it terminates just as the discourse of a company of intelligent persons terminates, who have had a free and animated discussion, sifted to the bottom individual points, raised and canvassed objections, ascertained perhaps where the truth did *not* lie, and then separated without professing to have reached a formal and satisfactory result. And throughout, laughing sportiveness, grave irony, keen satire, delicate banter, picturesque illustration, and occasionally elaborate and gorgeous fable, shed their varied fascinations over the discussion. The diffuseness thus generated would no doubt be scarcely tolerated in a writer of our day. With our shelves groaning with numberless important authors demanding our attention, we insist that each shall utter his plea in the briefest space, and give way to the rival claimant. Plato wrote when philosophical literature was hardly an appreciable quantity. He wrote, too, not merely as a philosopher, but as an artist. His comprehensive mind united, in an intense degree, the leading qualities of his nation. He was a Greek of the Greeks. With the Greek passion for knowledge he blended, in equal measure, the Greek passion for beauty; the sharp philosophical acumen with the fine æsthetic sense, in whose union that extraordinary people stand as yet without a rival. Hence Plato must not be judged as the mere philosopher; we must not apply to his writings the rigid and narrow rules to which he never held himself amenable. His productions were not intended, like those of Aristotle, merely to set forth so much philosophy. They were the vehicle at once of his philosophical views, his moral yearnings, and his literary tastes, and were moulded to gratify his æsthetic sense. That Plato adopted this form of authorship no



man of taste can regret; for it has given us, with all that is valuable in his philosophy, that which is far more valuable than could be any formal philosophy of his age; and it has scattered the flowers of sentiment and humor, taste and imagination, over about as thorny a path of dialectics as could well be opened. For if Plato is too much of an artist to be a mere dialectician, he is too much of a philosopher to sacrifice dialectics to art. If he relaxes, for a moment, the rigor of his dialectical method, it is only that he may tighten his grasp yet more closely; and the luckless wights whom Puck undertook to lead on a will-o'-the-wisp chase,

"Thorough bush, thorough briar,  
Thorough flood, thorough fire,"

had a light task compared with his who pursues, without flinching, the path of the Platonic dialectics.

It will be readily inferred, from what we have said, that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish in Plato his jest from his earnest, his play of fancy from his serious argument. Sometimes, too, in the rich, mythical drapery flung over the discussion, as in the *Phædrus*, the *Phædon*, the *Symposium*, the *Timæus*, it is difficult to determine how far the wing of the poet is bearing up the flight of the philosopher; how far the severe form of science is hid behind the changeful and many-hued garb of fiction. Still, Plato never employs myths without a meaning, and sometimes he expressly assures us that though he will not vouch for the literal truth of the scenic representation, he is satisfied that it shadows forth a substantial verity. It thus often resembles the parabolic imagery of the New Testament, and he who reads the solemn fable illustrating future retribution at the close of the *Gorgias*, and the splendid imagery which sets forth the state of future blessedness, near the close of the *Phædon*, may be pardoned if he is reminded of the Saviour's parable of Dives and Lazarus, or of the Apocalyptic vision of the New Jerusalem.

It will again be readily seen that to Plato, less than to almost any other professed philosopher, can justice be done by any analysis of his doctrines. The incidental discussions, the

splendid myths, the lofty morality, the profound religiousness (the latter an extraordinary phenomenon among the mercurial, speculating, sensuous Greeks), the earnestness with which he everywhere enforces his moral and religious convictions—these can be incorporated into no systematized sketch of his doctrines, and yet in these, far more than in his formal dogmas, lie his fascination and his power. It must be confessed of Plato, as of all the Greek speculative thinkers, that if we try him by the mere scientific connection and coherence of his system, as a whole, or even in its more vital parts,—if we demand from him, as the condition of success, a well organized and symmetrical structure of opinion, we must pronounce him to have failed. His physics had never sufficient value to demand a formal refutation. In ethics, he adheres to the vital error, so characteristically Greek, which identifies virtue with intelligence. His ideal Republic is a splendid—and not altogether splendid—Utopia. His proofs of immortality reveal rather the impotence, than the strength of reason, when dealing with spiritual truths; and even his celebrated doctrine of the “forms” (ideas) must be transformed beyond the recognition of its author, before it can be brought to harmonize with the best established teachings of modern psychology. Yet with all these abatements, Plato is not only one of the most delightful, but one of the most instructive of writers. Even when he leads us to no definite goal, he conducts us through a splendid country, and opens to us perpetual vistas of beauty and grandeur. Even when he does not satisfy the intellect, he nourishes the spirit. He spreads around us an exhilarating and bracing moral atmosphere. He imparts to us his own hearty faith in the reality of truth, and the supremacy of goodness. His failures are in the province of the lower understanding, growing out of the materials upon which he had to work, and the insolubleness of the problems with which he grappled; his triumphs consist in reaching essential, even when not formal truths, in the grandeur of his moral ideas, and the breadth of his intellectual surveys. His failures were inevitable, they belonged to his position, his nation, and his age; his excellencies, to himself. Even in his errors, the truth

is often deeper than the error; for the latter is but the attempt of the understanding to interpret the dim conception of the reason, or to embody the lofty moral aspirations. Hence, when the superficial error has been discredited, the language adjusts itself to the deeper truth, of which it might be regarded rather as an inadequate expression, than as the direct contradiction. The large and generous spirit of Platonism is the mould in which the noblest philosophies of earth may be cast.

We pass to a brief exposition of Plato's leading doctrines. For this we must transport ourselves into his time, and learn the problems with which he had to deal, the inheritance of ideas to which he succeeded. No finite mind can tear itself from its antecedents, or make itself independent of its relations. The utmost force of originality will still take the subject-matter, the direction, and the coloring of its speculations from without, and, perhaps, the largest minds generally feel most powerfully the pressure of their age. To understand Plato, we must un-Anglicise and un-Germanize ourselves, and plunge into the very heart of Greek speculative life. Plato is the consummation of the Greek philosophical thinking of two centuries.

Before Socrates, Greek philosophy had been almost purely objective. Philosophers had sought to solve the problems of the external world, but scarcely turned their thoughts to an investigation into the knowing faculty, or the nature of science itself. This advance was left for Socrates; he made it the philosopher's first business to "know himself," and, as a chief element of this self-knowledge, to scrutinize the nature of his own conceptions. "He first," says Aristotle, "introduced inductive reasonings, and based upon them general definitions, or universals." He clearly, therefore, laid the foundation of distribution into species and genera. His grand and perpetual aim was to compel men to define to themselves their own ideas; to determine the general conception under which they might group the particulars that floated loosely in their minds. Thus the person who, in reply to his inquiry, "What is virtue?" began to enumerate the various virtues, or met the question "What is beauty?" by a mention of the various beautiful objects



was instantly informed that he was altogether too lavish of his information. The interrogator would not trouble him to detail all the varieties of beautiful or virtuous manifestation, but would be satisfied with a statement of the single quality that underlies and pervades the class. Thus he pushed down after the central idea which unites a group of kindred phenomena. What is it that makes all beautiful things beautiful, all good things good, all virtuous things virtuous? What is it?—this was the right arm of his powerful *elenchus*; the “open sesame” with which he penetrated to the inmost chambers of human knowledge and human ignorance. This at once leads to universals or generic terms—to the grouping of particulars under their general *form* or species (*εἶδος*). And the most effectual *method* of accomplishing this, Socrates held to be by dialogue, by question and answer, by direct, pressing, unescapable interrogatory, which should force upon the respondent a perception of the exact measure of his knowledge or ignorance of the matter in hand. Thus sprung up the name and the art of dialectics (*διαλεκτική*)—literally dialogue, or reciprocal discourse; denoting, primarily, a *method* of pursuing truth, and then the object with which that method was in its origin inseparably linked—the doctrine of universals, or species (*εἶδη, forms*). With Socrates, and his disciple Plato, the true method of eliciting truth was by the immediate and close grapple of question and answer, directed, primarily, to the single, grand purpose of bringing out the central idea, the ground conception of the subject under discussion. Thus we explain historically the origin of the name dialectic, as denoting the science, with Socrates, of universal ideas, with Plato, of essential being. The developed science naturally retained the name of the method with which, in its origin, it was accidentally associated. Plato, too, gave a still deeper significance to the term, by making this outward question and answer only symbolical of that subtle spiritual process, in which the soul holds converse with itself, and by alternate affirmation and denial ascertains and establishes its own belief.

Thus far Socrates and Plato in common; we come presently to their point of divergence. The method of Socrates was

that of a keen, practical, moral logician. With him the fundamental conceptions thus arrived at, the universal comprehending all particulars, answered simply to the universals of modern logic. It was a pure conception of the mind ; it was the mind's recognition of that common *εἶδος* or form under which it contemplates the totality of kindred phenomena. Had Plato trod simply in the footsteps of his master, his celebrated doctrines of ideas (forms) would have contained nothing hard to be understood, and a world of perplexity would have been spared to the Platonic student. But he turned aside from the path of his master for reasons lying in his historical position.

Socrates was rather a moral logician than a strict philosopher. The philosophical method which he introduced, or so far perfected as to be virtually its originator, was applied exclusively to subjects of practical morals, politics, and religion. He was a practical reformer after the Grecian type. He cherished an undisguised and unbounded contempt for the entire mass of speculation, physical and metaphysical, which the Greek schools had originated. Heracleitan and Eleatic, the affirmers of eternal flux and the affirmers of eternal immobility, he alike consigned to the category of pretentious fools. Their warring creeds he likened to the incoherent and contradictory fancies of the insane, and ruled out the objects of their speculations as impossible to be known, or useless if possible. Hence he threw the whole of his massive and powerful intellect upon practical truth and virtue, though still with such potent appeals to the intellectuality of his hearers as to stimulate to tenfold activity the speculating spirit which he sought to repress. Plato was differently constituted. He was not merely a logician and a reformer, but a philosopher. His eager and capacious mind grasped after universal knowledge ; he could not refrain from grappling anew with all the great questions of that intensely curious and speculating age. The Ionian physics in their Heracleitan form, as impressed on his youthful mind by Cratylus ; the Eleatic metaphysics, antiquity's nearest approach to idealism ; the mystic symbolism and the formal cosmogony of the Pythagoreans, all blended themselves in his capacious mind with the teachings and method of Socrates, and

forced upon him the harmonizing, if possible, of the discords, the interpreting into an intelligible language the chaotic jargon of the schools.

He is met at the outset by two prevailing and antagonistic views. The Heracleitan maintains that all things flow—are in a state of perpetual movement alike in space and in quality; that man and nature, mind and matter, are swept on in one universal, ever-flowing, resistless current of change. With this philosophy there can be no abiding criterion of truth. There is no truth but the truth of sensation; no truth but the truth of the present; and the individual man—such is the logical, and such was the actual deduction from this theory—is his own measure and standard of belief. That is true which appears true, and all science is simply sensation. Now, with the truth of the fundamental position, Plato was profoundly impressed. He held to the instability and unreality of matter, but resolutely resisted the consequences deduced from it. He showed that the doctrine, thus held, destroys the very conception and possibility of science; that it is self-contradictory, as by his own showing the philosopher who propounds it is no more in possession of truth, and no more entitled to advance an opinion, than an idiot or an ape; that it is suicidal, because, on the very principle which it advocates, the opposite doctrine is as true as itself.

Having demolished the Heracleitan doctrine of science, Plato proceeds to perform a like service for the Eleatic. The Heracleitan annuls science by affirming plurality without unity; the Eleatic equally, by affirming unity without plurality. The Heracleitan declares that all things are phenomenal, and the testimony of the senses is the only test of truth; the Eleatic, that all things are one, that phenomena are illusory, and the absolute one is discernible only by the reason. The Heracleitan confounds matter and mind in one ever whirling vortex of change; the Eleatic confounds mind and matter in one rigid, absolute, unalterable unity. Plato mediates between the contending parties. He grants to the Heracleitan the eternal flux of his world of sense; he grants to the Eleatic the eternal stability of his world of reason. He accepts, with



modifications, the doctrines of each school, and divides the realm of the universe into two distinct provinces. The one is that of the phenomenal, the other that of the real. The one is explored by the eye of the body; the other by the eye of the mind. The substance of the one,

"If substance can be called what shadow seemed,"

is blind, formless, illusory, fluctuating in an eternal chaos of change, never being but always becoming; that of the other real, cognizable, immutable, never becoming but always being. These two elements make up the knowable universe. It is upon these two that mind, the knowing agent, acts apart from or through the senses, and out of which it extracts, by ascending gradations, sensation, opinion, knowledge. That which is the proper sphere of sense is matter, formless until impressed by the forms; unreal except as partaking of the real; in short, utterly insusceptible of scientific cognition, except as it stands in connection with the supra-sensible and eternal essences. These transcendental essences—these absolute realities, existing above the sphere of sense, and cognizable primarily by the naked soul, and secondarily, though reminiscence, by philosophical reflection, these *ὄντως ὄντα* are the Platonic forms *εἶδη*, which have been at once the wonder and the stumbling-block of the Platonic inquirer.

We reach, now, the point from which we may consider more exactly their nature. It is easy to speak vaguely, and describe them as "the unchangeable element in all phenomena," the "basis of the mutability of the sensible." It is equally easy to disregard their historical genesis, abandon the Platonic stand-point, and unceremoniously stretch or contract them to the Procrustean bed of our modern metaphysics. But it will be much more satisfactory to ascertain, if possible, what precise place they hold in the theory of Plato, and then trace out their *analogies* in modern metaphysics. Prof. Robert Blakey, in his history of the Science of Mind, makes the Platonic "ideas" equivalent simply to our term idea, "that which is in the mind when one thinks." This view may be dismissed as not deserving refutation. It would never

have been hazarded at this day by one who had learned the rudiments of the Platonic system.

Far more plausible are the views, now extensively prevalent, which resolve them into the generalizations and universals of modern logic, the intuitions or original suggestions of modern psychology, or the general laws after which all material things are framed, or into all of these together. "The idea of hardness," says Prof. Blackie of Edinburgh, in his essay on Plato, "cannot exist without the idea of a central presiding power to gather, compose, collect, and unify a multitude of individual impressions, and designate them by a common epithet. A dog may perceive two sticks of equal size, but man only conceives the idea of equality, and on this and kindred ideas builds up the sublime and stable structure of arithmetical and mathematical science. All knowledge comes through the senses only as an avenue, but from the soul as the only creative cause. This is the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas which has been so ignorantly spoken against." "No doubt," he says again, "there are some pleasant imaginations floating round the border land of the Platonic philosophy, which may be blown to the wind by the puff of any cheek without special inflation from Locke or Bacon. When the great thinker, for instance, pushes his argument for the independence of mind so far as to seem to assert, in positive terms, the existence in the human soul of ideas in ready-made panoply, transferred from a previous state of existence into the present, this must be regarded as a trick of the poet immanent in the philosopher, ever ready to mistake a beautiful analogy for a substantial argument."

Now, all this is very simple and intelligible, and Plato's doctrine is moulded into a view to which, as Blackie says, "no consistent Lockeist can object." But, after all, the real question is, whether Plato himself would object to it? whether it properly recognizes his historical relations, and stands in harmony with the other features of his system? Plato is dealing with the problem of the universe as it presented itself to the Greek mind, not to ours. He had left the simple, logical stand-point of Socrates, and was endeavoring to find an objective founda-

tion for a scientific belief. He had before him the so-called Ionic materialism and the Eleatic idealism, which it was his aim to harmonize. But this latter, be it remembered, was not a system of idealism according to our sense of the term. The Eleatic "one," as contrasted with the Heracleitan "many," was not our world of thought as contrasted with our world of sense. It was simply the entire objective universe conceived as a single, immutable essence, to which real change and phenomena were denied. Nor did the Eleatic "reason" which discerned this unity stand in contrast with the senses precisely as reason and sense are contrasted with us. The reason was simply the subtle part of man which, by virtue of its finer organization, could discern the subtler essence which lay behind the world of phenomena. The Eleatic system, then, was by no means a pure idealism. It was simply a more refined, as the Heracleitan was a grosser materialism. Out of this subtle, but not absolutely spiritual essence, are wrought the Platonic "forms." As he adopted on the one hand the Heracleitan hypothesis of the flux and unreality of matter, he was compelled, on the other, to adopt with modifications the Eleatic assumption of a world of real, separate, self-existent essences, cognizable by the reason. The interpretation of one side of his system determines that of the other. He could not hold to the non-reality of matter, and then make science lie in generalization of the particulars of which he severally denied the reality. This were to make science consist of the shadows of shadows; to attempt to build up a system of stable truth upon abstractions from objects which have no substantive existence. Such a folly cannot be attributed to Plato. His adoption of the Heracleitan system determines and explains his adoption of the Eleatic. Over against a world of phenomena cognizable only by the soul, he sets a world of stable essences, equally objective, cognizable only by the reason. These essences thus postulated are supra-sensible, intelligible, (*νοητοί*), occupying the intelligible region, independent, partially at least, of the conditions of space, closely akin to the mind, recognized primarily only by the naked soul, but subsequently recalled in philosophical



reflection. They are the antithesis and complement of matter in the external universe, and by entering into and pervading it, give it whatever of reality and cognizability it possesses. They are thus a world of bright, glorious, immutable essences; the patterns of which sensible things are the copies; dwelling in the pure, ethereal region, the only objects of pure science, and of contemplation to the true philosopher.

Such is the historical genesis and character of the Platonic "forms." They answer in no proper sense to our word "ideas," and the use of that term to express them can only be a source of obscurity and confusion. In accordance with the above view is the testimony of Aristotle. "Plato," says Aristotle, "came to the doctrine of the forms, because he was convinced of the truth of the Heraclitean doctrine that the world of sense is in a state of eternal flux and change. He inferred, therefore, that if there is any true science of anything, there must be, aside from the sensible, other and permanent substances; for there can be no science of the fleeting." "Socrates," he adds, "discussed the moral virtues, and sought to frame respecting these universal definitions. Socrates, however, did not make his universal conceptions separate, individual essences; this Plato did, and denominated them *εἶδη*."

Such is the express testimony of Aristotle. It falls in with the prevailing tenor of the Platonic writings, and leaves no reasonable ground of doubt as to the origin and nature of the forms. They are not the Socratic universals. Both the philosophical and the poetic elements of Plato's mind forbad his resting on the logical abstractions of his master. The philosophical; for he readmitted the objective, realistic elements which his master had thrown out, and undertook with former schools to solve the problem of universal being. The poetic; for this naturally led to his substituting half-sensuous, concrete objects, in place of pure logical abstractions.

But our position is corroborated by the mode in which, according to Plato, we first make our acquaintance with the forms. If they are mere logical abstractions, or psychological intuitions,—if they are merely the laws imposed by the mind

on objective existence,—then the action of the mind upon the senses is sufficient to originate and develop them. If not,—if they are independent, substantive existences,—then the mind must, at some time and in some way, have come into positive and real contact with them. It must have seen and surveyed them through its proper organ, precisely as through the senses it sees and surveys matter. No logical or intuitional power can bring within the purview of the mind that which is positively exterior to and remote from itself. Here the doctrine of Plato confirms our position. His “forms” are not brought within reach of the soul by any logical or intuitional processes. It became acquainted with them,—as it only *could* become acquainted with them,—in a state anterior to the present, before the veil of matter was interposed between it and the objects of its survey, in its and their proper and original home. There the naked, unembodied spirit, unfallen and unsensualized, beheld with open eye the eternal essences (just as now the bodily eye beholds the phenomena of sense), and lived with them in immediate and sublime communion,—a communion to which it is the high destiny of those souls which philosophy has purified to re-ascend. When ultimately lapsed and embodied, therefore, the soul brings into its embodied state dim remembrances of these forms, or rather such capacities of remembrance as under certain conditions shall bring them before the exiled spirit. Thus—and it is an inevitable, at least a natural, deduction from the objective reality of the “forms”—the real knowledge of the soul was acquired in a pre-existent state, and learning here is merely reminiscence. The splendid poetry of Wordsworth is thus essentially the truth of Plato :

“Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;  
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,  
Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar.  
Not in entire forgetfulness,  
And not in utter nakedness,  
But trailing clouds of glory do we come  
From God, who is our home.”

The subsequent part of the description is indeed the opposite

of the Platonic doctrine, and less philosophical. With Plato our birth is truly "a forgetting," and "heaven does not lie about us in our infancy." It is only in the high strivings of the philosopher that the slumbering images are thoroughly aroused from the depths of the soul, and heightened again into something of their original brightness.

But do we not make too much of the doctrine of reminiscence with its accompanying pre-existence? Are we not heightening what is a mere fancy of the poet into a grave tenet of the philosopher? Let us see. Admitting the correctness of our interpretation of the "forms," it will be seen at a glance that pre-existence and reminiscence become a logical necessity. The doctrines mutually condition and necessitate each other. Let us see now whether the manner in which Plato introduces this theory of pre-existence, and the way in which he handles it, justifies our regarding it as a significant element of his system. We grant, indeed, that he sometimes presents it under a mythical garb; and if we had the doctrine only as exhibited, *e. g.*, in the gorgeous imagery of the *Phædrus*, where the yet unfallen souls follow in the train of the celestials, and making their circuit on the outer circumference of the heavens, behold in the extra-celestial region the forms of the eternal verities, we might well question whether the poet had not taken the reins from the hand of the philosopher. But the rigid scientific processes by which Plato elsewhere establishes the doctrine, and the important purposes to which he applies it, utterly preclude the above supposition, unless Plato, as a scientific writer, is to be denied all claim to confidence. First, he argues at length in the *Meno*, that if a person be brought before a diagram he may, by a series of skilful questions, be made to evolve a whole system of geometrical truth, thus showing that it was already latent within him, and needed but to be recalled to consciousness. Still more acutely and elaborately he argues the doctrine in the *Phædon* from another class of phenomena. To this point we beg particular attention.

To make his argument clear, we must remind the reader that the immutable and transcendental "forms" are arche-



types of the world of sense, the latter being a copy and sort of shadow of the former, or as often expressed, participating in them, and thus borrowing a portion of their nature. How this takes place is not our present concern ; but as matter of fact, the innumerable beautiful objects of sense are beautiful by virtue of their participation in the absolute and eternal beauty ; *like* and *equal* objects by participating in absolute likeness and equality. Hence, as the picture to him who has seen the original face recalls that original, so do these sensible pictures of the eternal essences, reaching through the senses the mind, which has once held converse with those essences, restore them to its recollection. Thus the sensible world is to the eye of reason and reflection perpetually recalling its objects of former converse. Now how does Plato convert this from a mere splendid conception into a demonstrated truth ? His process is ingenious, and marks, perhaps, his most important contribution to psychology. I look, he says, upon two pieces of wood, and pronounce them partially, but not perfectly alike ; approximatively, but not perfectly equal ; upon a human face, and pronounce it relatively, but not absolutely beautiful. Roughly speaking, I call things alike, equal, beautiful. But properly they are not so. They only *approximate* the qualities which exist in my conception, and to which I instinctively refer them as to a standard. And so of all sensible objects. The eye *never* discerns beauty which meets the mind's conception of beauty ; never discerns likeness and equality which answers to its idea of those attributes. Whence, then, come these conceptions—these ideas of beauty, likeness, equality, right, &c., which are in the mind as the invariable standard of sensible judgments, and which, as never realized in the world of sense, could by no possibility be derived from it ? Whence that conception of beauty toward which the artist is always striving ? whence that idea of a circle which, dwelling in the mind of the mathematician, has never been realized in matter ? Whence came they ? asks Plato. Not from the action of the senses, for sense never gives them, and they antedate and condition all sensible experiences. With *us* these ideas are in part logical abstractions, in part intuitions which

by an ultimate law of the mind, spring up *through*, but not *from*, these experiences of sense. Not so reasoned Plato. He inferred naturally that ideas which the soul has, and which could never have reached it in its contact with the world of sense in which it is now placed, must have entered it at a period anterior to its subjection to the restrictions of sense, therefore before its imprisonment in a mortal body. These cognitions must be its inheritance from a prior state of existence—the inheritance with which it enters on its earthly career; and, though lost to consciousness with the entrance of the soul into the body, they are restored through the action of the senses upon those material phenomena which act as the pictured remembrancers of the once familiar and divine originals.

In this analysis, Plato has cut deep into the central truth of modern psychology. He has anticipated what has been deemed the grand psychological achievement of our time, the distinction between ideas of the sense and conceptions of the reason—those conceptions which, though coming *through* the senses, do not come *from* them, and in fact blend with and control all our subsequent experiences. And it is precisely by this close and sharp line of reasoning, utterly dissociated from myth and poetry, that Plato argues the pre-existence of the soul and his doctrine of reminiscence. The conclusion may be erroneous; but it is Plato's mode of accounting for mental phenomena, which he had observed with wonderful acuteness; and to excise it from his system, as a mere poetical figment, is preposterous.

But our argument is made impregnable when we see the practical use to which Plato applies his doctrine. Not only does he *prove* it by a rigid analysis of the mental phenomena, but he makes it the main link in his chain of argument for the immortality of the soul. From the soul's possession of ideas which are independent of and prior to the action of sense, he infers successively its existence prior to its connection with the body, its natural independence of the body, and therefore the impossibility of its being affected by the body's dissolution. To this argument Plato attaches great importance. He congratulates himself for having found in this a sure refuge for his

doctrine, and anchored it safe from all the perils that attended it. He has linked the soul with the eternal ideas ; demonstrated the connection by a sharp discrimination of the phenomena of thought, and thus perhaps constructed the strongest formal argument for immortality that was possible for Paganism. To the Pagan who knew nothing of the positive doctrine of creation, it was just as probable that the soul anticipated in its being its material dwelling-place, as that it will survive it. The doctrine that soul is *older* than body, lay near to the doctrine of its superiority to body. The doctrine of pre-existence, then, was natural, and intrinsically probable. It is, indeed, scarcely possible to see how a Pagan could believe that the soul would depart unharmed by the decay and dissolution of its corporeal tenement, without believing it altogether probable that it was equally independent in its origin. Pre-existence, then, with its consequent doctrine of reminiscence, is no mere light vapor, floating over the surface of the Platonic system, which a breath may dissipate, and, when dissipated, leave it unimpaired. It fits into it as an essential element, and when withdrawn, leaves it incoherent and unintelligible. It is the Pythagorean ligature with which Plato bound into union the Heracleitan and Eleatic dogmas. If this be mythical, his doctrine of the soul's immortality is mythical ; his Heracleitan assumption of the flux and non-reality of matter is mythical ; his doctrine of the "real forms" is mythical ; everything in his speculations that is purely Greek is mythical ; the whole peculiar structure of Platonism tumbles down, and we have in its stead a snug, compact, unexceptionable structure of Scotch metaphysics, but which has got to be spelled out from Plato through the obscurest set of hieroglyphics under which mortal man ever succeeded in concealing his ideas.

It follows from our view that Plato held the doctrine of innate ideas. Men are born not merely with capacities for knowledge, but with the elements of knowledge transferred from another state of being. These, however, are not the so-called Platonic "ideas"—i. e., the εἶδη or forms. They are ideas in our sense of the term ; ideas of the forms. They are the mind's *knowledge* of the forms, sustaining to them a rela-



tion precisely analogous to that of our conception of an object to the object itself. The *εἰδῆ* of Socrates were abstractions which existed properly only in the mind; the *εἰδῆ* of Plato, as real entities, were always objective to the mind, which possessed and could reproduce its conceptions of them, as we call up any object of former perception or knowledge. Nor is there ground for Professor Blackie's statement, that Plato in this doctrine is asserting "the independence of the mind." He rather asserts its dependence. Plato is no mystic. He gives to the soul no power of thinking beyond the sphere of objective reality. He makes it dependent for every conception, alike the highest and the lowest, upon the world without. He does not reach the height gained by modern metaphysics, which clothes the soul with power to originate from itself those great categories of thought, which unite our sensible perceptions and exalt them into science. He remained on lower ground. He made the observations upon which modern psychology has established the higher functions of the reason, but he adopted a different and a less exalted explanation.

We see again how admirably Plato harmonizes the three great systems of Greek speculation, and crowns them with the sublime ethics of Socrates. The Heracleitan flux of matter, the metaphysical unity of the Eleatics, the mathematical unity of the Pythagoreans, together with their dogma of pre-existence, are all wrought into a comprehensive system, and assume each a significance which was wanting to it in its isolated state. With the Pythagoreans, pre-existence was probably but a fragmentary and half-mythical conception; with Plato it became inwrought into the very texture of his philosophy. The central and all-pervading element, however, is the doctrine of the "forms." In physics these appear as the patterns after which the universe of sensible things was moulded, and from which it derives its partial reality. In metaphysics they are the only objects of real knowledge, and the true basis of science. In ethics they are the sublime spiritual essences, the proper end of all virtuous and philosophical striving, the highest of all being "the good," in which perfect wisdom and perfect virtue become identical. It is that he may learn to converse with

those glorious essences that the philosopher keeps aloof from the thralldom of the body, and wars with its sensual appetites; and it is that he may re-ascend to them that he welcomes its dissolution, as the breaking down of a barrier between himself and the goal of his strivings.

In estimating, finally, the scientific value of the Platonic system, we do not find it standing the test of a rigid examination. It is marked by the striking errors and faults which characterized the Greek school philosophy; and yet, all things considered, we cannot hesitate to pronounce it one of the most wonderful creations of the human mind, one of the profoundest struggles of the indwelling divinity of the soul against the debasing influence of Paganism. The "forms" are a noble creation, alike in their origin and their application. In their origin they rest on a clear distinction between the ideas springing from the sense and those which transcend it, and though the explanation is erroneous, yet the distinction itself has received the sanction of modern science. As to their spirit and purpose, they are Plato's assertion of truth against error, of faith against skepticism, of the possibility of a permanent science against a degrading sensationalism. They are Plato's mode, from his stand-point, of vindicating the reality and the perpetuity of truth, and stemming the current which threatened to sweep away all true knowledge and true virtue. Plato built up against this incoming flood his doctrine of the ideal forms; with these he fought against the Materialists of his day substantially the same battle which has been fought over in ours against Hume and Helvetius. Plato's errors, we repeat, are the product of his age, his truths are his own. Philosophical science was yet in its infancy, and in the analysis of the faculties of the soul he was absolutely a pioneer. The student of philosophy, who sees how the field of the ages is strewn with the wrecks of demolished systems, will not deal harshly with the formal errors of Plato. He will rather admire the varied elements of truth with which it is everywhere fraught, and reverence the loftiness of aim, the integrity of purpose, the earnest religiousness of spirit, which place him in the front rank of the world's champions of truth for all ages. Plato appears before

us in a Greek garb, and discusses formally the Greek problems from the Greek stand-point. But in spirit he is the philosopher of all ages, fighting the moral battles of humanity. To this spirit, time, while it discredits his specific explanations, renders more abundant honor. His truth is broader and deeper than his errors. His whole philosophy is like one of his own gorgeous myths, in which the outward drapery may be swept away, but the essence of truth remains. The arithmetical expressions of his system may be erroneous, but its algebraic generalizations remain valid. No man can doubt where Plato would have stood, in any age, in the contest that is always going on between a spiritual and a materializing philosophy. In an age of skepticism he argues manfully for the truth; amidst the superstitions of heathenism he pleads for virtue and piety with almost the zeal of an apostle. We must reserve some further account of his philosophy, and a survey of his historical influences for another occasion.

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#### ARTICLE III.—ARNOLD'S RHODE ISLAND.\*

THE little state that rests upon the islands and shores of Narragansett Bay is invested with more than common historic interest. Her territory, indeed, ranks her among the very least of the states of the Union; but her population is larger than that of several of her sisters that boast of ampler dimensions, while the native resources which her industry has developed, the wealth which her people have accumulated, and the eminent names she has given to the varied service of the republic, in the arts both of peace and of war, place her in an enviable position among the confederate sovereignties of the land. But that which more than any other attribute distinguishes Rhode

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\* History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. By Samuel Greene Arnold. Volume I. 1636 to 1700. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1859.



Island, and gives her her pre-eminence, is the principle of absolute religious freedom which, at the beginning, was incorporated into her earliest colonial organization, and was in full exercise there long before it was adopted by any other civil society in Christendom. Other and greater states, both in the Old World and the New, have since appropriated this principle, and it is now travelling with tardy, though advancing steps, over the civilized world; but it was hers from the beginning, and she is now the only organized community upon the earth which has existed for two hundred and twenty years, whose history records not a single encroachment on the freedom of the human soul in matters of religious faith and worship. It is this which gives to the history of Rhode Island its great peculiarity, which invests it with unusual interest and importance, and makes it especially worthy of study to those who would trace to their origin the great principles of social happiness and freedom.

Rhode Island was founded for the single purpose of embodying and putting to the test of actual experiment the doctrine of social ethics to which we have referred; and she is not only the first, but the only state in history that can point to such an origin. Her annals, therefore, are full of this idea, and abound in illustrations of the misconceptions to which it was liable, the struggles through which it was called to pass, and the splendid triumphs which it finally won. Particular portions of these annals have been presented to the public before, in the lives of several of her founders and her later public men, or in the histories of some of her towns or churches or industrial interests; but never till now has a history of the state, as a whole, been attempted in American literature. The want of such a work has long been felt, for few subjects in our national annals have been invested with grosser prejudices, or have been more singularly misrepresented, than the characters and principles of the founders of Rhode Island, and the condition and progress of her early society.

This work, we are happy to find, has at length been undertaken by a writer whose initial volume, now before us, shows that he is thoroughly master of the materials from which the

work is to be prepared, and at the same time that he has a loving appreciation of the principles which those materials are to illustrate. He is an educated scholar, practised in writing, familiar with the history and condition of mankind, experienced in public affairs in his native state, and has withal devoted several years to a preparation for the work which he has now so well begun. The volume which he has thus given us reflects high credit upon his research, his fidelity, and his historic skill. Its facts are accurate and well arranged, its style is correct and sprightly, and the general tone of its narrative is elevated and liberal. It undoubtedly deserves to rank among the very best of the state histories which have thus far been contributed to American literature.

Rhode Island was originally settled by exiles from Massachusetts, in three separate communities, the first of which was planted at Providence by Roger Williams, in 1636, the second at Aquidneck or Rhode Island, by followers of Mrs. Hutchinson, in 1638, and the third by Samuel Gorton and his adherents, at Warwick, in 1642. These little communities existed for a time as independent colonies, though without any forms of incorporation, and were first brought together in political bonds by a patent from the king, which went into operation in 1647. They were afterward separated for a time by a new commission, which embraced the island towns, and were at length fully organized into a single colony, and clothed with the powers of a distinct jurisdiction, by the charter of Charles II., in 1663. This charter, which was distinguished by its liberality, also annexed to the colony the district lying south of Warwick, between the shores of the bay and the borders of Connecticut, known as the Narragansett country. This strip of territory had long been the subject of rival claims, and was finally adjudged to Rhode Island, in consequence of the submission which had been made by the once powerful tribe that occupied its soil.

It was within this narrow territory, thus settled at different times, and by different sorts of persons, and thus founded and defined in the charter of the king, after being claimed in its several parts by Massachusetts, by Plymouth, and by Conne-

ticut, as well as by powerful individual proprietors, that the colony of Rhode Island commenced its career, and carried into practical execution its great idea of absolute "freedom in religious concerns." The trials, both from within and from without, that attended this first experiment of the kind ever made in human affairs, are exceedingly interesting, and the narration of them of necessity constitutes the staple of her early history. Before adverting to them, however, let us consider the peculiarities of the origin and position of the little colony at the beginning of her career.

The first planters of each of these several portions of the state were heretics, according to the standards of the age. They were, of course, heretics in common with the other settlers of New England, when judged by the articles of the Anglican church and the English statutes of uniformity. But still more than this, they were also heretics according to the standard which had been set up in the colonies around them, and for this they had been banished from Massachusetts, and were at open variance with the prevailing sentiments of both Plymouth and Connecticut. According to the ideas of the age, alike in the mother-country and the colonies, heresy was the least forgivable of crimes. Other offences injured the citizen or the state, and were easily palliated or pardoned; but this was an outrage on the divine authority, a corruption of sacred truth at its fountain. Other crimes were against human law, and affected only earthly interests; but this was a departure from God's own truth, and exerted its evil influence on the human soul itself. This conception of the nature of heresy entered as an element into the civil organization of the New England colonies, and is essential to the explanation of their proceedings toward Rhode Island and her founders.

The ideas of both government and religion which the colonists brought with them to New England were far purer and more worthy than those they had seen exemplified in the mother-country. They were the ideas of that puritan party in the Anglican church, and that liberal party in English politics, which were then almost the only guardians of freedom and piety that England could boast. These Puritans, with all



their imperfections, were an immense improvement on those who, in possession of the power of the government, were using it to oppress and drive them into exile. They cherished the ancient spirit of English freedom, and also clung with unyielding tenacity to the cardinal doctrines of the New Testament. Queen Elizabeth, who, at the beginning of her reign at least, was a Roman Catholic in all but the Papal supremacy, had used her utmost endeavors to extinguish them. James I., who had been a Presbyterian till he came to England, let loose upon them the fiercest bigots of both the church and the state. But in spite of all attempts at their suppression, they continually increased; and when this vain and narrow-minded tyrant went to the tomb and left the kingdom to his son and successor, it already embosomed the hidden elements of a strife which was soon to bring the direst calamities alike on monarch and people.

In Charles I. were united the most arrogant notions of the royal prerogative, and the most bigoted views of ecclesiastical discipline, with a full share of the instability and treachery that characterized his race, though with little of the coarseness and none of the licentiousness that belonged to his father and his father's courtiers. The accession of such a prince to the throne was all that was needed to develop in open and violent collision, the forces that were already in fatal though concealed antagonism. The party that had long endured in powerless submission the intolerable oppressions of the first of the Stuarts had now become strong, and was about to assume the ascendancy in both church and state. The storm was long in gathering, but when it came it was irresistible in its might. There were times when it might have been averted, and its wildest desolations prevented; but neither in Charles nor in any of his political or ecclesiastical advisers was there a sagacity that could comprehend the crisis till it was already upon them. It swept away king, and nobles, and prelates, and church, and monarchy, and gave England over to the stern though comparatively wise and impartial rule of a military despot, who, though he grasped the sceptre with a vigorous hand, yet failed to found a dynasty or to rebuild the fallen institutions of

his realm. He could not call himself by the name of king, and without that name no sovereign of England could transmit the sceptre to lineal heirs. His power was buried with him amid the splendid rites with which he was entombed with England's kings in Westminster Abbey; and with the hated race of the Stuarts again on the throne, the work which he and his party had attempted, remained to be accomplished in the age that succeeded. Unless this work had been thoroughly performed, England would have been without freedom and without pre-eminence, and might have become little else than a pensioner of France, and perhaps a subservient province of Rome.

Few general readers are fully aware of the amazing change that has been wrought in the estimate which the world places upon the Puritans. The portraits of their character and manners, drawn by such writers as Sir Walter Scott and the author of *Hudibras*, still remain in English literature, but they have ceased to be considered resemblances, and are now regarded only as broad caricatures. The account of their part in the drama of the age, as given by Lord Clarendon and Mr. Hume, has been cancelled and supplanted by the chronicles of Lord Macaulay and Mr. Carlyle, and its want of truth has been lately shown still more glaringly by Mr. Sandford, in his "*Studies and Illustrations of the Great Rebellion*." It is now understood and admitted that they were not the morose and sanctimonious persons they were represented to be, but that they numbered in their ranks no small proportion, not only of the gravest and most earnest-minded men in England, but also of the most educated and most accomplished. There were undoubtedly among them persons marked by morose manners, by nasal tones and canting language, and these sat for the pictures of the whole class, which historians and novelists, poets and dramatists, have chosen to paint. But no portion of society is ever to be represented by its extremes. The Puritans as a class were indeed grave and thoughtful, as their circumstances naturally made them, but they were as well bred and as accomplished as their opponents, and their chiefs were also far more profound and varied in their acquisitions and refined in their

tastes. In manners and dress, in which they were long the butt of unlimited ridicule, it has been truly remarked that they set the fashion which later ages have adopted; and the English or American gentleman of our own time, like the Puritans two hundred years ago, "dresses plainly and in sad colors, and puts his lace and embroidery on his servants." \*

The annals of the Puritans also, especially prior to the Protectorate, are adorned by a multitude of names both of distinguished rank and of illustrious service. From Bishop Hooper, who refused to be consecrated in the ecclesiastical vestments in the reign of Edward VI., to Bishop Williams, who suffered the vengeance of Laud in the reign of Charles I., a large number of the ablest and most pious of the English prelates, and a still larger number of the clergy, were in open sympathy with their principles and aims. From the Earl of Leicester, Sir Philip Sydney's uncle and guardian, who in the reign of Elizabeth shielded them from Archbishops Parker and Whitgift, to the Earls of Essex and Fairfax, who commanded their armies in the great rebellion, they were never without advocates and adherents among the hereditary aristocracy of the realm. In the House of Commons, representing, as it then did almost exclusively, the landed gentry of the country, they were often in a majority, and stood up in bold resistance to the arbitrary prerogative of the crown. In other spheres of civil life they were everywhere represented by statesmen, lawyers and scholars, such as Selden, Whitelocke, Sampson, Cartwright and Milton, who have since been honored among the worthiest characters that adorn their age. It is now conceded that on more than one occasion they would have carried their points in the English Parliament, repealed the act of uniformity, and abolished the ceremonies and restraints to which they objected, had it not been for the inordinate and usurped ascendancy of the monarch and the interested votes of the bishops in the House of Lords. Had this been accomplished, and a reasonable flexibility been given to the rubrics of the Anglican church, separatism and nonconformity would have dwindled away, and New England history would have been woven of different materials.

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\* Palfrey's History of New England. Vol. I.



Such, in character and position, were the Puritans of England, and such they continued to be till they were spoiled by the civil wars, and till success attracted to their ranks a herd of adventurers, who aped their manners and professed their principles only that they might share their triumphs. England did not produce their superiors in the ages to which they belonged, and not even their equals in some of the noblest qualities of human character. They present themselves in history at different periods, in different relations both to the church and the government. In politics they were all liberals, though in different degrees; while in ecclesiastical matters some of them differed from the church in opinion but conformed in practice; others differed both in opinion and practice, but clung to the church itself; others still not only departed in opinion and practice from the Anglican ritual, but also attempted to separate themselves from the ecclesiastical body as established by law, and to form congregations for independent worship.

With antecedents and diversities like these, representatives of each of these several sections of the Puritans came to New England, and planted, in succession, the colonies of Plymouth and Massachusetts, of New Haven and Connecticut. The emigration began in 1620, but was not considerable or influential till 1630, and after 1640 it almost entirely ceased. The westward tide of Puritan colonists is limited in its flow almost entirely to the ten or twelve years commencing about 1630 and ending about 1640. At the end of these years, the population of New England was not far from twenty thousand. They came from various ranks of English life, with principles and aims both political and religious, not entirely identical, yet united by many close affinities; and with the grave and earnest Christian men who came for religion's sake, were undoubtedly mingled many of lighter mould, who were prompted by the spirit of more worldly enterprise. With all the high virtues and the freer spirit that characterized them, the notion of government which they brought with them, was not essentially different from that to which they had been accustomed at home. They did not condemn the principle of an established church—but only such a church as that established in Eng-

land. They denounced the statutes of uniformity—not for enforcing any faith at all, but for enforcing one to which they could not subscribe as according to the Scriptures. With them there was no denial of the right of government to prescribe some worship or other, but only of its right to prescribe an erroneous worship. Hence, when they brought to New-England the faith which had been delivered to the saints, they rejoiced in the opportunity to make their state tributary to its preservation, and felt called upon by every conviction of duty, and by every sentiment of piety, to enforce that faith by law upon the members of their new society in the wilderness. The communities which they formed thus became little theocracies, in which the members of the church alone were citizens, and the magistrates were clothed with an undefined power to promote both spiritual truth and the social weal, and so long as they were sustained by the public, to inflict severe penalties as well on the erring heretic as on the offending criminal.

From a system like this, dissent was of course sure to arise, and the only wonder is that it did not earlier annihilate the system itself. The Reformation had established a precedent never to be forgotten. If the Anglican Church might separate from the Papal—if the Puritans might dissent from the Anglicans, then by a logic that could not be withstood, the Antinomians, the Baptists, the Quakers, might dissent from the Puritans. And if it were an outrage and a wrong for Queen Mary to exterminate the English Protestants with the dungeon and the fagot; for Queen Elizabeth and the Stuarts to exterminate the Puritans, by imprisonment, by confiscation and banishment; then were it also an outrage and a wrong for the colonies of New England to punish with exile and with death those who rejected the faith which had been there established.

This was precisely the case of the founders of Rhode Island. They were banished from Massachusetts and forbidden the other colonies for their opinions in matters of faith, and in no respect for crimes or acts of civil disturbance. These opinions related to different points, and were expressed at different times and in different ways; but they were accompanied in no single instance with civil insubordination or aggression. In

the case both of Roger Williams and of Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers, the opinions actually involved were undoubtedly misrepresented and perverted ; though in the former they appear to have related to questions of political ethics and social organization, while in the latter they were confined entirely to points of religious doctrine. But in neither had they any more connection with the security of the state than had the ethical truths taught by Socrates or the astronomical facts announced by Galileo. Roger Williams, indeed, called in question the fundamental principle of the Puritan theocracy, and asserted that the magistrate ought not to punish for violations of the first table of the moral law ; but he sought to maintain his positions, which, as mere speculative conclusions, were not original with him, with no force but that of argument. It was the doctrine itself, and not the mode of its promulgation, that gave rise to his banishment from Massachusetts, and created the irreparable breach between him and the Christian brethren with whom he had been so long associated both in the Old World and the New. He had sympathized in their opinions, he had shared their trials, he had come to be their companion in their wilderness home. In learning, in piety, and in fervid eloquence, he was distinguished among their ministers, and in all the qualities and attainments of both mind and character that marked the Puritan chiefs, he was a peer of the loftiest, the bravest, and the best that could be selected from their ranks. In addition to all these qualities, which he shared with others, he also had firmly planted in his mind, in distinction from all the others, the novel but grand idea of the inalienable liberty of the human soul. This distinguishing peculiarity was the cause of his banishment, and also became the basis of his renown.

The time has passed, never to return, in which Williams and his associates were derided in literature as fanatics worthy of the treatment they received, or when the proceedings of Massachusetts against them were justified on any ground of right or of necessity. Nor is it now often denied that they made the first experiment of a civil society founded on entire freedom in matters of religious faith and worship. But there



still lingers a sort of sectarian reluctance to concede these merits to the founders of Rhode Island, lest the concession should involve some admission of inferiority in the fathers of the other colonies of New England. For ourselves, we are free to confess that we cherish no such idea. We wish the day were gone when Christian scholars need contend for names and sects. We appreciate the merits of the good and heroic men who planted the wilderness at Plymouth and Boston. We join in their praises, and aid in paying honor to their memory. But we maintain, as a fact of history, what they themselves would have scorned to deny, that neither liberty, nor even toleration in matters of religion, was one of the articles of either their political or their ecclesiastical creed. They not only rejected it as wrong, but they embraced precisely the opposite doctrine, and wrought it into the framework of their society. However much they were above the standard of their age in other respects, in this, they were only on a level with it. They still clung to the bad principle which had sanctioned all the persecutions that disgrace the history of the Christian Church, and copied without deviation the bad example which the government of England had set before them in the very oppressions that had driven them away.

On these preliminary and somewhat difficult points of Rhode Island history, Mr. Arnold shows a discriminating liberality which cannot be too highly commended. He is no partizan writer of history. He aims at the vindication of no champions, at the demolition of no opponents, but seeks only to narrate the truth, whomever it may justify or condemn. He tells the story of Puritan persecutions, but he is careful to admit all the palliations of which these persecutions are capable. He delineates truly the character and position of the founders of Rhode Island, but he claims for them only what is fairly and justly their due. He also very properly makes a discrimination between the spirit of the treatment which Roger Williams and the disciples of Mrs. Hutchinson experienced from the Massachusetts authorities while within their jurisdiction, and the unrelenting hostility which for nearly a century was visited upon them and their descendants after they became a separate

colony. Had the rulers of Massachusetts been content with the mere banishment of these heretics, whom they chose to denounce as also disturbers of the peace, the transaction would have been only after the model of the government of England, and on a level with similar proceedings in other parts of Christendom. But they went far beyond this, and put forth their utmost endeavors for their annihilation, even when banished and organized in a separate community.

The first exiles from Massachusetts had scarcely become settled in their respective homes at Providence and Aquidneck, when they were practically excluded from nearly all connection with civilized society, in consequence of the severe policy with which they were pursued. Boston was the only port at which vessels from England often came, and the only considerable market at which the supplies afforded by commerce could be obtained. Exile itself was a barrier that of necessity interrupted intercourse to a most inconvenient degree. But the authorities of Massachusetts, not content with this, passed a decree in 1638, that no inhabitant of Providence should come into their jurisdiction for any purpose whatever, unless he was willing to admit the right of the magistrates to exercise power in the church, but if any such persons, after being once ordered to depart, should be a second time found in the jurisdiction, "they should be imprisoned and punished as the court shall see cause." In consequence of this inhuman act, the people of Providence were not only unable to supply themselves with articles needed for their daily comfort, but also were debarred the purchase of arms and ammunition for their defence against wild beasts and the Indians that were around them. This prohibition was in one instance relaxed in favor of the people of Aquidneck, in a season of unusual extremity and alarm, but was constantly enforced against the people of Providence. Roger Williams says of this cruel law, that many thousand pounds could not repay the losses which he alone had sustained in consequence. The colonists were forced to turn from their brethren in New England, and to carry on the only traffic within their reach with the settlers at Manhattan or New York. Many incidents in their early condition illustrate the privations they were thus obliged to endure.

But this was not all. They were regarded by the Puritan colonies merely as bands of fugitives, and were denied all the rights of civil communities. Plymouth, though at the outset she admitted that Aquidneck was not within her jurisdiction, soon claimed it as her own. Massachusetts, in virtue of an act of submission by some wayward inhabitants of Pawtuxet, began to exercise authority over this part of Providence, and the whole of Warwick; while Connecticut, in her turn, set up a claim to whatever territory might remain after the other colonies were satisfied. In 1645, Massachusetts also pretended to have received from the council of state in England a charter, annexing the whole of Rhode Island to her own territory and jurisdiction; and in 1643, when the New England confederacy was formed for the common defence against the Indians, who were threatening the extermination of all the English settlers, neither of the Rhode Island settlements was invited, or even permitted to join this league of mutual protection.

The explanation of these and similar proceedings, which now reflect so much discredit on the New England colonists, and especially those of Massachusetts, is to be found in part in their irrepressible hostility to the civil doctrines that were wrought into the formation of the Rhode Island communities. Those doctrines were thought to be dangerous enough when professed by here and there a solitary heretic in Massachusetts, but how much more portentous their aspect when organized in independent social institutions! Besides this, the "tendency to Anabaptistry," which from the beginning had been suspected of those men, had now developed itself in its full results. For the first three years of their colonial life, the people of Providence formed no church; though, as there were among them two clergymen who had been ordained in England, and as William Blackstone, also a non-conforming clergyman of the English church, dwelt within six miles of the town, it is not probable they were without arrangements for public worship. In March, 1639, Roger Williams was baptized by Ezekiel Holliman, a layman, and then himself administered the rite to eleven others of the population who professed a faith in Christ. In this manner, and at about this time, was



formed the first church in America that recognized immersion as the only apostolic baptism, and a personal repentance and faith as the only qualifications for the ordinance. It is by no means certain that this church embraced all the Christian disciples of the infant town, but no other was formed, and no different type of Christian faith was established there for two or three generations. At Aquidneck was exhibited the same "tendency to Anabaptistry;" and so far as can be traced, the earliest church that was gathered upon the Island was also in accordance with the same idea. This church was probably formed at Portsmouth, in 1639, and on the settlement of Newport, it was removed with its members to that town. This church, Governor Winthrop complains, was gathered "in a very disordered way," being made up in part of those who had been excommunicated from the churches in Boston. Still, like the church in Providence, it was formed in the only mode that was practicable among Christian men thrown together in the wilderness, beyond the bounds of Christendom. Over this church, Dr. John Clarke, a man of superior talents and education, and of unusual sagacity in public affairs, who had been a physician in London, was placed as pastor; and of that at Providence, Roger Williams was probably the minister during the brief period in which he continued to be one of its members.

Of "Anabaptistry," or the doctrines now professed by Baptist churches in every part of the world, the Puritans of that age entertained only the profoundest horror; and this is the more remarkable, as in all other respects, saving only in their ideas of the ordinance of baptism and their principles of religious freedom, the Baptists scarcely differed from the Puritans themselves. Indeed, in the mother country they were mingled with the Puritans in all their movements, and though not always organized in separate churches, they were widely scattered through different ranks of society all over England and Wales; and a few years later, showed themselves to be a power of no inconsiderable importance in the revolutionary movements of the times. It was the embodiment of their doctrines in the earliest churches that were formed in Rhode Island that, more than any

other single cause, provoked this most unchristian hostility from the authorities of Massachusetts and the other New England colonies. This was the heresy of heresies, the *scandalum magnatum*, that cut off the little settlements on the shores of the Narragansett from the sympathies of all their civilized neighbors, and made them worthy only to be deserted and left to perish, unprotected and uncared for, amid the hardships of the wilderness and the violence of savages.

In contrast, however, with this policy of the Puritan colonies, the conduct of Rhode Island towards her persecutors, and especially the conduct of her founder and most influential man, we delight to record, was always generous and magnanimous. While living in Plymouth, Mr. Williams had formed the acquaintance and won the goodwill of several of the Indian Sachems who ruled on the shores of the Narragansett; and it was to the continuance of this goodwill that he, and the settlements with which he was connected, were indebted for their safety, amidst the conflicts that were waged around them. In the summer of 1636, and but a few weeks after the settlement of Providence, we find the exiled heretic interposing his kind offices, by sending to Massachusetts early intelligence of the hostile designs of the Indians. A few months later, when the Pequots, already in open conflict with the people both of Plymouth and Boston, were endeavoring to unite the Narragansetts in a common league for the extermination of these colonies, he cheerfully became the agent of Massachusetts for the purpose of defeating the league. The undertaking was full of perils, and no other man could hope for success. He made his way to the wigwam of Canonicus, the Sachem of the Narragansetts, as he himself has recorded, "in a poor canoe, through a stormy wind, with great seas, every minute in hazard of life." The fate of New England depended on his fortitude, his energy and his address. His success was complete, and he returned with a treaty that separated the Narragansetts and Mohegans from the Pequots, and formed them for many years in faithful alliance to the English. This alliance, however, was often threatened, in consequence of the offensive policy adopted by the United Colonies; but the kindly relations of Rhode Island

with the Indians, and especially the peace-making offices of Roger Williams, were effectual in preventing the recurrence of hostilities. To no other man of the time was New England so frequently and so largely indebted for whatever exemption her settlements enjoyed from Indian depredations and wars. The influence which he wielded over the native tribes was always exerted in promotion of the interests of justice and peace, and for the benefit of the very colonies that had denied to him and his associates the charities and the courtesies due among civilized men to each other.

But these external perils were not the only ones to which the infant settlements of Rhode Island were long exposed. These settlements had become the asylum of a large number of the uneasy and disaffected spirits that were to be found in New England. In the other colonies they were cramped and restricted by social forms and institutions which did not exist in Rhode Island, and the freedom they found there, they too frequently perverted to mischief. The settlements were sometimes at variance with each other, and each one was liable to be distracted by the feuds that sprang up among its members. Indeed, it must be admitted that the idea of individual independence ran wild among a portion of the people, and at times became almost incompatible with allegiance to authority. But this is to be ascribed to faults of personal character, not to the principles of religious freedom themselves, or to the manner in which they were asserted by the founders of the colony. It was for the purpose of correcting the wild vagaries which prevailed among a portion of the people, that Roger Williams addressed his celebrated letter to the town of Providence, which shows how clear and well defined, in his own mind, lay the grand idea of the freedom of the human soul, and its perfect compatibility with civil government.

In 1643 was formed the New England Confederation, which, as we have already stated, neither of the heretical colonies of Rhode Island was invited or even permitted to join. The reason given at the time was, that they were without any chartered authority. This reason, however, was soon to be removed, for in the same year Roger Williams went to New



England as the agent of these colonies, in order to procure a patent of government. His mission was successful, and in the following summer he returned with an instrument that invited them, under the title of "The Incorporation of Providence Plantations in the Narragansett Bay, in New England." He was compelled, by the severe policy which Massachusetts would not relax, to embark at New York, and on his return, he was allowed to land in Boston only in virtue of an official letter which he brought from the Parliamentary authorities that then ruled in England. The utmost exertion was made to thwart his endeavors with the English government by the emissaries of Massachusetts, and his triumphant success, amidst so many hindrances, well merited the popular ovation with which he was spontaneously received on his return to Providence.

The charter which Mr. Williams brought with him did not go into operation till May 1647, and it was soon found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the colony. These facts, it must be conceded, furnish a most unfavorable commentary on the intelligence of the people who then formed the communities of Rhode Island. They were undoubtedly the most democratic communities, in their organization, then to be found in the world; and they were also unfortunately pervaded by a wild spirit of individualism, which in too many instances made their members foolishly impatient of social bonds, and childishly jealous of all delegated authority. A few master spirits alone comprehended the principles and position of the new civil society they had formed. The mass of the people thought so much of mere liberty, that they were in danger of overlooking the necessity of law; and it was only after a long and painful experience that the colony at length learned how these two social elements may be united in perpetual harmony and order. This is always one of the hardest lessons for an infant democracy to learn, and in Rhode Island it was taught only amid trials and dangers that came near defeating the noble experiment of "soul liberty," which its founders were making in the wilderness.

In this distracted condition of the colony, in August, 1651, William Coddington, the wealthiest and most influential of the proprietors of Aquidneck, returned from England, where

he had been residing for two years, bringing with him a commission vesting in himself the authority of governor for life, with a council of six assistants, to be annually chosen, over all the inhabited islands of Narragansett Bay. It was, of course, a revocation of the charter of 1644, and the erection over a portion of the colony of a government appointed in England, and only in a slight degree responsible to the people whom it was to govern. The institution of such a government among a people already jealous to excess of everything like delegated authority, naturally awakened the utmost alarm. It proved, however, in the end a most fortunate occurrence, for it taught the several settlements the necessity of a greater union with each other, and of a government whose powers should be adequate to the protection of the common interests.

The alarm immediately gave rise to the most active measures of protection. The colony was already dismembered by the fiat of the government at home, and the island towns had no alternative but quietly to submit to the rule of their new governor. The settlements at Providence and at Warwick, however, still remained united, and they immediately appointed Roger Williams to go a second time to England and obtain, if possible, a revocation of the commission of Coddington, and a renewal of the charter which had been set aside. In like manner the inhabitants of the islands, but few of whom really favored the new authority, appointed Dr. John Clarke to hasten to England on precisely the same errand. They were the two most gifted and liberal minds in the colony. Both of them were men of education, and both, as is probable, scholars from one or the other of the ancient universities of England. They also held in common the same great ideas of the liberty of the soul, of its right to interpret the Scriptures for itself, and of the duty of the government to leave it unshackled in its faith and worship. In minuter points they were less alike than they had formerly been. Clarke, who, in London, and afterwards in Boston, had been a physician, was now a Baptist minister at Newport; while Williams, who had been a clergyman of the Established Church in England, a Separatist in Salem, and a Baptist at Providence, was now unconnected with any ecclesi-

astical body; and though still a Christian preacher, was waiting in pious faith for a new revelation of a more apostolic ministry and a holier church than he had thus far found on earth.

The envoys soon completed their preparations; and having obtained the reluctant permission of Massachusetts, they embarked at Boston in November, 1651. They reached England and entered upon their mission in the declining days of that famous Parliament which had overthrown the king and abolished the monarchy, the House of Lords, and the Anglican church, and now, as a feeble remnant of what it had once been, was sitting merely to sanction the decrees that were dictated by Cromwell and his officers. Nearly a year elapsed before their business could be fully brought to the notice of the Council of State. The Council soon, however, revoked the commission of Coddington, and directed the towns of the colony again to unite under their charter. This act passed the Council of State in October, 1652, but the decree in which it was embodied did not reach Rhode Island till the following February. It was soon afterwards carried into execution, though not without some show of resistance on the part of Coddington. At nearly the same time Sir Henry Vane, the friend of Milton and of Roger Williams, who had always manifested a hearty sympathy in the affairs of the colony, wrote to the people "a most kind and imploring letter, urging them to reconcile their feuds, for the honor of God and the good of their fellow-men."

Both the commissioners from Rhode Island remained in England after their immediate mission had been crowned with success,—both probably having personal objects which engaged their attention. Mr. Williams appears to have been intimately associated not only in the relations of public business, but also in frequent private intercourse with Sir Henry Vane, with Milton, and Cromwell, and others of the leading spirits of the age. In a letter which he addressed to his friend, Governor Winthrop, of Connecticut, he refers to his teaching the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French and Dutch languages as a means of support; also to the common studies which he pursued with John



Milton in the languages and literatures of the continental nations. He returned to Providence in the summer of 1654, bearing with him an order from the Lord Protector requiring the Government of Massachusetts to permit him in future to pass through that territory without molestation. Mr. Clarke still remained in England as agent of the colony during the entire Protectorate of Cromwell. He maintained the most amicable relations with that government. He also witnessed the fall of the Protectorate, the restoration of the monarchy, and the accession of Charles II. to the throne he was so soon to dishonor. He was unquestionably a man of superior knowledge of human nature and address in the conduct of affairs. While he steadily adhered to truth and rectitude in performing the duties assigned him, he yet knew how to take advantage of opportunities for the promotion of his ends. Immediately on the accession of the new king, and in the midst of "the era of good feeling" which this event had produced, he presented the petitions he had received from the people of the colony for a confirmation of the privileges they had obtained under the patent of 1644. The petitions were favorably received by the monarch and the council; and after some delay, during which the opposition of Massachusetts was brought strongly to bear on the question, a royal charter passed the seals, confirming and guaranteeing these privileges almost in the very words of the petition in which they had been asked. The charter appears to have been signed in the summer of 1663. In the following October it was received in Rhode Island with universal demonstrations of joy, and on the 24th of November the government was organized in accordance with its provisions.

Thus began in Rhode Island that famous charter under which the colony, saving only the interruption occasioned by Sir Edmund Andros in 1687, pursued her career to the revolution and to independence; under it she was admitted into the Union, and under it, as her only instrument of government, she continued till 1843, when she abandoned it for her present constitution. It lasted for a hundred and eighty years, and at the time of its extinction, says Mr. Bancroft, it was "the oldest constitutional charter in the world." It was distinguished for

its liberality and its democratic spirit, and for the ample grants of power which it contained, the colony was indebted almost exclusively to the agency of Dr. Clarke. Mr. Williams, while he remained in England, had done much in explaining the true position and principles of the colony, and had awakened the interest of several of the most distinguished statesmen of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate. But the Restoration sent all these into retirement or exile, if not to the prison and the block, and raised to power the hitherto scattered adherents of Charles II. The new ministers were to be conciliated, and a new monarch was to be petitioned; and the complete success with which this was accomplished and the charter at length obtained, reflects the highest credit on the ability and the address of the humble envoy from Rhode Island. So completely surprised were those who had opposed him, that they did not fail to charge him with deception and fraud. The charge has been sometimes reiterated by subsequent historians, but it has been amply refuted by Mr. Bancroft and other American writers, and is completely annihilated by Mr. Arnold by means of documentary evidence, much of which is here published for the first time.

In the year 1656 commenced the persecution of the Quakers in Massachusetts. In October of this year, the General Court passed its famous order against them, with a preamble beginning, "Whereas, there is a cursed sect of hereticks lately risen up in the world which are comonly called Quakers." Several of these people immediately fled to Rhode Island, and the colony, especially at Newport, became a place of refuge for the hated sect. An attempt was immediately made by the United colonies to induce the government of Rhode Island to drive them from its jurisdiction, but the authorities replied that they could not punish for religious opinions, but that if the Quakers refused to conform to the laws, complaint against them would be made in England. This persecution continued in Massachusetts for five years, when, on the restoration of the monarchy in England, it was stopped by the order of Charles II. Many of the inhabitants of Rhode Island adopted the new opinions from the Quakers who fled to the colony; members

of the sect also came there and settled from England and from Barbadoes; but they were never molested or in any manner called to account, and at one period they appear to have united as a political party, and to have acquired the ascendancy in the government. Among the numerous victims of this law who suffered the various penalties of fines, imprisonments, whippings and death at Boston, several of the most conspicuous were inhabitants of Rhode Island. They were protected there solely on the ground of religious freedom. The colony at first had no sympathy with their doctrines or their practice. Roger Williams opposed them in argument, and when seventy years of age, went to Newport in an open boat, which he rowed with his own hands, in order to hold a public discussion with George Fox, their most distinguished champion. But no aversion to their doctrines could make him or his compeers in the government lose sight for a moment of the distinction between personal argument and legislative force, or induce them in the slightest degree to encroach on the inalienable liberty of the human soul. They resisted the importunities of the united colonies, and even petitioned the government of Cromwell that they might not be compelled to exercise any civil power over men's consciences.

The only instance in which an attempt, even, has been made to charge upon Rhode Island any departure from the principle of unqualified religious freedom, relates to a law said to have been passed in March, 1664, and contained in the earliest printed collection of the colonial statutes. This statute, as printed first in 1719, provides "that all men [professing Christianity] and of competent estates and of civil conversation, who acknowledge and are obedient to the civil magistrate, though of different judgments in religious affairs [Roman Catholics only excepted], shall be admitted freemen, and shall have liberty to choose and be chosen officers in the colony, both military and civil." It has been often referred to as an unqualified proof that Rhode Island had proved faithless to her own principles, and been guilty of limiting citizenship to men "professing Christianity," and also of proscribing Roman Catholics. This charge, however, is by no means admitted to be just. It is true that such a statute is found in the earliest printed edition of the laws;



but it is not true that any such statute has ever been found in the legislative records of the State, though these records contain a multitude of enactments wholly at variance with it. Roger Williams was one of the assistants in this legislature, and was appointed by it to transcribe the new charter, the very terms of which condemned any such enactment not less than his own most cherished principles. Besides, at this very session laws of precisely the opposite character were enacted; a few years later Jews came to reside in the colony, and were admitted as citizens without question, and there were withal no Roman Catholics in the colony or in either of the neighboring colonies. Mr. Arnold pronounces these restrictive clauses to be "additions of later times," interpolated by some transcriber of copies of the laws that were to be sent to England. In full accordance with this opinion is the testimony of Mr. Samuel Eddy, who was for many years Secretary of State in Rhode Island, and who published the result of his careful and repeated examinations of the Records, and also of Mr. John R. Bartlett, the present occupant of that office, whose compilation of the colonial records, now in the course of publication, deservedly ranks among the most thoroughly prepared contributions ever made to the materials for American history. Difficult as it always is to prove a negative, we consider it well nigh demonstrable that no such statute was ever enacted in Rhode Island.

In 1686, commenced in New England the despotic sway by which James II. was, at that time, attempting to overthrow the liberties of the British empire on either side of the Atlantic. Writs of *quo warranto* had already been served upon the colony, and the government had made its submission to the authority of the king, and declined to stand suit with his majesty on the question of the royal prerogative. In December, 1686, Sir Edmund Andros arrived at Boston with a commission from the king, appointing him governor of New England, and clothing him with an authority little less than absolute over all the settlements. The charters of the several colonies fell before him, and their governments were all concentrated in his hands. Free New England was stripped of her popular institutions; her towns were garrisoned by soldiers, and her

people were compelled to submit to the arbitrary sway of the hated viceroy of James II. Rhode Island suffered in common with all her neighbors, though, as she was without an ecclesiastical establishment, she presented fewer points to provoke the despotic changes of Andros. The king, himself a Roman Catholic, and bent on establishing the Roman church in Protestant England, had put forth a "Declaration for the Liberty of Conscience," in order to further the advancement of his favorite faith. This "Declaration" became, of course, an element in the new administration. It immediately overthrew the theocratic institutions of the other New England colonies; but in Rhode Island there was nothing of the kind to overthrow, for by the very terms of her charter, both Episcopalians and Roman Catholics were as free to worship there as were Baptists or Quakers. It also chanced, that in the disputes which the colony was still carrying on, respecting a portion of her territory, the royal governor decided in her favor. In consequence of these and some other incidents in the administration of Andros, it is probable that Rhode Island suffered less than either of her sisters, during this gloomy period of tyranny and violence. A second commission to Andros annexed New York and New Jersey to the dominion over which he was to rule, and Rhode Island became a mere county in the broad principality that was placed beneath his jurisdiction.

But at an unexpected moment, intelligence was received at Boston that the Prince of Orange had landed in England, and had made his way to London without opposition, and that James II. had deserted his throne and fled from the kingdom. Scarcely had the fact been announced to the people, when Andros was already on his way from the council chamber to the prison. The sceptre immediately fell from his now nerveless grasp, and that colossal fabric of despotic power, which extended from the banks of the Penobscot to the shores of Lake Erie, faded away forever, "like the unsubstantial pageant of a dream." The governments of the several colonies were soon re-established as they were before the arrival of the fallen viceroy, and his entire career forms but an exciting episode in New England history, without affecting in the slightest degree the course of

subsequent events. In Rhode Island, as in the other colonies, he had demanded the surrender of the charter, but when he came to receive it, the instrument had been taken from the archives, and could nowhere be found. It was now drawn forth from its concealment, and again installed in its wonted authority, though not till after serious and disreputable delay on account of the timidity of those who should have resumed their offices in the government.

But we have lingered longer than we intended over these passages of early Rhode Island history, as they are suggested by Mr. Arnold's volume. They borrow their interest and importance, not from the magnitude of the colony, or the wisdom of its inhabitants, but solely from the nature of the principles which they illustrate. They present to us a little group of settlements springing into existence in the first half of the seventeenth century on the shores of a beautiful New England bay, and alone, of all the colonies and states of that or of any preceding age, asserting and constantly maintaining, that the civil magistrate has no right to dictate in matters of religion. Toleration, as broad as Christianity itself, had before been wrought into the legislation of Protestant Holland, and had been still more distinctly embodied in the charter of Roman Catholic Maryland. But here was asserted, and carried into practice, the idea of perfect religious freedom—a freedom inherent in the human soul itself, which compacts and laws might indeed guarantee and recognize, but which compacts and laws could neither give nor take away. Of this freedom the history of Rhode Island records the earliest incorporation in a civil society; and the struggles through which it made its way, amid the ignorance and folly of its friends, as well as the contempt and obloquy of its foes, till at length it triumphs over both, and becomes the priceless possession, or the kindling aspiration of every people in Christendom. This history we now leave at the close of the seventeenth century, with which the volume before us comes to an end. But even here, the grand idea which it celebrates is no longer the despised and persecuted heresy that it was sixty years before, when first incorporated in the plantations of Providence. The great events



of the age—the English Revolution of 1688, the Act of Toleration, and the liberal policy of William and Mary—had all given it countenance and encouragement, and were imperceptibly aiding in that ultimate triumph which it has since accomplished among all the varieties of the English race, wherever they are scattered in the four quarters of the globe.

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ARTICLE IV.—WHAT ARE THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR  
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF BAPTISM?

AMONG Baptists there is no controversy as to the sole authority of the Bible, and especially of the New Testament, as the rule of faith and practice for Christians and Christian churches. They learn this lesson of Scripture authority from the very words of Christ himself. "My sheep," he says, "hear my voice, and they follow me." The New Testament is Christ's "voice." It is therein, as Paul tells us, that God has "spoken unto us by his Son." Accordingly, we all hold, that no practice in religion can be valid unless it be *authorized by the New Testament*. It must have the sanction of this, Christ's "voice," or it is not "following" him. And it is equally obvious, that it is the whole business of Christians, as the sheep of Christ, thus to follow him in all things, and at all times.

The question, then, in regard to the essential qualifications of the administrator of Christian baptism, is simply a question of Scriptural authority and instruction. If the New Testament is entirely silent on this subject, then no special qualifications are essential. If, on the contrary, it prescribes any qualifications, then those qualifications must be found in every one whose administration of the rite is valid. The following will, I think, be found to be a careful exhibition of the whole Scripture testimony on this subject:

I.—*Do the Scriptures prescribe any qualifications for the administrator of baptism?*

Consider what the *negative* of this proposition amounts to. If the Scriptures *do not* present any qualifications for the administrator, that is, do not lay down any *law* on the subject of the administrator of baptism, then any person, any man, woman, or child, who has the physical power, may lawfully administer this sacred rite. For, where there is no law, there can be no transgression. It would follow, too, that no church has the right to restrict the administering of baptism to any one person or class of persons; for this would be to usurp the authority of the Lawgiver, and to make laws where He has made none; and hence, a candidate for admission to a church may choose his own administrator, and be as lawfully baptized by any one else as by the pastor of the church himself.

Nor is this all. If no qualifications are prescribed, and no law whatever is laid down,—if all that is required is simply an immersion in the name of the Trinity, according to the commission, “He that believeth *and is baptized*,” no matter by whom,—then there is no necessity for an administrator at all, and every one may lawfully *baptize himself*!—just as the Israelites, in a certain sense, baptized themselves “in the cloud and in the sea,” when they went down, in obedience to Moses, into and through the channel of the Red Sea, and under the cloud. 1 Cor. x. 2. Indeed, if baptism, as this hypothesis makes it, be simply an act of individual duty, like faith and repentance, it is more properly self-administered. No one thinks of administering faith and repentance, or of making them dependent upon the presence and agency of another. It was this view of the subject that gave rise to the sect of *Se-Baptists*, that sprung up in England about the beginning of the seventeenth century, and who maintained, as their name imported, that it was lawful for every one to baptize himself.

As a preliminary question, then, it is necessary to inquire first, *whether the Scriptures require an administrator at all*. If it be not lawful to baptize one’s self, then there must be

some law against it, thus rendering it unlawful. Where is that law? In the following particulars:

1. Christ has enjoined *the duty of baptizing*—has required persons to act as administrators of the ordinance to others, and actually employed them in this capacity. Thus he employed John the Baptist, who confessed that he was “sent” for this very purpose, viz., “*to baptize with water.*” John i. 33. The Pharisees, and John’s hearers generally, understood that they were to receive the ordinance from him, and that it was not lawful for them to administer it to themselves, for they invariably went to him for that purpose. Matt. iii. 7. And Christ as much as tells us, that this was so *ordered*, when he says, “All the people who heard him (John), and the publicans, justified God, being baptized *with the baptism of John*; but the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against themselves, being not baptized *of him.*” Luke vii. 29, 30.

Thus, too, the Apostles, during our Lord’s ministry, were commissioned by him to baptize. John iv. 2. At the close of his ministry, he renewed and extended this commission, when he *commanded* them to “teach all nations, *baptizing them,*” &c. Matt. xxviii. 19. Does this not show that Christ deemed an administrator necessary?

2. All *the examples* of baptism in the Scripture record confirm this supposition. Not one instance is to be found of a person’s performing the rite upon himself. The practice of John’s hearers has already been mentioned; and the same practice prevailed under the ministry of the apostles, both before and after our Lord’s ascension. The case of the eunuch is an example: Acts viii. 36–38. His promptness and eagerness in requesting baptism at the hands of Philip, show plainly that he did not think it lawful to dispense with an administrator.

3. The *symbolical import* of baptism, which is a spiritual *burial*, teaches the same thing—the necessity of an administrator. Who ever heard of one’s burying himself? Paul uses this symbol, in speaking of baptism, and also the kindred one of a “*planting.*” which equally implies the agency of an



administrator: Rom. vi. 4. In connection with this, the Apostle represents the believer's baptism as bearing a resemblance to Christ's burial. See verses 5 and 11. But Christ did not bury himself. Nor does the sinner, when he does that which his subsequent baptism expresses, that is, when he dies to sin, work this great change in himself. To dispense with an administrator, therefore (bearing in mind the symbolical import of the rite), would teach rank Pelagianism, by thereby denying the Spirit's agency in conversion, or making the subject of this great change the sole author of it.

4. *The example of our Lord himself* is to the same effect. His baptism, as far as it could be, was designed to be a *model* baptism, as his own words at the time intimate. See Matt. iii. 15. Christ did not baptize himself, but received the rite at the hands of John, thus laying down the rule for all others to follow.

5. The last and perhaps the best proof of the position, is the fact that our Lord, during his personal ministry, *acted himself as administrator*, through his disciples. John iii. 22—"After these things came Jesus and his disciples into the land of Judea; and there he (Jesus) tarried with them and *baptized*." "And John *also* was baptizing;" that is, John and Jesus were doing the same thing. Verse 26—"And they (John's disciples) came unto John and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou bearest witness, behold *the same baptizeth*, and all men come to him." In the first verse of the next chapter, it is stated that "the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and *baptized* more disciples than John." Nor should we have known but that he baptized them in person, just as John did, if it had not been added, "though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples."

Christ has therefore established, and illustrated by his own example, the order which he intended should prevail. That order has never been repealed. It is, then, the law of Christ, as plainly laid down in the New Testament, that *an administrator* of some kind is necessary to the validity of the ordinance.

But is this all that that law requires? Does it authorize any

and everybody to act as an administrator, or does it *restrict the right to persons of specified qualifications?*

I must here again remind the reader, that this is a question, not of expediency, of natural propriety, or of uncertain inference, but of plain *Scripture law*. If *that law* does not demand a qualified administrator, no man or set of men has any right to demand one, or to make this a condition of valid baptism; but if that law does demand this, then no one has any right to set aside this demand, or to modify it in any degree, by making it either more or less than Christ has made it. The question can be answered only by an examination of that law. This we will do by attending carefully to the following particulars; viz., 1, the first appointment of administrators of baptism; 2, the examples of its administration as recorded in the Scriptures; 3, the design of the ordinance.

1. *The first appointment of administrators.* The New Testament records show that the first administrators of baptism acted under divine appointment. Now such appointment plainly restricts the right of administering the ordinance to such persons as those who thus received that appointment, unless it can be shown by subsequent inspired testimony that such a restriction was not intended.

The first appointment was that of John the Baptist, who says, expressly, that he was "sent to baptize." This appointment, too, he regarded as proceeding from Christ the Son, as well as from the Father; for he calls himself "the friend," or attendant, "of the bridegroom," which, of course, implies choice or appointment by the bridegroom, and declares that "the Father hath given all things into his (the Son's) hands;" among which "all things" we are to reckon his being sent to act as the forerunner of the Messiah. This view accords with the prophecy in Malachi with reference to John—"Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way *before me*." Mal. iii. 1. Here the person sending is the person whose way is prepared: that is, it is Christ himself. I have dwelt longer on this point than the argument in hand required, because Robert Hall and others deny that John the Baptist acted under appointment from Christ, and thence try to make it appear that his baptism was not Christian baptism.

John did not employ any assistants in administering the ordinance, for all the baptisms under his ministry are expressly said to have been performed by him personally. "Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the regions round about Jordan, and were *baptized of him* in Jordan." Matt. iii. 5, 6. See also Luke vii. 29, 30, where the "Pharisees and lawyers" are said to have "rejected the counsel of God against themselves, *not being baptized of him.*" This shows that they were not only required to be baptized, but to be baptized by John himself. They were not at liberty to choose any administrator they might think proper, but were required to receive the ordinance at his hands only.

It is evident, therefore, that in John's time the right to administer the ordinance was restricted; a qualified administrator was necessary to its validity.

The record shows, too, what were John's qualifications as administrator of baptism. They were the following: *First*, he held and practised believers' baptism only, or immersion on a profession of faith in the Messiah. It is expressly called "the baptism of *repentance* (Mark i. 4; Luke iii. 3; Acts xiii. 24, xix. 4), and is described as having been performed "in the river Jordan," and in places where there was much water. That he did not himself receive the rite was simply because there was no one qualified to administer it to him. Had it been lawful for any and every one to baptize, he would certainly have received the rite, which he desired to do at the hands of Jesus. See Matt. iii. 14. John's not being baptized, then, so far from proving that any one has the right to baptize, proves exactly the reverse. *Secondly*, John was *duly appointed* to administer the ordinance. It was a part of the discharge of the office, which, as we have seen, he regularly received from Christ,—a part of the ministry to which he was divinely ordained. Are *these two qualifications* to be found in any *Pedobaptist* administrator of the ordinance?

The next appointment of baptizers made by our Lord was that of his immediate disciples, at the beginning of his personal ministry. In John iv. 2, it is stated that "Jesus baptized not, but his disciples." This was previous to his choos-



ing "the twelve apostles," and to his appointment of "the seventy," though several, as Andrew, John, Peter, Philip and Nathaniel, who soon after this became apostles, had already attached themselves to him. John i. 37-49. The fact that he is said to have baptized through them sufficiently, proves that he appointed them to this service. Here it is to be noted, however, that the disciples of Christ, during the whole of his ministry, are nowhere said to have baptized except as his agents or substitutes merely. They received at that time no general commission to baptize. When the twelve apostles were chosen and sent out, to baptize was made no part of their duty. They were simply to preach and to perform miracles. See Matt. x. 1-8; Mark iii. 13-15; vi. 7-13. And the same was true of "the seventy," whom he subsequently appointed. Luke x. 1-16. Our Lord reserved to himself, or to his own immediate direction, the baptizing of the disciples whom the apostles and the seventy were instrumental in gathering. Yet the record tells us that he employed some of the disciples, most probably the apostles, or those who became such, to perform the rite for him.

What, then, were the qualifications of these baptizers? *First*, they were *disciples* of Christ, and as such had themselves been baptized. If they had been John's disciples they must have been baptized, for, as already shown, had they neglected or refused the rite, they would, like the Pharisees and lawyers, have "rejected the counsel of God against themselves," and thereby proved themselves to be no disciples at all. If they first became disciples under Christ, they must have been baptized, for his uniform method, as we are expressly told, was to "make *and baptize* disciples." Moreover, he had taught by his example that baptism was a part of "all righteousness." To have permitted any of his disciples to omit this duty, then, would have been to nullify the law which he had himself so solemnly ratified. *Secondly*, they baptized by special authority from Christ. They did not, it will be observed, baptize because *any person* might lawfully do this, or because *any disciple* or pious person might, but because Christ had appointed *them* to do this. We have a divine warrant for

employing *such* administrators ; have we such a warrant for the employment of any others ?

The next and last appointment of administrators was that of *the eleven Apostles*, at the close of our Lord's ministry. Matthew thus records it : " Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them. And when they saw him they worshipped him, but some doubted. And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, *baptizing* them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," &c., Matt. xxviii. 16-20. From its being stated here that " some doubted," it has been supposed that the persons present on the occasion were not the eleven Apostles only, but the " five hundred brethren" also, alluded to by Paul (1 Cor. xv. 6); " for this (some doubting) could hardly be supposed true of any of the eleven," says Dr. Robinson, " after what had already happened to them in Jerusalem and Galilee, and after having been appointed to meet their risen Lord at this very time and place." Whether there were other persons present on the occasion or not, it is certain that the commission containing the command to baptize was addressed exclusively to the eleven. The language of Matthew admits of no other construction. Mark records a similar meeting on a previous occasion, and restricts the commission as there given, just as Matthew does, to " the eleven." Mark, xvi. 15, 16. The language of Mark is, " He that believeth *and is baptized*," &c. Because no allusion is here made to the *administrator*, but only to the recipient of the rite, the expression is not to be understood as teaching that it is immaterial by whom the baptism is administered. The language in reference to baptism is *elliptical*, just as it is in reference to "*believing*." If the expression, " is baptized," may be understood as enjoining *an immersion* simply, no matter how or by whom administered, then the expression " believeth" may be understood as enjoining *belief* simply, no matter in whom or in what exercised. Both expressions are to be understood according to the general teachings of the Scriptures on the subjects to which they respectively refer. Mark's account

is very brief, as is his Gospel generally, and is to be understood according to the more particular and extended record of Matthew.

The commission was not given to the Apostles *as Apostles*, but as ministers of the Gospel merely; for there is no duty therein laid down that required apostolical or extraordinary qualifications. They were simply to carry out Christ's instructions, and to enjoin "whatsoever he had commanded them." This, as we learn from the subsequent history, others besides the Apostles did, but not that all the disciples did it, or thought they were to do it.

The persons then whom Christ, in the commission, appointed to administer the rite of baptism, were (1) his regularly *baptized disciples*, and (2) *authorized preachers of the Gospel*. The duty of baptizing is coupled with that of "teaching." The commission, then, authorizes none but regularly baptized preachers of the Gospel to administer the ordinance of baptism. This is *the law* of baptism. If we baptize at all, we do it in obedience to this law, which we are bound to obey in every part, unless it can be shown that Christ, the law-giver, has repealed or modified some part of it.

2. The examples, in the Scriptures, of the administration of the rite are next to be attended to, as determining whether *qualifications* are required in the administrator in order to the validity of the rite. These examples show how inspired men understood the law referred to, and they are, therefore, authoritative interpreters of it.

I have already referred to the baptisms which occurred previous to our Lord's ascension, and which were administered, as we have seen, by John the Baptist, and Christ's immediate disciples for him. Our inquiry now has respect to the period subsequent to his ascension. I there find *nine* instances of the administration of the rite. In the most of these it is not plainly stated who the administrators were; but even then the circumstances indicate them with sufficient clearness.

The *first* is the baptism of the three thousand on the day of Pentecost: Acts ii. 37-41. This occurred soon after the Apostles received the commission, and was the first baptism



administered under it. It required them to "teach and baptize." In pursuance of this, "Peter standing up with the eleven, lifted up his voice and said," &c. ; that is, he proceeded first to teach or make disciples of his hearers. In reply to their penitent inquiry, he enjoins "repentance *and baptism.*" And with this they complied, for it is immediately added, "Then they that gladly received his word *were baptized.*" It is not stated that the Apostles baptized them, but this is the plain inference from all that is recorded respecting the giving of the commission to the Apostles, and their evident pursuance of its instructions in the case of these persons. This is the natural presumption, and there is no proof to the contrary.

The next baptism is that of the Samaritans: Acts viii. 1-12. A severe persecution of the Christians followed the martyrdom of Stephen, which forced many of them from Jerusalem into the surrounding regions. "Therefore, they that were scattered abroad went everywhere preaching the word. Then Philip went down to the city of Samaria, and preached Christ unto them. When they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women." Here it is not said that Philip baptized them, but this is plainly to be inferred from his having performed the other part of the ministerial duty, as laid down in the commission; and there is no intimation that he employed others to baptize for him. But who was Philip? Luke here speaks of him as one who "preached," and elsewhere as an "*Evangelist.*" Acts xxi. 8. Paul applies this appellation to Timothy (2 Tim. iv. 5), and uses it to indicate a distinct ministerial office in the Church of Christ. Eph. iv. 11. Philip was not a deacon only, but a regular minister of the Gospel.

The next baptism is that of the Ethiopian eunuch, by Philip: Acts viii. 26-40. We have already seen who Philip was. It is a significant fact in this case, that the eunuch requested and received the rite *immediately*. Had it been lawful for him to receive it from any and every one, he might have waited till he reached home, that his example might the better testify in favor of the religion he had embraced. But

there was no one there qualified to baptize him, and hence his dispatch.

The next is the baptism of Paul: Acts ix. 10-18, xxii. 12-16. The administrator in this case undoubtedly was Ananias. He was specially sent to visit him. This he did alone. He exhorted Paul to "arise and be baptized," and Luke says that he did do this "forthwith." Ananias was a prominent "disciple," and most probably a preacher.

The next baptism is that of Cornelius and his company: Acts x. 47, 48. The parties here referred to as present at the baptism were the baptized, Peter, and the "brethren" who accompanied him from Joppa. As Peter did not administer the rite himself, one or more of these "brethren" must have done it, for the record shows that there were no other persons present. The reason why Peter himself did not baptize on this occasion, doubtless was, that he wished, by inducing them to take a more active part, to secure the strong co-operation of these Jewish Christians, in this the first admission of the Gentiles to equal privileges in the Christian church. Accordingly, when called to an account for this transaction, he appeals to these very "brethren." See Acts xi. 12. Whether they were ministers or not, it is certain that those of them who baptized on this occasion acted under the special authority of an inspired Apostle, and as "brethren," were regular members of the church.

The baptism of Lydia and her household, at Philippi, is next in order: Acts xvi. 14, 15. This was the first conversion and baptism in that city; and Paul and Silas were the only agents in it. One or the other must have administered the rite.

The next is the baptism of the jailer and his household, soon after this, in the same city: Acts xvi. 33. Here again, it will be seen, either Paul or Silas must have baptized.

The next are the baptisms at Corinth: Acts xviii. 1-8. These occurred under the preaching of Paul, Silas, and Timothy. Paul says that he himself baptized only Crispus, Gaius, and the household of Stephanas. It is natural to infer that the other two ministers baptized the rest. 1 Cor. i. 14-16.

Divisions or factions had sprung up in that church, one claiming to be of Paul, another of Apollos, &c. Paul condemns these, and earnestly refuses to occupy any such position of rivalry. In this connection he incidentally refers to the fact of his having baptized so few of them, and, under the circumstances, thanks God that it was so, since it disproved any supposed intention on his part to be a party leader among them. The intimation is plain, that the practice of baptizing belonged exclusively to the ministry. When he says, that "Christ sent him not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel," he evidently means that baptizing was only a part, and a subordinate part, of his work; for the order of the commission is, first, to "teach" or make disciples, and then to "baptize" them. "Preaching the Gospel," as Mark's rendering of our Lord's words seems to make it, includes both these duties.

The last baptism mentioned is that of the twelve "disciples," at Ephesus: Acts xix. 1-5. That these persons were baptized again, is evident from the fact that Paul ascribes their want of the gifts of the Spirit to some *fault in their baptism*. Every thing in the narrative leads us to infer that in this instance Paul was the administrator.

This case is worthy of special attention, since it furnishes an example, in Apostolic times, in which the absence of proper qualifications in the administrator occasioned, incidentally, the invalidity of the baptism, and its readministration. According to the view which is given substantially in Prof. Ripley's *Notes on the Acts*, the persons referred to, contrary to what they had supposed, *had not* received "John's baptism," in which the doctrine of "the Holy Ghost" was distinctly taught (see Matt. iii. 11), but had received what purported to be John's baptism, after John's death, and when therefore John's baptism as such had become a nullity. Had they received the rite at the hands of John himself, who, as I have already shown, was alone authorized to administer his baptism, or at the hands of any duly authorized administrator, they would not have failed to receive correct views of Gospel truth on the subject referred to by Paul. And hence, their not having been baptized by a duly authorized administrator, was, incidentally, the reason for their re-baptism.



I have thus examined all the detailed examples of baptism in the Scriptures, after the delivery of the commission, and shown, in every case, the presence of a qualified administrator, one who had himself become a "disciple," and had been duly authorized to confer the symbol of discipleship upon others.

3. The third and last source of direct testimony as to the necessity of qualifications in the administrator of baptism, is found in *the design* of the ordinance, as taught in the Scriptures.

The leading design of baptism is plainly set forth in the commission. "Baptizing in," or more properly *into* or *unto*, "the name of the Father," &c., as all good critics agree, means "baptizing into a profession of faith in the Trinity." The phrase is fully explained by comparing it with the similar one in 1 Cor. x. 2, where the descent of the Israelites into the Red Sea, at the command of Moses, is figuratively called their "baptism unto Moses," because it was an act in form like baptism, that is, a species of *immersion*, and was at the same time a profession of their faith in him, and a pledge of their allegiance to him as a divinely appointed leader. Baptism, then, according to the express terms of the law itself, is a solemn public profession and pledge of discipleship under Christ. Now this pledge cannot be given except to one duly authorized to receive it. It is a formal, official transaction, like taking the oath of allegiance or naturalization, which, according to the laws and customs of all nations, must be administered by *an officer of the law*. In perfect accordance with this view, Paul describes baptism as the "putting on of Christ." "As many of you as have been *baptized into Christ* have put on Christ." Gal. iii. 27. This is a military metaphor, according to which baptism is the putting on of the badge or uniform of Christ's soldiers—the formal enlistment and enrollment into his army. But only an *authorized and official agent* can lawfully enlist soldiers and invest them with the proscribed badge.

But further. The man who puts on a military uniform, by that very act identifies himself with a company or army. It is preparatory to, and a part of the ceremony of *enrolment*.

So is baptism an act by which the recipient identifies himself with, and is enrolled among, Christ's regular army — his church; by whom he is recognized as "the *Captain* of their salvation." To change the metaphor, it is the *porch* to the church, through which all must pass in order to enter, and which, like a porch, is designed to be the medium of entrance. If it fails to subserve this purpose, then it fails of its object. Hence, by a very common figure of speech, baptism, in the Scriptures, is sometimes put for full admission into the church — a part for the whole — entering the *porch* for entering *the house* to which it leads. Thus John's disciples said of Christ (John i. 26), "The same *baptizeth*, and all men come to him." They meant, "he *gathers or makes disciples*." So in the commission, as recorded by Mark, the expression, "believeth *and is baptized*," evidently includes union with the church, the fold of Christ. This practical effect of baptism, in initiating into the church, is asserted, or alluded to, by Paul, when he says, "we are all *baptized into one body*." It is no objection to this view, that in some instances, as in the case of the eunuch for example, the person baptized could not and did not immediately attach himself to a church; for that was the best he could do; and that he could not immediately enter *the house*, was no reason why he should not enter *the porch*, and thus be ready for full admission whenever the opportunity might offer.

Now, if baptism be thus initiatory into the church, then two things, among others, are necessary to its valid administration; *first*, the church must authorize the administration in every case; and, *secondly*, the person baptized must receive the rite for the specific purpose of thereby becoming a member of the church. Initiation is reception to something, in whole or in part. The party receiving it is therefore the party that initiates. It is *the church* that receives any one to its membership. It is really the part of the church, therefore, to initiate him. But as the church cannot perform the initiatory rite in its *collective* capacity, it must do it through an officer, agent, or representative, appointed for the purpose. The pastor of a church, as its official agent, is the proper per-

son to baptize, and thus administer its initiatory rite. But a church is not necessarily restricted to this functionary. In his absence, it can, for the time being, authorize one of its deacons or private members to act for it. But whoever may be the administrator, he must be one who has been *duly authorized by the church*, that is, by the party receiving or initiating the candidate.

On these principles, the rite performed by a Pedobaptist minister cannot be held valid, because he was not in any sense authorized by the receiving, initiating party—a Baptist church—to act for them. If it be objected that the Scripture examples of baptism, already referred to, do not present the administrator as acting directly as the agent of a particular church, in the performance of the rite, it is sufficient to reply that, except in one case, (the baptism at Jerusalem, on the day of Pentecost,) there was no church at or near the place of the baptism to take immediate cognizance of the matter. It was missionary ground, and the administrator acted as a missionary, just as our missionaries do at the present day under similar circumstances, that is, under the general authority and implied sanction of the church from which he held his credentials as a minister of the Gospel. He acted in exact accordance with the commission, which prescribes the duties of ministers in the character of *missionaries*, and not as settled *pastors*. Under such circumstances he would be obliged to act somewhat on his own responsibility, or under the general sanction of his church; but as soon as a sufficient number of persons were baptized, and a church organized, the case would be altered, and the commission alone would no longer apply. He would then act as the missionary *pastor* of that church, and would henceforth baptize in conformity with, and in obedience to, its wishes.

The ministry is an office *in* the church—"set in the church"—as Paul expresses it. 1 Cor. xii. 28; Eph. iv. 11, 12. It is not superior to, nor independent of the church, but receives its appointment and derives its authority from the church, as "the body of Christ," and is responsible to it in the execution of its office. No minister, therefore, ever bap-



tizes *absolutely* on his own responsibility. If he acts not as the pastor of a particular church, and by its special authority, he acts under the general authority which his church has given him to decide for them in such cases. He is still their agent. Otherwise, the ministry would not be an office "*in* the church," but *over* it, as indeed all the unscriptural forms of church polity make it.

In the one instance of baptism where there was a church, that is, at Jerusalem, there is no intimation that the church was not consulted with reference to the baptism, or that it was administered by the apostles wholly on their own responsibility. The contrary supposition is entirely consistent with the narrative, and derives additional countenance from the fact that the apostles had a short time before thought it proper to co-operate with the church in a matter of even greater importance—the choice of an apostle to supply the place of Judas. Acts i. 15–26.

Again: Baptism being an initiatory rite, it also follows that the person receiving it must distinctly intend thereby to become a member of the church—the church of the New Testament; he must make it what it was intended to be, initiatory to such a church. Now, when a person receives immersion at the hands of a Pedobaptist minister, what does that immersion do? It certainly does not initiate him into a *Baptist* church, for this was no part of the intention, either by the recipient or the administrator. It is, however inconsistently, an initiation into a *Pedobaptist* society—a mere substitute for infant sprinkling. Now, can that be baptism, in the estimation of a Baptist, which subserves such a purpose? With as much propriety could this nation regard the oath of allegiance, which one has taken to a *foreign* nation, as valid, and as sufficient for his investiture with the rights of citizenship in *this nation*—that is, as a proper substitute for the oath of naturalization or of allegiance to this nation. The form of the oath in the case of each nation might be substantially the same, but while the intention and practical effect were so wholly different in the two cases, the oath itself must be different also.

If it be said in reply, the immersion in such a case was at least a *profession of faith in Christ*, whatever other and erroneous purposes it may have subserved ; I answer, it has already been proved that baptism, to be valid, must involve something more than this. It has been made apparent that from the time of John the Baptist to the end of the apostolic era, it served, as it was designed, to distinguish its subject not as a believer merely, but as a member of the true fold of Christ—his “*body*” of baptized followers. But even on the supposition that baptism is simply a profession of faith, an immersion into a Pedobaptist society could not be a valid baptism, because the faith thus professed is not a scriptural and valid one. It is the profession, after all, of the *Pedobaptist faith*—of a faith which leads the subject into a Pedobaptist society. No one holding and avowing such a faith could be admitted to baptism in any intelligent, orthodox Baptist church, for the obvious reason that his faith would not be the faith of such a church. (“How can two walk together unless they agree?”) And hence, when he repudiates this faith, and becomes a *Baptist*, he then needs to be immersed upon a profession of *that faith*. His former faith having been cast away, the act by which he professed it should be cast away also.

II. The other ground for the supposed validity of Pedobaptist immersions, is, that their administrators are to be regarded as *evangelists*, and evangelists are expressly authorized by the Scriptures to baptize. An *evangelist* is certainly a qualified administrator ; but is a Pedobaptist minister really an evangelist according to *the Scriptures*? Is he such an evangelist as the Scriptures authorize to administer baptism? A reference to the three places where the evangelist is mentioned, will determine this.

The first is Acts xxi. 8—“And we entered into the house of Philip the evangelist, who was one of the seven, and abode with him.” “One of the seven” here means one of the seven deacons, appointed by the church in Jerusalem soon after the Pentecost. See Acts vi. 5. Philip had been a deacon, but had exchanged this office for that of an evangelist. As an evangelist, then, he was a baptized man and a member of the church, which is not true of a Pedobaptist minister.

The next reference is Eph. iv. 11, 12—"And he (Christ) gave (that is, appointed) some apostles, and some prophets, and some *evangelists*, and some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying (or building up) of the body of Christ." "The body of Christ" here means the church, the whole body of Christ's baptized disciples as organized into separate local churches or congregations. This is plain from the mention of *pastors* along with apostles, evangelists, &c. The duty of pastors undoubtedly is to build up, or "edify," local churches, congregations of baptized believers; and yet the text associates *evangelists* with them, as participants in the same general work—the building up and extension of the New Testament church. Now it is simply a fact that Pedobaptist ministers are not thus employed; and hence that they do not answer to this description of an evangelist, according to Baptist principles. This is evident from the fact, that if their labors were universally successful, the church of the New Testament, the only true Church of Christ, as Baptists view it, so far from being "edified," or built up, through their labors, would be banished from the earth. And this is the direct testimony even of the act of the immersion when performed by a Pedobaptist minister, for the design and result of the act, at the time at least, is to build up Pedobaptist societies, and consequently to supersede and destroy Baptist organizations. If Christ then appointed evangelists for the building up of his church, and if the actual performance of this duty is an essential characteristic of them, then Pedobaptist ministers are not *Scriptural* evangelists, and hence their immersions are not valid baptisms.

The last reference is 2 Tim. iv. 5—"But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, do the work of an *evangelist*, make full proof of thy ministry." Paul here calls Timothy "an evangelist," and charges him to "preach *the word*," assigning as a reason, that "the time will come when they will not endure *sound doctrine*, but will turn away their ears from the truth, and be turned unto fables." The qualifications of an evangelist, then, as exemplified in Timothy, are, first, mem-



bership in a church of baptized believers; and secondly, the practice of preaching "*the word*,"—the whole truth of God. The administrators in question certainly have not these qualifications; and hence, though in a certain sense they may be regarded as evangelists, yet not in that sense that entitles them to act as administrators of the baptismal rite. The evangelist *of the Scriptures* is entitled to baptize, but no other. The evangelists, of whom Paul speaks, were a class or order of preachers "given" or appointed by Christ, and present in the apostles' times. Will any Baptist admit that the administrators of Pedobaptist immersions answer to this description?

But it may be asked, does not the commission make it the duty of all preachers to baptize? and are not Pedobaptist ministers preachers? I answer, they are not *such* preachers as that commission authorized to baptize. I have already shown that commission was given to the *baptized* apostles, and that none but baptized persons were appointed and employed to administer the ordinance during the whole time of the apostles.

But it may be said, *John the Baptist* preached and baptized without being himself baptized, and this, too, in the character of an evangelist. If this example of John authorizes an *unbaptized* person to baptize, it certainly does not authorize *any and every* unbaptized person to do this; much less does it authorize a *Pedobaptist* to do this. It can at best authorize only one *in like circumstances* to do it. There were four things true of John as a baptizer, which distinguish him from Pedobaptist ministers. 1. He could not receive the rite at the hands of a qualified, that is, a baptized administrator. 2. He was specially raised up and "sent" to introduce the rite of baptism. Hence his name, "*the Baptist*." 3. He desired to be immersed himself, as he confessed to Christ, when about to administer the rite to him. And, 4. He faithfully preached and practiced what he could not himself exemplify—believers' baptism. He never sprinkled infants, and he never immersed believers with a view to their thereby becoming members of a Pedobaptist society. But Pedobaptist ministers, unlike John the Baptist, *can* be Scripturally baptized. They are not raised

up to introduce the rite ; they do not themselves desire to receive it ; and they do not faithfully preach and practise believers' baptism, but more frequently sprinkle infants in place of it ; and when they baptize believers, do this practically to make them Pedobaptists. John's case, therefore, is wholly different from that of Pedobaptist ministers, and can by no means be pleaded in justification of their immersions.

It is not true, as some suppose, that John the Baptist was, strictly speaking, an evangelist, or that his office as the forerunner of Christ ceased at his baptism of the Saviour. He declared the whole purpose and character of his mission when he said, "*That he [Christ] should be made manifest to Israel, therefore am I come baptizing in water.*"—John i. 31. Accordingly, he lived and labored just long enough to "manifest" or introduce him to *the Jews* (he never thought of acting the part of an evangelist, and making him manifest to *the world generally*), and as soon as Christ entered upon his ministry, John's work ceased ; the morning star was lost amid the glory of the rising sun. Paul settles the question, by declaring that the appointment by our Lord of "evangelists," did not take place till the time "when he ascended up on high," which was several years after the death of John ; see Eph. iv. 8, 11. Even the apostles were not appointed to their work, except in a very subordinate sense, until that time. Previous to that, they were but little more than mere pupils and assistants of Christ. The commission first set them apart as apostles and evangelists ; John, therefore, never baptized as an evangelist, but always as *the forerunner* of Christ.

But it may be asked, do not the Divine blessing and approval, which seem to accompany the labors of Pedobaptist ministers, establish their evangelism, and, by consequence, their right to administer the rite of baptism ? I answer, this would be to array God's *dealings* against his inspired *Word*. What God, as a Sovereign, may be pleased to do, is no rule or law to us. "*Secret things* belong to the Lord our God, but the things which are *revealed* belong to us, and to our children, forever."—Deut. xxix. 29. "These," it is said of the Bereans, "were more noble than those of Thessalonica, in that they

searched *the Scriptures* daily, whether those things were so." —Acts xvii. 11. This wholly forbids us, as in this case, to set aside the plain teachings of the Bible for uncertain inferences, or for what may seem to some the reason of things. Reason has nothing to do, as a guide, where the Bible speaks to us.

We have, then, no authority from the Bible for regarding Pedobaptist immersions as valid baptisms. The whole Bible testimony on the subject I have shown to be distinctly and emphatically against them. The only reason why we baptize at all, is because the Scriptures require it. This is the reason why we insist upon immersion as baptism, and this is the reason why we should demand *qualifications* in the administrator, and such qualifications, too, as are therein set forth. We have no more right to dispense with one requisite of the ordinance than another.

The only objection to the view here maintained, is, that it is supposed to involve the necessity of *an unbroken succession* of qualified, that is, baptized administrators from the apostles' times, in order to the validity of the rite in any case. But suppose it did involve this, what then? Are we, therefore, to set aside or alter the law of Christ on the subject, as already plainly shown? Certainly not. If, according to the requirements of that law, there must have been such a succession of baptizers, then we are to believe that there *has been* such a succession, until it is plainly *demonstrated* that there has not been. It is not necessary in any one, according to this view, that he should be able to *trace* his baptismal succession, but simply that *no one should be able to disprove such a succession*, by pointing out an instance, or instances, of the want of the Scriptural qualifications in the administrator, at some period in the supposed succession. The law of baptism, as we have seen, does not require a person to receive the ordinance at the hands of one whom he knows to be in regular succession from the apostles, but simply at the hands of one whom he knows to be a Scripturally qualified administrator, that is, *one who has been duly accredited as the minister or agent of a New Testament church*. If the administrator be so accredited, the



baptism, so far as that matter is concerned, is valid, no matter what the true character of the administrator may turn out to be. It is his *official*, not his *inner* character, that the candidate, or the church he joins, is required to know.

The baptismal succession, then, according to this view, is of no importance whatever. And yet we think it susceptible of proof, if it were required to prove it, that there has been such a succession, and hence that the great body of the Baptists of the present day, throughout the world, have descended in unbroken succession from the apostles. This must be so, if our churches are, as we contend, identical with the New Testament church, of which Christ expressly said, "The gates of hell *shall never prevail against it.*" This is, in fact, admitted by the highest authorities, even among Pedobaptists. Thus, Dr. Ypeig, Professor of Theology in the University of Groningen, and the Rev. J. J. Dermont, chaplain to the King of the Netherlands, the highest authority in the Dutch Reformed Church, in their "*Account of the Origin of the Dutch Baptists*" say: "We have now seen that the Baptists, who were formerly called Anabaptists, and in later times Mennonites, were the original Waldenses, and who have long, in the history of the church, received the honor of that origin. And on this account, the Baptists may be considered as *the only Christian community that has stood since the days of the apostles*, and as a Christian society has preserved *pure the doctrines of the Gospel throughout all ages.* The perfectly correct external and internal economy of the Baptist denomination tends to confirm the truth, disputed by the Romish Church, that the Reformation, brought about in the sixteenth century, was in the highest degree necessary, and at the same time goes to refute the erroneous notion of the Catholics, that their communion is the most ancient." Rev. Mr. Tustin, in his able "*Historical Discourse*," at Warren, R. I., gives the results of the best historical investigations, where he says: "The witnesses for the truth, and the dissenters from the reigning apostacy of Antichrist, were always found among thousands of sequestered groups of Christians, who loved the Gospel, and held it in its purity of doctrine and of worship; who are known in history

by the name of Novatians at Rome, the Donatists in Africa the Paulicians in Greece, the Cathari, or Puritans, in Italy; in all the south of Europe, in Germany and Holland, these Christians were known as the Albigenses, Montenses, Waldenses, and Anabaptists, names not assumed by themselves, but applied in contempt by the dominant power of the papal church." "It would be an easy and delightful task," he adds, "to trace the history of the principles of the Apostolic and primitive churches, through various channels and by various names, *in an unbroken line of succession*, from the first communities down through the long night of papal despotism, till they reappear in all their brightness and beauty, in modern times." The leading church historians have fully substantiated the truth of these statements. Baptist churches, and therefore qualified administrators, have ever existed.

It cannot be shown that the Baptist churches of the present day have not received their baptism in regular succession from the apostles. The only apparent exception is the case of *Roger Williams*. But whatever view may be taken of the validity of his baptism, it is not probable, and it certainly cannot be proved, that there is a man now living whose baptism is traceable to that of Roger Williams. This will appear from the following facts in the case, which are sustained by the best historical data:

1. Roger Williams was baptized by Ezekiel Holliman, March, 1639, and immediately after he baptized Mr. Holliman and ten others.

2. These formed a church or society, of which Roger Williams was the pastor.

3. *Four months* after his baptism, that is, in July following, Williams left the church, and never afterwards returned to it. As his doubts respecting baptism and the perpetuity of the church, which led to this step, must have commenced soon after his baptism, it is not likely that he ever baptized any others.

4. The church which Williams formed "came to nothing," or was dissolved soon after he left it.

5. It was re-organized, or another was formed, a few years

afterwards, under Mr. Thomas Olney as its pastor, who was one of the eleven baptized by Roger Williams. Olney continued to be the pastor of this church until his death, in 1682, something over thirty years.

6. In 1653 or '54, which was a few years after the formation of Olney's church, there was a division in that church on the question of "the laying on of hands" in the reception of members, and a separate church was formed for the maintenance of this ceremony, under the pastorship of Chad, Browne, Wickenden and Dexter. This church was perpetuated, having, in 1808, given up its original faith as to the laying on of hands, and is now the First Baptist Church in Providence.

7. The parent church, under Olney, gradually dwindled away, and became extinct about the year 1718, some *seventy* years from its origin.

8. No church was formed from Olney's after the division already mentioned, and no ministers are known to have gone out from it. Olney's baptism, whether valid or invalid, was not propagated.

9. Nearly a century passed before the church formed from Olney's began to colonize, in 1730.

10. None of its ministers, or the ministers of the churches formed from it, received their baptism from Williams, or from any one whose baptism descended from his.

11. The Baptist churches of America, then, could not have descended from Roger Williams, or from the temporary society which he formed. Their true descent is from the Baptist churches of Wales and Piedmont, extending back to the apostles' times.

The law of baptism, thus far considered, and which we have seen requires the administrator to be the accredited agent of a Gospel church, is intended to apply where such a church is to be found, or where access can be had to such a church, and to such an administrator; but we may suppose a case (as that of Roger Williams and his friends) where persons desire to receive the rite, and where there is no qualified administrator to perform it. Can it be lawfully administered *under such circumstances*? I think it can, and for the following reasons:



John the Baptist was not baptized, and yet the rite was lawfully administered by him. As I have already shown, this does not authorize us to *dispense* with a qualified administrator, where such can be obtained ; but does it not warrant a similar course under similar circumstances ? Christ designed to gather and organize believers into *churches*, for the maintenance of the doctrines and order of the Gospel. Baptism he made essential to this—a part of the process of organization. For this purpose John administered it. A church *was to be* formed, and this could not be done without baptism, and that baptism could be obtained only at the hands of one who had not himself received it. It was *of necessity*, therefore, that it was thus administered. It was on the principle that “necessity knows no law, or is a law in itself.” On this principle God permitted the sons of Adam to marry their *sisters* ; and Christ justified his disciples in plucking and eating the ears of corn on the Sabbath : Matt. xii. 1, 5. Such a baptism, though not *complete*, according to the general rule laid down for its observance, is as complete as was the first observance of the Lord’s Supper by the disciples, at a time when they had no idea of “showing forth the Lord’s death ;” and as complete as was their faith, at a time when the burial and resurrection of Christ, which their baptism symbolized, constituted no part of their belief. And yet Paul makes the “showing forth of Christ’s death,” and the believing “that God raised him from the dead,” essential to the valid observance of the Supper, and to a true saving faith *under ordinary circumstances*. See 1 Cor. xi. 26 ; Rom. x. 9.

Under certain circumstances, then, I think baptism by an unbaptized and unaccredited person would be valid ; that is, (1,) where there is no true church or minister ; (2,) where it is impossible for the parties desiring it to obtain the services of a qualified administrator from abroad, or where there is no knowledge, on their part, of such an administrator ; (3,) where the intention of those receiving the rite is thereby to form themselves into a Gospel church ; and (4,) where the person thus administering the ordinance does so in good faith, and in practical submission to the teachings of Christ ; that is, he must

be one of the number forming the church, and as such must himself receive the rite in turn, which John the Baptist would have done, had not his peculiar mission, as the forerunner of Christ, prevented.

Such then, we think, is the law of Christ on the subject in question. It may be thought to be a small part of that law, one of "the least commandments" here involved. But for that very reason we ought not to neglect it, for the observance of the "least commands" is a more decisive test of obedience than is the observance of the great ones. "*Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.*"

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#### ARTICLE V.—THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.

THE more common classification of the phenomena exhibited by the mind is under the designations: 1. The intellect or understanding; 2. The sensibilities; and 3. The will.

We trust there can be no harm in suggesting an inquiry as to the advantages or otherwise, of an arrangement somewhat different.

I.—The Intellect.

II.—The Sensibilities.

III.—The Conscience.

Of course, it is expected reasons will at once be demanded for the alteration. Why is such a special pre-eminence given to conscience in a classification of the mental capabilities? And what, in the meantime, has so suddenly become of "THE WILL?"

To the consideration of these two questions attention is invited separately.

In reference to the first we would say, in general terms, a distinct and prominent place should be given to the conscience, for the same reason which leads to the adoption of the other two divisions, viz., *the distinctive character of the phenomena to be classified*.

The reason for any division whatever is not that the mind is divided into sections and departments,—as if the intellect, the sensibilities, and the conscience, were so many individual members of the soul, as the hands and feet are members of the body. We are not writing to reaffirm the unity of the soul, which, so far as we know, no one ever denies. But while it is a unit, it is a unit capable of acting and being acted upon in various ways, and by various and very diverse agencies. It is with these actions and feelings of the soul that we have to deal in all our researches in mental science. Inquiries into the substance of the soul itself are futile. As we know God only through the manifestations of Himself, which He condescends to give, so in like manner, we can understand *mind* only through the phenomena it exhibits when acting itself, or being acted upon. In one respect, mind is like electricity. In its passive state we can tell nothing about it, nor even discern its presence. It is only when excited that we are aware of its existence. But the phenomena of mind are found in very great variety; naturally we generalize, and for convenience sake we classify. Certain of them, while differing in many respects, are yet found to have something in common which indicate an *active* state of the mind. These we associate together, and represent them by a common name, *the Understanding*. Others, again, have a different characteristic in common, which indicate a *passive* state of the soul. These, in like manner, are viewed in connection, and referred to what we call *the Sensibilities*. Now, for the same reason, and in accordance with the same principle, we would form a third class, and consider them under a well understood designation, *the Conscience*. For the *moral phenomena* of the mind have in them something different from the purely intellectual and from the purely emotional; being neither the one nor the other exclusively, but to a certain extent combining them both, and combining them in



such a way as to render the individual character of each at once perceptible.

It will be said that what is here asked for is already given ; that by almost every writer on moral science, conscience is treated in this very manner, receiving distinct notice in a separate "section." True ; but this very reply contains an affirmation in another shape of the complaint now brought forward. A "section" does not give to conscience that importance in a system of mental science which it ought to receive. The reason of this we believe to be that some of our earlier writers on this subject, who have surveyed this mammoth cave, and given names to particular galleries, have been men to whom the study of the nature of conscience has been rather distasteful. The other departments have presented more agreeable fields of investigation, and on them they have therefore chiefly expended their strength, leaving whatever pertains to the conscience to take care of itself. We could instance writers who, we think, speak of conscience solely because they cannot well avoid it while writing on mental philosophy. This seems obvious from the fact that their writings on this subject do not exhibit the same concatenation of reasoning that marks their other investigations. What they have thrown together seems to be the detached and isolated fragments concerning conscience which they have accidentally stumbled upon while mining for other things. It is quite evident they have sunk no special shafts into the depths of man's moral nature, as they have done in his intellectual nature.

If a writer chooses to confine his inquiries mainly to the understanding, or to the sensibilities, or both, it is of course perfectly proper for him to do so. He will have an ample field before him, even with such limitations. But then his work should be called by a name corresponding to this restricted examination. If a man should write a book, entitled a General Survey of the Eastern Continent, and should fill the bulk of it with an account of Europe and Africa, and should include Asia in a short section towards the close, or under the caption "Africa," he would be open to sharp criticism. It would do very well to call the book "A Survey of Europe and Africa, with

occasional remarks about Asia." More than this would be assumption. In like manner, we think nothing can properly be styled a *complete* survey of mental science which does not include and assign a most prominent place to the moral phenomena of the mind.

It will be said, perhaps, that the consideration of these moral phenomena does not pertain to a work on *mental* science, but has a place by itself. We can say that writers in mental philosophy, by *neglecting* this part, have caused it to be *understood* that it does not pertain to mental science, but this does not cause it to be so in reality. Recurring to our definition, we say, *Mental Philosophy is the science which treats of the phenomena of mind*. But what do we mean by the phenomena of mind? We mean the manifestations it gives of itself when either acting itself or being acted upon by something else. Is now the mind solely influenced by natural objects and not by moral considerations? Does it perceive natural relations only? Does it not also perceive moral relations? And is there not a great variety of phenomena contingent upon the latter as well as upon the former? And is not the mental process which takes place when the mind perceives a moral relation, and reasons thence to the obligation arising from it, as worthy a subject of consideration as that which takes place when it sees two material objects and infers their relation, sizes or distances from each other? When there is something so similar in the process, why is it that one should be embraced within the province of the mental philosopher, and the other should be considered as lying so far without? We think there is a want of discrimination. The *application* of the principle of obligation to the circumstances of every-day life furnish a distinct field for the moral philosopher; but the manner in which the mind, unaided by revelation, comes to a knowledge of these obligations, while it may, with propriety, be considered by the moral philosopher, *demand*s the strictest attention of the writer on mental science.

If, while enumerating the different kinds of knowledge which the mind obtains from the outer world, and the manner in which that knowledge is received, he should speak particularly

of the senses of hearing and feeling, and pass lightly over that of seeing, he would, we think, be only repeating what he does when he devotes a large space to the actings of mind in reference to matter, and a small space to its actings in reference to spirit.

Into every matter connected with the former he enters largely. He expatiates upon the manner in which the mind comes to a correct apprehension of the relation of distance and nearness, of height and depth, of length and breadth, as they exist in matter and space, but when he comes to the discovery of moral relation, or relations existing between spirit and spirit, his views become exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory.

Even Christian writers have followed the paths marked out by those who have neglected this higher department of the phenomena of mind. One of the complaints urged against a recent work by Dr. Hickok is, that "too little is made of conscience." In reference to what the conscience should be regarded as including, there has been, even among contemporaneous writers, a very wide difference of opinion. Dr. Wardlaw, in his "Christian Ethics," regards the conscience as purely a *determining* faculty; the faculty that determines the right or wrong of our conduct. An operation of conscience "is an act of judgment, and an act of judgment *exclusively*." Dr. Payne repudiates this view, and declares that conscience denotes "the *susceptibility* to the emotion of approval and disapproval." Conscience, according to his opinion, was designed to be a "moral spring," and not a "moral guide." We have the "moral guide" in the faculty of judgment, and as an element of the mental constitution we need no other; but we require an *impulsive* principle—something to secure the doing of that which judgment tells us we ought to do.

In subsequent writings, Dr. Wardlaw being pressed by his critics, and more particularly, as Dr. Payne supposes, by the criticisms of Sir James McIntosh, that his system "contained no method of explaining the most conspicuous if not the most essential part of moral approbation and disapprobation," changed his view, and made conscience to consist in the exercise of judgment *combined with* the susceptibility to certain emotions. To



this change of sentiment he does not seem fully to have adhered, for we find him afterwards using expressions more in accordance with his first definition.\*

Notwithstanding the array of names against it, we confess our partiality to the view which includes in "the conscience" a *determining power* and an *emotional susceptibility*. If this be not in favor with English writers on mental science, it is certainly the teaching of the most approved writers among ourselves. There is surely good reason for esteeming highly an arrangement *marked out by such authority as Dr. Wayland*. Dr. Payne's reasons for regarding the operation of conscience as limited to the emotions are two:

The first is philosophical, the second is philological. The first is, as stated above, that "we have the faculty of judging as an element of the mental constitution; we need no other. Therefore it is unphilosophical to look for another; to seek an additional cause when a sufficient one has already been found.

The principle every one will admit; but we do not see the correctness of the application in this particular case. We humbly beg to express our opinion that Dr. Payne, reasoning *against* the existence of a distinct faculty for *perceiving moral relations*, overthrows (upsets) his reasoning in *favor* of the existence of a distinct susceptibility for *experiencing moral emotions*. We think the distinction he draws when he refers different perceptions to *one* element of the intellectual constitution, and different emotions to two elements of the emotional constitution, is not a distinction in reality, but arises from the process of generalization being carried *one step farther* in the case of the intellect than it is in the case of the sensibilities; and thus "the legs of the lame" become "unequal."

In the first case, we will suppose two distinct subjects of consideration are presented to the mind's eye: two entirely distinct perceptions arise in consequence. If Dr. Payne stopped his process of generalization in reference to perceptions as soon as he does in reference to emotion, he would now proceed no further, and would say, the mind has and must have *two distinct* powers of perception,—one to perceive natural distinctions, and the

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\* See Note, Payne's Elements of Mental and Moral Science, third edition, page 442.

other to perceive moral distinctions. But finding that although these perceptions are widely different in some respects, yet in another they have a feature in common, he generalizes one step further, and refers them to *one* common judgment as an element of the mental constitution.

Now we would propose an application of this process to the sensibilities, and carry it out to its full extent. A merchant, in examining his accounts, finds that through mismanagement the loss of a large fortune has been entailed; but he sees how, by a forged signature, he can retrieve the whole. After hesitation he commits the crime. Here now are two distinct emotions,—*one* of anguish at the discovery of his loss, the other of *remorse* at the recollection of his crime. Just at this point Dr. Payne stops, and says, “Here now we have two emotions quite different from each other, and therefore we would refer them to different susceptibilities.” Let us take one step more in this case, as he has done in the other. These two emotions, though very different in one respect, are quite alike in another. Therefore we may refer them to a common susceptibility to emotion, whether of pain or pleasure, which God has given to the mind. If it is unphilosophical to suppose *two* intellectual natures in order to perceive natural and moral relations when one is sufficient, is it not equally so to speak of two emotional natures, in order to feel the emotions which correspond to those relations?

It will contribute to the elucidation of the subject to answer the inquiry, how do we come to a knowledge of *obligation*?—through our understanding or through our emotions? So far as common language is concerned, nothing is more universal than to speak of “*feeling* an obligation.” But is this philosophically correct? Is an obligation originally something to be perceived or something to be felt? An answer to this question must be drawn from an attentive observation of what takes place in our mind when a question of obligation is before it.

And first, in reference to others. We never say to another man, “I *feel* it to be your duty to act after a particular manner;” but we do say, “I believe it is your duty;” “I am persuaded it is your duty;” “I am inclined to think it is your duty.” All such expressions are indicative of purely intellectual processes,

and we think are sufficient to show that a question of duty or obligation is one of mind before it becomes one of feeling.

But second, in respect to ourselves. Do we not speak of *feeling* obligation? We do. But this does not prove that we are made acquainted with obligation through our feelings any more than are others. This will be apparent upon a very little inspection. Suppose a man is told by his friends that in their opinion he ought to demean himself towards some particular individual in a given specified manner. To himself this duty is not so clear. What means does he take to decide the matter? Does he consult his feelings? Does he inquire what his emotions are? By no means. He enters into a careful examination of the circumstances of the whole case. The entire process is an intellectual one, weighing, scrutinizing, deliberating; and the question of the existence of obligation (or otherwise) is determined by the mind and not at all by the heart. That is, the cord that binds must be seen before it can be felt. Feeling is but a result of seeing. We would add further:

In every mental process involving a perception of moral obligation, and the rise of the subsequent emotion, we observe the following distinct phenomena, which, when they exist, are always found in the following order:—

1st. A discovery of the relation which some other being sustains to ourselves, as that God is our creator, such a one is our father, such a one is our neighbor, &c.

2nd. A perception of the claim or right of this other being to be treated with the regard due to his nature and position, which is only another way of saying that we perceive our obligation to treat him according to a particular standard.

3rd. An emotional impulse to make our conduct and feeling comport with the requirement of this standard.

It may be asked, does the perception of obligation always arise upon the discovery of the relation existing between the beings, and why is it so? We believe it does always and invariably arise: that is to say, it does always and invariably *follow*, though men may not take any notice of it. A perception of obligation follows as a corollary follows the demonstration of a proposition in mathematics. To prove the one is to establish the



other. If we were asked on what grounds we regard as true the statement contained in a corollary, it would be sufficient to say, because a certain proposition before it had just been established. In like manner, if asked why a particular obligation exists, it is enough to say, because a particular relation has existence. Why is it my duty to love my father? Because he *is* my father. Both Christian and heathen admit the sufficiency of the reason. Obligation is a moral corollary following some natural relation established by the Creator.

We have used the expression, "particular standard," "duty to treat others according to some particular standard." What *is* this standard? Whatever it is, we shall expect to find it something easily discovered, and the reasonableness of which is self-evident.

The ultimate standard of rectitude is, *the Divine moral perfections*.

When God made man, he made him in his own image. He made him to show forth the divine glory. Suppose the Creator had created but one single intelligent being for the purpose just specified. In his case what would be *rectitude*? Most evidently, conformity of the image to the moral pattern after which it was fashioned. Being an independent soul, capable of acting for himself, he should ever imitate the actings forth of the divine moral perfections, and capable of being acted upon, he should reflect an unsullied moral likeness of the Creator. God, who created him, has this claim upon him, that he shall fulfil the purpose for which he was called into existence. If any one word were chosen to express the obligation that spontaneously arises from a perception by the creature of his position in relation to this superior Being, it would be *love—supreme love*.

Suppose now another being to be called into existence. Here is a new relation. This second being is also made in the image of God, and reflects back the Divine glory in the same manner and with the same degree of clearness as the first. This very circumstance would require the first being to love the second as much as he loved himself; to take delight and complacency in him for the sake of the Creator, but in a subordinate degree. Furthermore, the second, being created with similar rights and

privileges, has a reason for claiming the same regard which the first would expect from his newly-created fellow. *No difficult process of argumentation is necessary* to render this *obligation apparent*. One single perception, and one obvious and *necessary* inference, and the whole is comprehended. The first being *knows* that whatever regard he can claim from another for himself, is founded upon his nature and position. But that second has the same nature and position, *therefore* he is entitled to the same regard which the first expects. If any one word were sought to express what is here included, it would be LOVE—EQUAL LOVE.

Here, now, we have two principles or two rules for the guidance of the conduct, SUPREME LOVE TO THE CREATOR—EQUAL LOVE TO THE CREATURE. Here is a standard of conscience—a standard the reasonableness of which becomes evident to every man. It is the law which binds every created being, angel, man, or devil. It is a law which will never be relaxed in the least degree. No amount of violation, and no degree of punishment inflicted for *past* violations, will inhibit its binding force even during the infliction of punishment. If it were so, the devils would cease to become sinners.

These two requirements form the proximate standard of rectitude.

An operation of conscience we would then regard as judicial and executive.

First, conscience acts as a judge. But a judge must have a law by which to decide. Without this, he can neither pronounce guilty nor innocent. "Where there is no law there is no transgression." The above obligations form the law in accordance with which conscience makes her decisions. The real inquiry in the mind of the judge is this:—Does this comport with the obligation to render supreme love to the Creator? Does this comport with the obligation a man is under to love others as he loves himself? Or to state the question the other way (for both ways of statement are necessary to avoid confusion), does this comport with the *rights* and the *claims* and the *privileges* of the being in question? If it *does*, then, the feeling or conduct under consideration is pronounced *right*; if it does not, it is pronounced *wrong*.

Then follows the executive work of conscience ; the impulse to act according to the decision, or the feeling of approbation or disapprobation, as the case may be.

We presume the correctness of what has just been advanced will be called in question to some extent. We beg the reader to examine the nature of his objections before he uses them against what is stated. It will be observed, we do not assert that every man is conscious of such a standard being before his mind, *in full view*, every time a decision of conscience takes place ; but we do assert, that however ignorant he may be of the process in the case, yet, nevertheless, this is the standard, the only standard, and the invariable standard by which the right and wrong of his conduct is decided. A knowledge of this rule or standard is absolutely indispensable to an operation of conscience.

By others it will be denied that all men, especially the heathen, have any such perception of these two rules as is here mentioned. One of the points at issue between Dr. Wardlaw and Dr. Payne was, "whether a moral system could be constructed without the aid of the Bible?" Dr. Wardlaw maintained it could not, Dr. Payne affirmed it could.

The results of missionary observation among the heathen are every way in favor of the latter. It *can* be done. If not, then why are the heathen punished? If they can ascertain no moral system, then they are not sinners. We repeat the text already quoted, "Where there is no law there is no transgression." The Bible itself teaches that heathens have, if not a moral system, at least the means of making such a system. Our Saviour himself reduces the whole Christian system of morality to conformity to these two rules, and these two obligations are known and understood by the heathen.

In respect to the first, the proof is seen in the fact that the heathen always admit, that "whoever is God has a claim to be worshipped." On this point there never is controversy ; at least, the writer of this has never heard it disputed. The question is, *who is God?* As for the rest, it is the same now that it was in the days of Elijah. "If Jehovah be God, serve Him ;



and if Baal be God, then serve him." The writer, in preaching to those who have never heard the Gospel before, and while laying down the proposition that Jehovah is God, since He has created all things, and sustains them by the word of His power, has been suddenly interrupted by the exclamation of attentive listeners: "Why, if that is the case, we are bound to worship Him." They may have no disposition to worship; they may have false and absurd notions as to the way in which to worship Him. As to the *obligation* there is no question, if the assertion is true. Others have refused assent to the truth of the statement, "Because," they have said, "if they believe that He is God, and then do not worship Him, they will incur great demerit." Furthermore, the writer, on asking persons who were sacrificing to idols why they did so, has received this reply, "*Because this is God.*"

In respect to the second, the proof that it is known to the heathen is seen in the fact, that all disputes concerning personal right are ultimately referred to it. Time and again has the writer heard conversation like the following, not only among adult heathens, but among children:

A charges B with unfair treatment. B denies the reasonableness of the charge. A re-affirms, and points out where the unfairness lies. B extenuates his conduct, and says he cannot see anything wrong. A, finding every argument useless, at once starts up and says, "Well, suppose I should do so to you, how would *you* feel? would you feel satisfied?" Instead of disputing any longer, they come at once to the test known to them all. This appeal settles the question.

If B is not willing to be treated in the same way, then he must acknowledge he has done wrong. Every individual in the company will acquit or condemn him, according as they believe he gives a sincere reply to the question. Only one way of vindication remains open to B after this inquiry. It is to show that by his conduct, in some way or other, A has *impaired his claims upon others*. If he can do this, he is still upheld by the common approval. *The amount of A's claims or rights forms, under every circumstance, the just measure of B's obligation.* But enough has been said in reference to this part of the subject.

We come to inquire, in the second place, what becomes of "The Will?" We will endeavor to state clearly.

In the controversies concerning the will, and its "determination," there have been two classes of opinions: 1st. Those who have maintained that the will determined *itself*. 2d. Those who have contended that the will is determined by *motive*.

It has been shown, conclusively, that the first view makes the will to be a mere caprice, which has not even the merit of being susceptible of a definition or an explanation. It teaches that it is possible for the mind to act in any particular way without a shadow of intelligent reason, or a particle of discernible motive, which is equivalent to proving it capable of the lowest form of insanity. We conceive that it goes far to overthrow all foundation of virtue, since a man *may* choose good and reject evil, and vice versa, not from any intelligent conscientious comparison of the two, but from a sudden, indefinable, incomprehensible notion, or impulse, acting contrary to both his feelings and his judgment.

The other view makes the will to be dependent upon motive, intelligently perceived and sensibly felt. This is the view maintained, and so clearly established, by our best thinkers, from President Edwards downwards.

It establishes, firmly, the foundation of virtue in the agent, since it represents him as choosing good and rejecting evil, not from any inexplicable caprice, but from an intelligent apprehension of the right and wrong involved. It makes the mental process connected with volition to appear, at least reasonable, if not fully luminous, since it makes volition to be the result of causes which *are* comprehensible.

But observe one obvious inference from the view taken by President Edwards and others. If the will never is exhibited, except in connection with motive, then, in some sense or other, it must be an *effect*. Such we believe it to be.

But in what way is it an *effect*? We shall try to state. Some things which might be advantageously expressed to establish what is laid down, will, nevertheless, be omitted. We shall simply state results, leaving them to stand or fall by the reasonableness they carry in themselves.

The motive or impulsive power of the soul is lodged in the sensibilities and the conscience. It would not be using language with precision to speak of conscience and the sensibilities as *Forces*. But we may say with propriety that, to excite the *Sensibilities* and the *Conscience* is to excite *Forces*, *Self-acting Forces*, which operate *in* the soul, to make it change the circumstances of some particular object, or the soul's relations to that object. If the soul were free from all encumbrance, and if no obstacles were discerned in the way, the force thus excited would carry the soul along with it. We have words in common use, such as "desire," "wish," "inclination," "longing," &c., which are appropriately used only when some motive has been presented to the sensibilities or conscience; and this internal force in the direction of the object is excited in consequence, but the intellectual understanding discerning difficulties in the way, no attempt is made by the soul to move in the direction of its desire. Desire and volition therefore differ from each other only in this: the one is the force simply *felt*, the other is the force impelling the soul to action.

It may be said, language, which represents the soul as containing a system of "self-acting forces," is too grossly material to be applied to the mind.

We reply, it is strictly in accordance with expressions found in such authorities as Sir James M'Intosh and Dr. Payne. The latter speaks of the absolute necessity of such a force, in order to render man a moral agent. The former, while upon the subject of conscience, says expressly, "The main object of conscience is to govern our voluntary exertion. But how could it perform that great function, if it did not IMPEL THE WILL?" Here, at least, is a "self-acting force." *We assert nothing more than that as conscience, when excited by its appropriate motive, and under particular circumstances, is a self-impelling force; so, in like manner, the sensibilities (as a class), when acted upon by their appropriate motive, become self-impelling forces.* Popular language, when philosophically explained, is fully in accordance with what is here stated. We speak of the "force possessed by motive, to in-



fluence the mind." We do not mean that the motive *exerts* any *force* ; this would be absurd ; but it is all plain when we understand the expression to refer to the degree of force it is fitted to arouse within the mind itself.

The conscience represents a single force ; the sensibilities represent several. So that we have, in reality, within ourselves, a system of self-acting mental and moral forces. Or, these forces may sustain various relations to each other. They may, several of them, operate to lead the soul towards some particular object, or in one direction, as we would say in common language ; or they may act in different directions. One may be excited ; the others may be dormant. The majority may incline in one direction ; the minority press in another. They may sustain one relation to each other at one period, and quite a different relation at another, and under different circumstances. Those which co-operate to-day may be in opposition to-morrow. We have already said, that to excite any one of these impulses is to excite the soul to action, by which we mean, that unless some restraint be felt, the soul will endeavor to produce some change in respect to the relations existing between the exciting object and itself.

We remark, in the next place, that God has so constituted the soul, that when it becomes conscious of an impulse towards any particular purpose, or object of desire, it may, in the exercise of its intelligence, perceive a reason why the impulse should not be obeyed ; and of feeling immediately in consequence, a counter influence in the opposite or some other direction. Now follows, or may follow, one of the most extraordinary exercises of the soul. A mental action takes place which consists in a conflict of these forces, one with the other, the result of which is, that instead of *several* opposing inclinations or forces, there remains but *one*, inclining, it may be, in the direction of the strongest, or in a direction modified by one or two or more of these inclinations. All that is now necessary in order to a volition is, to render the *end* in question, or which the soul has in view, attainable as to time and space, and the soul will certainly make the attempt to reach it. To speak more correctly, the volition has *already* taken

place ; it took place when the forces within the soul *measured* their strength with each other. The result of that measurement indicates the *future action*, or "*will*" of the soul, simply for the reason that it indicates what will be the mental force exerted within the soul at the time in question. This force the soul will certainly obey, unless there be resistance from *without*. It is not an external force, but an inward one, and obedience to it is the highest exercise of the soul's sovereignty.

To this, it may be said, it is difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend any such mental action as is called a "conflict of forces." We answer, not any more so than it is to comprehend anything that we call a "mental conflict." That the soul has a self-exercised power of acting with reference to outward objects, must be admitted without question. Were it not so, man would not be a "living soul." If we admit this, we see no reason for doubting that this power may be exercised in several different ways. If it be said we cannot see how such forces, as we for the present designate them, can be acting at the same time ; we reply, whether we can explain it or not, every man is conscious of *feeling*, under certain circumstances, an inclination *towards* and away from a given object, *at one and the same time*.

Here now it is understood what we mean when we speak of the will. Our object is not to find a short and comprehensive definition of what it is, so much as to show that it is *not* an independent faculty of the mind, as this expression is commonly used. It is not a cause of mental action, but the *effect* of one of the highest exercises of which the soul is capable. *It is the soul yielding to impulses within itself, or where these impulses are complex, to the RESULTANT of thus combined strength and direction.*

When, therefore, we say in common language that a man's *will* decides in a given way, we are not by this word to understand that some particular faculty of the mental group has carried the point. This would be as improper as it would be when speaking of a legislative body, and saying, "The will of the senate decreed in the negative," to understand by "The

will," some important and influential member or officer of that body. But we do mean that the various reasons for and against have been set before the mind, the various impulses lodged in the conscience, and the sensibilities have been aroused in consequence. After more or less conflict and confusion they measure their strength; some are vanquished, others are triumphant, and that which results is the exponent of the soul's action or the will.

It is not, of course, indispensable that these impulses should be under the guidance of the understanding; at times they are thus guided. In what we call *rational acts* they are always so directed, but at other times they sweep the soul away, and then we speak of the man as hurried along by the *blind impulse of passion*.

From what has now been said, it will be seen what place is assigned to the WILL. Instead of being treated as an independent faculty, the proper place for its consideration is, when treating of *the powers and susceptibilities of the soul, acting in their appointed relations to each other, or the soul exercising its powers of life*. Instead of the *will* occasioning our impulses, we should with propriety say, our impulses originate, form, and direct our WILLS.

It may be objected to all this, that the "determination of the will" is made by it to consist in a mere *resolution* of forces. It is precisely so. The mental process which takes place in our own mind is exactly of this nature. In reference to our own mind we do not give sufficient attention to the subject to be conscious of it. But any one who will recall what takes place in his mind when he proceeds to conjecture what will be the will of *another* under certain circumstances, will find it is even so.

He calls up all the motives that bear upon the man. He studies out the action to which each particular motive will incline him. He estimates the strength of each motive or the force which it is fitted to arouse within the soul, and from a careful consideration and comparison, he concludes that the man's will chooses to do one thing rather than another. He then ventures freely to express his opinion as to what the man's will



will be under the circumstances indicated ; or, in other words, that the soul will at a certain period do a certain act, BECAUSE it will at that time have a certain force or impulse acting *within* itself, while at the same time there will be no hindrance from without.

That this is a correct representation is rendered still more apparent, should the man, after all, act in a manner different from that which we have predicted. We say at once concerning him, "There has been some other *motive* (and consequently, some other impulse), of which we were in ignorance at the time of making our conjecture." This is considered a sufficient explanation of any deviation in his will.

Skill in judging human nature is, in reality, only skill in *resolving mental forces*, or those impulses which are self-excited in view of suitable motives. The problem set before a good judge of human nature, in reference to the future course of any individual, is to ascertain what particular impulses will exist in his bosom under the given circumstances. His inquiries and reasoning are to settle the following questions: (1). When the man is placed in a given situation, will any impulse at all be excited in his bosom? and if so, of what nature will it be? (2). Will any counteracting influence arise? and if so, of what nature will it be? (3). What will be the effect which these forces will have relatively upon each other (whether they be one, two or three in number), and what will be the *resultant of the whole*? These answered, the problem will be plain. *This resultant is that by which the man wills. The soul yielding to this resultant is an act of the will, or a volition.* By "*yielding*" we mean, first, the submission of the weaker force to the stronger, under the *guidance of the intelligence*, but also the soul *acting* under the influence of this predominant impulse.

We will add, in conclusion, the circumstances under which an act of the will may take place, if this theory be true.

I. When an act of the *will* will take place.

1. When the sensibilities, or any one of them, are called into action, and exert this internal force to impel the soul towards a certain end, and when there is no commensurate counteracting force exerted by any of the other sensibilities or conscience.

2. Or, it will take place when the conscience is excited to action in a certain direction, and no adequate resistance is made through the sensibilities, singly or conjointly.

II. When an act of the will will *not* take place.

1. When the force aroused is so small as to be unable to overcome the slight *vis inertiae* arising from the connection of mind to matter. We say *vis inertiae*, for if the soul were free from the body, we believe even these slight forces would be followed by action, or, in other words, would become acts of the *will*. As we are constituted, the sluggishness of our bodies interposes an obstacle to volition. A man may experience a slight degree of thirst, and would *will* to arise and procure a drink, or, to speak more correctly, would move towards the object of desire. But this would require an effort which, though small in itself, is nevertheless more troublesome in thought than is the slight degree of thirst.

2. When an impulse is given by the conscience towards the discharge of a certain duty, but the sensibilities press strongly in the opposite direction with a force sufficient to withstand it. This is exemplified, when we find men unwilling to obey the dictates of their higher and better judgment. The conflict between these suddenly aroused propensions is often painful and long protracted. No act of the will takes place, because the impulse that began the struggle for the mastery is insufficient for the purpose.

3. When the circumstances are reversed, or when the impulse arises from some one of the sensibilities, and the conscience starts forth to hold them in check.

In this there will be a conflict the same as in the other case, but this conflict will differ in one notable respect—it will be attended with a certain peace of mind which will be wanting in the first. This very indecision will, in the one case, be attended with a feeling of guilt, which will be absent in the other. The reason is, that in the one case indecision is a victory for bad passion, in the other it is a victory for conscience.

4. When an impulse is given by some one of the sensibilities, and opposition arises from some other of the sensibilities suffi-

cient to withstand it. A man may seriously meditate the commission of a robbery ; to this act avarice goads him on. The proper opposition to this should arise from conscience, but conscience has been silenced. A new opposition arises from another quarter ; fear suggests that there is a probability of detection. The first impulse is held in check by this, and so we say that although he has a "desire" or an "inclination" to commit the deed of violence, yet he has not willed to do so : that is, the soul has not "yielded" to this force within itself which was first aroused, simply because another has been called into action which effectually withstands it.

5. When neither the conscience nor the sensibilities are in any way excited, the will is then at rest, or in other words, the soul is under the influence of no motive whatever. It may be engaged in reasoning, comparing, and reflecting, either about itself or in reference to something else ; but there is no emotional force aroused, and therefore there is no action of the soul with reference to external objects.

In addition to these cases, there are also some others which have in them something peculiar, and require special notice.

1. The conscience or the sensibilities may be excited sufficiently to influence the soul to action, but at the same time the intelligence points out some hindrance in the way, arising from time, space, or circumstances. On account of this, therefore, the impulse is not obeyed, or does not lead to an act of the will. This exhibits the reciprocal influence which the various faculties and susceptibilities have over each other. The understanding directs—the sensibilities impel. There is no act of the will in this case, because this hindrance which the understanding perceives without, is equivalent to an opposing force within ; in other words, the force of conscience, or the sensibilities which may be excited, is *fettered* by difficulties ; remove the difficulties, and it will terminate in action or "willing."

2. The mind can will to do something at some future day. In this case there is no such acting in reference to external relations as has been described. The soul does not move to the accomplishment of an end, and yet it "wills." Is not this at variance with the doctrine that the will is only the soul yield-



ing to the force of motive, or rather, to forces within itself? We think not. The time may, indeed, be future. The object concerning which the soul wills may not yet be in existence.

But the mind does, nevertheless, *conceive* of the object, so that, for practical effect, it is the same as if it were in reality present. It being thus perceived in its various relations and characteristics, the sensibilities are excited, as if by a real object, with a degree of strength proportioned to the clearness and distinctness of the perception which the mind has of the suitability or unsuitability of the object to the purposes of its own enjoyment. Force or impulse is thus actually felt. Now, then, this force may be fettered in the way above described; but then, again, an opposition may be excited within the mind, in *prospective* view of the object. The conflict does take place under the inspection of the reason; so that, instead of contradicting, such a case as this confirms the doctrine that *the will is but the soul acting*.

3. But once more. A man sometimes "wills to do nothing"—not to act at all; to be entirely passive. How can this be reconciled with the view expressed? We think it involves no great difficulty. We believe this will be seen by considering what we regard as a fact, that no man ever *willed to be passive* without feeling a previous impulse *to act*. In such a case, the impulse to act is *first* felt, and the opposing impulse *follows*, and the latter is the stronger. So this quiescence is in reality the result of mental action, the same as in other cases, where the outward manifestation is widely different.

4. We sometimes "will" to occupy our thoughts with a certain subject. Such a volition as this we still pronounce to be an action of the sensibilities. We know of no case in which the soul so engages itself, in which we may not observe the antecedence of some emotional force. We would say the action differed from others only in the direction of the force. In the one case, the direction is outward, terminating on something else; in the other, it is inward, terminating on itself.

Strictly speaking, we doubt if it be wholly correct to so represent the mind reversing the order of the operations of the

understanding and the sensibilities in the present constitution of things; the action of the former does ordinarily precede that of the latter, but not always so. Influence may reach the soul first, through the one as readily as through the other. Whether it be the understanding exciting the sensibilities, or the sensibilities impelling the understanding; whether this operation back and forth be repeated once or a dozen times, the several actions are conducted with equal readiness and instantaneous rapidity;—like the movements of the glorified human souls described in Ezekiel, “who ran and returned like the appearance of a flash of lightning.” “They went every one straight forward,” and “they turned not when they went.”

W. ASHMORE.

*Hong Kong*, Oct. 29th, 1858.

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ARTICLE VI.—SIR HENRY VANE.

THE 20th of April, 1653, was a day memorable in the annals of England. On that day the famous Long Parliament, which had for twelve years swayed the destinies of that country, which had been first weakened by its own infirmities and dissensions, and then reduced by violence to a mere fragment of its former self, was at last driven out by Oliver Cromwell.

Bishop Warburton pronounces its original members the “greatest geniuses for government that ever lived.” It is certain that, when it met in 1640, the world had seen no such deliberative body since the palmy days of the Roman senate, which it more than equalled in moral, if not in intellectual, power and cultivation. Hume says: “Some persons, partial to the patriots of this age, have ventured to put them in the balance with the most illustrious characters of antiquity; and mentioned the names of Pym, Hampden, Vane, as a just parallel to those of Cato, Brutus, Cassius. Profound capacity, indeed, undaunted courage, extensive enterprise; in these particu-

lars, perhaps, the Romans do not much surpass the English worthies. But what a difference, when the discourse, conduct, conversation, and private, as well as public, behavior of both, are inspected! Compare only one circumstance, and consider its consequences. The leisure of those noble ancients was totally employed in the study of Grecian eloquence and philosophy; in the cultivation of polite letters and civilized society. The whole discourse and language of the moderns were *polluted with mysterious jargon, and full of the lowest and most vulgar hypocrisy.*"

The verdict of the sceptical historian will now scarcely find an echo in the heart of any man who has imbibed the true spirit of Anglo Saxon liberty. It may be that neither of the illustrious English trio was so well versed in the graces of rhetoric or subtleties of philosophy, as some of the cotemporaries of Cato and Brutus; but in ability, there can be little doubt that the moderns surpassed the ancients with whom they are compared, and the "lean and hungry" Cassius, "with his itching palm," was as far below Vane, in wisdom and talent, as in disinterested patriotism. It will be hard to persuade us, that the "whole discourse and language" of Pym, who had long mingled in council with the first gentlemen of England; of Hampden, whose unequalled address extorted the reluctant praise of the royalist Clarendon, and of the accomplished and eloquent Vane, were "polluted with mysterious jargon, and full of the lowest and most vulgar hypocrisy." They had, indeed, adopted, as their standard of opinion and conduct, that book, whose language seemed as "hypocritical and mysterious" to Hume, as it would have done to his favorite heathens, and had derived from it that heroic enthusiasm which carried them through life unshaken and unseduced. These three, although pre-eminent, were supported by a host of worthy coadjutors.

The able and dreaded Strafford, and the odious bigot Laud, had early fallen before the will of this powerful assembly. Under its sanction, at a later period, when it had become contemptible in numbers and weight, the king himself had expiated his follies and crimes upon the block. In this act, it had



been the instrument of a few daring military officers, self-constituted leaders of the extreme party. At the time of which we now speak, there had elapsed, after that tragical event, four years, during which the English flag, in spite of threatening anarchy, had everywhere triumphed, by sea and land.

As far back as the year of the king's death, Sir Harry Vane had proposed a bill for the reform of parliament, and final settlement of the government. This bill, after four years' delay, much discussion, and many modifications, would have come to a final vote, on the memorable 20th of April, in the body which was then forcibly dissolved.

On that day, the English Cæsar completed the passage of the Rubicon, which he had already more than half crossed, when, with the sword of Pride, he purged the body of its obnoxious members. He saw, that if the bill was carried, and a new parliament elected, the republicans, or more probably the royalists, would be in the ascendant, and his prospect of sovereignty, inseparably connected, it may be in his own mind, with national tranquility, forever blasted. With characteristic decision, he determined that there should "no longer be a parliament," and drove them out at the point of the bayonet. Vane, the only surviving member of the great triumvirate, firmly opposed this act of tyranny; and Cromwell, who strove to drown the cries of conscience in coarse and loud abuse, turning fiercely on him, exclaimed in words, which seem ludicrous on such an occasion: "Sir Harry Vane; Sir Harry Vane! The Lord deliver us from Sir Harry Vane!"

This thrilling, although disgusting scene, will give us no bad idea of the two remarkable men who thus came in contact. The injustice done the protector by royalist historians, has been long discovered, and his great qualities fully vindicated and acknowledged.

Indeed, there seems now in the public mind a strong tendency to indiscriminate and extravagant eulogy of his character. That he loved his country, and was strongly imbued with religious feeling and principle, must be freely admitted; but that he was always a consistent Christian and stainless

patriot, are statements too strong for any but the most predetermined credulity to swallow. He was certainly a profound dissembler, loved power, and was, by no means, scrupulous about the means of attaining his object. When, in 1649, the majority of parliament, then controlled by Presbyterians, favored a treaty and reconciliation with the king, and talked of proclaiming some of the generals traitors, he rid himself of them by the drastic remedy of Col. Pride's sword. With equal boldness and decision, he hurried on the trial and execution of Charles; and now that a constitution was on the point of being adopted, and submitted to the unbiassed decision of the whole nation, he again stepped forward to prevent a vote so distasteful and dangerous to the Independents and the army. It may be, that his sagacity discovered the necessity of all this, and that he shrank not from any responsibility, however odious, in securing, not only his own ascendancy, but the true peace and interest of the commonwealth. Still, there must be doubt about the expediency of his measures, and still greater doubt about the motives, of a man who imprisoned and oppressed such patriots as Vane and Hutchinson. We must turn with fonder and more unmixed admiration to the noble Harry Vane, who, untrue to his name, blow the wind from whatever quarter it might, never veered, for an instant, from the direct course of constitutional liberty. Although the Presbyterians differed from him, and thwarted his darling measures, he did not sanction their violent exclusion, and showed his disapproval by withdrawing from Parliament. Notwithstanding his decided republicanism, he refused to unite with his party in the king's trial and execution; and now, when the daring soldier was about to destroy the last relic of the old government, he boldly "withstood him to his face," and braved his fierce anathema. "It is passing strange," that, after this scene, any could have been found to question the courage of Sir Henry Vane. Although he may never have "set a squadron in the field," that man must have been truly brave, who never blenched, for a moment, before Oliver Cromwell, and his invincible Ironsides.

I propose to examine, briefly, the character of this states-

man, who was long represented as a mixture of fanatic and hypocrite, by those who could not deny his singular talent, unsurpassed address, and great success in public business.

In such times as then "tried men's souls," history scarcely furnishes an instance of a man who passes through them with a soul unsoiled by political intrigue, or hands unstained by blood. The overthrow of long-established institutions is a task, however necessary, so full of temptations and dangers, that he must be more than man who can accomplish it without dissimulation or violence. Those who begin it are obliged to conceal their purposes until they gather sufficient strength, and those who complete it, must violate the forms, if not the spirit, of law. How very few came unscathed through the English rebellion, and through the first revolution in France, where, indeed, the great foundations of order and religion were completely broken up! The countrymen of Washington, in looking abroad for those who resemble him, can only find here and there a La Fayette and a Hampden, like green oases on the great Zahara of revolutionary history. I believe that Vane may be fairly added to this small and illustrious number, and that nowhere can his claims be more appropriately vindicated, than in America, where his career began, and his great principles have been fully and practically adopted. That vindication has already been made, with great copiousness and eloquence, by Mr. Upham, in Sparks' American Biography; but, as it is a theme which has not attracted very general attention, and which will bear repeated discussion, we shall add our feeble tribute to that elaborate eulogy.

The family of Sir Harry Vane was noble, although his father, of the same name, was neither wealthy nor powerful, until raised by the favor, first of James, and then of his son Charles, or rather his queen, Henrietta Maria. Accounts differ as to the natural powers, and the cultivation of the elder Vane. Clarendon speaks contemptuously of both; others more favorably. The high trusts which he held, warrant the belief that they were, at least, respectable, although both in them, and in moral character, he seems to have been vastly inferior to his son. After holding some inferior appointments,



and going on some important embassies, he had become Secretary of State just before the rebellion.

Clarendon tells us, that neither he nor his wife was handsome, and that the son was homely, but striking in appearance. The young man, before he was fifteen, manifested some tendency to wildness and dissipation; but at that early age he not only became sedate, but thoroughly imbued with those religious principles which governed the whole course of his subsequent life.

He has been sneered at for entertaining Antinomian doctrines, which claim exemption from the moral law for those who have arrived at an imaginary sanctification. We enter not into the theological question, nor assert that, in a time of extreme mental activity about the great mysteries of religion, he entertained no extravagant dogma, never used any language which would now be considered offensive to good taste, nor was betrayed, amid his manifold temptations, into any immorality. But, if we apply the great rule of common sense, as well as Scripture, "By their fruits ye shall know them," to his public conduct, we must allow him to have been second to none in lofty integrity and unswerving fidelity to principle. He seems to have advocated practically, from his very boyhood, universal religious liberty. He preferred to sacrifice the advantages and honors of Oxford University rather than, against his conscience, take the oath of "Allegiance and Supremacy." When he became fourth Governor of Massachusetts, at the age of twenty-four, he firmly resisted the persecution of Mrs. Hutchinson, and others, pronounced heretical by the dominant sect in that colony. He thus forfeited his popularity, which was, at first, great, and, in consequence, left America in disgrace with the intolerant and inconsistent emigrants to Massachusetts. He preceded even Roger Williams in the published, although not practical, advocacy of religious liberty, and carried it out to Roman Catholics, Unitarians, and even heathens, all of whom were not embraced in Milton's and Locke's theories; the earlier practice of Lord Baltimore, noble, as far as it went, tolerated nothing but Christianity.

It has now been about two hundred and twenty years since

Vane, who departed in 1635 or '36, left these shores, on which his eager desire for soul-liberty had been sadly disappointed. Could he now rise from his grave and return, he would receive and deserve such a reception as never before welcomed a foreigner. His would be the triumph of principle, once scouted, but now universally admitted and applauded. Like the lofty peak, whose summit is gilded by the sun-light, when the valleys are wrapped in shadow, is the great soul which, in the midst of surrounding moral darkness, perceives and welcomes the truths which are ultimately destined to illuminate the race.

When, after three years' stay on the Western Continent, the young ex-governor returned to England, it is usually stated by his unfavorable biographers, that he evinced a favorable change of sentiment and conduct, by accepting from the king knight-hood and an office connected with the Navy Board. Whether these preferments were bestowed as rewards of merit, or given as bribes to forsake his principles, cannot, of course, be ascertained with certainty. He seems to have remained quiet for several years, until at the age of twenty-eight he was elected to a seat in the Long Parliament. His conduct in that body proved, that if the king designed to buy his support in his own arbitrary policy, he had utterly failed of that object. He sided at once, and most cordially, with the advocates of resistance to illegal exactions, and of thorough reform in the government. He coincided and acted with Pym, Hampden, and others of the same stamp, in striking those great blows for liberty, which soon drove the king and royal party into open hostilities with the representatives of the people. Here again we will not maintain that he took no step and uttered no word which ought to be condemned by an impartial posterity. Human nature well nigh always staggers under such weighty responsibilities, such fearful temptations as those of revolutionary leaders. But there can be no reasonable doubt that his great objects were right, and that he moved honestly, steadily, and energetically onward to their accomplishment.

Lord Strafford, the most able and daring of Charles' ministers, was at deadly enmity with the elder Vane. The nation shared in Vane's hatred of this dangerous renegade from the

popular party, with which Strafford had acted in his youth, and the Parliament, representing the nation's wishes, unanimously demanded his arrest, with a view to his impeachment. The younger Vane, accidentally, but willingly, became the principal cause of his condemnation. Lord Strafford and his father were both privy counsellors, and were sworn to reveal nothing which was said and done at their meetings. The son, while searching his father's cabinet for another purpose, had seen and copied a memorandum, kept by the latter, of a privy council, at which Lord Strafford had advised the king to bring over the army from Ireland for the purpose of conquering England, and forcibly subjecting it to his unconstitutional exactions. Before this discovery of the younger Vane was known, at least publicly known, an act was passed to exempt privy councillors from their oath of secrecy, and require them to testify all they knew about the Earl of Strafford. This led to the examination of the elder Vane, who stated the advice given by Strafford, and finally to an admission by Pym, that the son had shown him the private memorandum, and allowed him to copy it. These circumstances are stated by Clarendon as conclusive proof that father and son had formed a plot to destroy their deadly enemy; nor is it wonderful that such should have been the belief of one so deeply prejudiced against both.

But a decision is not so easy for one who desires to form an impartial opinion. The immediate circumstances are certainly suspicious, and no one can, while looking at them alone, entirely exclude the idea, that it was a scheme to strike down a public and private foe. If the secret memorandum contained the exact truth, even the safety of the country could have scarcely justified a privy councillor in perjury; but, if both the memorandum and the statement in regard to the mode of its discovery were false, no public benefit could justify so infamous a transaction. Yet, when we reflect that the elder Vane never acted with, nor was afterwards advanced by the popular party; when we recollect that his anger against his son, for thus jeopardizing his reputation, appears to have been real, and that the disregard of everything



but public duty, manifested by the son, if his own account be true, tallies exactly with his whole previous and subsequent career; we must believe that it was, at worst, an act of Roman patriotism, overriding all private feelings and considerations. The man who afterwards so often risked fortune, life and reputation in defence of principle, was not likely to permit his father's sensibilities and fame to interfere with an act of great public justice.

Such he and the great majority of the nation considered the conviction and execution of Strafford. His genius and energy made him the right arm of tyranny, which it was indispensable to lop off, or lie down quietly under its exactions. According to Hallam, Bristol, Usher, Juxon and Northumberland, four other privy councillors, corroborated the statement of Vane, about his treasonable advice. Lords Clarendon, Falkland and Capel voted for his attainder, although they afterwards fought in the King's ranks, and the last was executed by the regicides shortly after the death of his master. Even the judges, when consulted, pronounced Strafford's conduct treason. Yet, after all, we will not undertake to say, that the forms of law were strictly regarded, or that treason was technically proved on the accused. But, if the minister of the crown, one of that body, according to the theory of the English constitution, made responsible instead of the irresponsible king, substantially commits treason, by advising the hereditary guardian of the laws to substitute military violence for lawful authority, and by moreover setting an example of utter lawlessness in his own conduct, then Strafford richly merited the penalties of an attainder. This form of proceeding, although in the nature of an *ex-post-facto* law, which defines the offence after it has been committed, had, in spite of its obvious abuses, been often resorted to in extraordinary cases.

Archbishop Laud, although neither so formidable, nor so clearly guilty, was executed some years later, on the same charge. This bigoted prelate had, at his father's request, once attempted to convince the young Vane of his religious errors; and finding him incorrigible, had given him a sharp reproof.

It was, therefore, unfortunate that the obstinate heretic should have been selected to carry up the Primate's impeachment. Yet, as he only concurred with many of the ablest and best men in the kingdom, he cannot be justly charged with the mere gratification of private malice.

In the interval between the beginning of the civil war and the king's death, Vane had, by his dexterous and successful management of all the important affairs entrusted to his charge, risen to great prominence. None of these was more important than the negotiation with the Scotch, which resulted in the formation of the famous "Solemn League and Covenant," binding together the enemies of Episcopacy in Scotland and England, in a union which, for a time, overthrew the national Church of the latter kingdom, and led to the king's surrender and execution. Vane was the soul of the commission which persuaded the Scots to form this league; his enemy Clarendon himself admitting, that it was necessary to mention his name only among the commissioners, because he was invariably "everything in every such body to which he belonged." The same historian says, "There need no more be said of his ability, than that he was chosen to cozen and deceive a whole nation which excelled in craft and cunning, which he did with notable pregnancy and dexterity." Hume, too, admits, that "In this negotiation, the man chiefly trusted to was Vane, who, in eloquence, address and capacity, as well as art and dissimulation, was not surpassed by any one, even in that age so famous for active talents." In regard to the "cozening, deceiving and dissimulation" imputed to the negotiator, it is impossible, at this day, to decide with certainty how far the charges were well-founded. We fear that men of excited passions, especially when great interests are at stake, have never been scrupulous about the use of such means, and dare not say that Vane and his coadjutors entirely abstained from these pious diplomatic frauds. It is certain, that Vane did not agree with the Scotch in his religious views; and the pledge in the covenant "to extirpate prelacy and popery, superstition, heresy and schism," appears inconsistent with his doctrine of religious liberty. But it must be recollected,

that the Presbyterian party still had the ascendancy in the Parliament which Vane represented, and that however he might differ from his northern allies in other matters, he perfectly agreed with them in opposition to that prelacy which Charles tried to force down their throats, which gave political power and seats in the House of Lords, in England, and which, in this worldly garb, every friend of religious liberty, although an Episcopalian, was bound to strike down. If he meant to "extirpate," by force, "prelacy, popery, superstition, heresy and schism," when unconnected with government, he clearly violated his own cardinal principle; and even, if he merely deluded those with whom he treated into the belief that he agreed in their intolerance, his conduct was manifestly indefensible. We freely admit this, because our object is truth, and not mere eulogy. But whatever the means employed, his main and laudable purpose was efficient union against political and religious tyranny. Although others, then acting with him, may have afterwards lost sight of that object, Vane's eye was ever fixed on it with steady and inflexible consistency.

After effecting this treaty, which was essential to the plans of the parliamentary leaders, as the alliance with France was to the success of the American Revolution, he continued to hold many important trusts from the insurgent party. He never took arms himself, but was commissioned to supervise and direct the operations of the army, which, we may be sure from his character, he did with equal vigilance and discretion. He took no part in the king's trial and execution, although brought about by his party. He seems to have been equally determined to bring Charles' power within safe limits, and to spare his person. Lord Clarendon gives him no credit for this, nor indeed for anything but great ability. Yet it is evident, that his forbearance may have proceeded from the purest motives, from deference to that maxim of the British Constitution, which made the king irresponsible, from kindly feeling toward Charles individually, from general humanity, or, above all, from the conviction, that, whatever his guilt, his triers had no authority to bring him to punishment. We



have never yet seen how the advocates of his execution could get over the last difficulty, without advocating a principle, which would have justified the assassination of Cæsar, or of any other usurper of arbitrary power. The court which tried Charles against the unanimous vote of that feeble remnant of the peers, which continued to meet, and was called the House of Lords, against the wish of a vast majority of the nation, was constituted by a faction of the Commons, scarcely exceeding in number the sixty assassins of Cæsar. When the president of the court arraigned Charles in the name of the people of England, a voice from the crowd, ascribed to Lady Fairfax, replied, "of not one tenth of them." The proceedings can only be justified on the stern plea of necessity, a plea equally valid in the mouth of an individual, as of a collective body, in California now, as in England then.

As we have no account of the motives assigned by Vane, it is but charitable to conclude, that he did not believe in this alleged necessity, but, on the contrary, thought, with Mr. Macaulay, that the king's execution, although deserved, was inexpedient. He may have thought it, if not "a crime, a blunder," in one whose "darling object was a republic, but not a red republic." Harrington, the republican author of the *Oceana*, was Charles' most attached servant, and stood by him at the block.

If Vane's true motive was this, all honor to the man who consulted alike true policy and humanity !

He went, for a while, into retirement, while that startling tragedy was enacting ; when, at length, he was prevailed on to take part again in the acting government, it was a glorious part, one worthy of special notice, and for which England owes him eternal gratitude. If

" Britannia rules the waves "

she owes the first establishment of that rule to the vigor and wisdom of his naval administration. The fleets of the then powerful Dutch republic, under such men as De Ruyter and Van Tromp, were a full match for the English, and the contest for supremacy long and doubtful. The great English

admiral, Blake, was, like Vane, a republican, and true as steel to his duty and his country. But, in spite of his skill and valor, he was, at one time, defeated and driven up the Thames, while the triumphant Van Tromp, with a broom at his mast-head, exultingly swept the English Channel. The whole kingdom was panic stricken, and despair was rapidly settling down on the land, not only because of the defeat, but because there was no money to equip a new fleet. Vane, who was at the head of the admiralty, boldly and wisely resolved to find resources by selling lands and other property belonging to the crown. Another fleet was soon gotten ready, with which, in a three days' conflict, Blake completely vanquished the Dutch, and put an end to their successful rivalry. It may be well to observe that this great disaster was repaired, and this great victory was achieved, before Cromwell, to whom it has become the fashion to ascribe all the glory of that period, was made Protector, and by an admiral and a minister who never bent the knee to the British Cæsar.

Algernon Sidney says, "When Van Tromp set on Blake in Folkestone bay, the Parliament had not above thirteen ships against sixty, and not a man that had seen any other fight at sea than between a merchant ship and a pirate, to oppose the best captain in the world. But such was the power of wisdom and integrity in those who sat at the helm and their diligence in choosing men only for their merit was attended with such success, that, in two years, our fleets grew to be as famous as our land armies, and the reputation and power of our nation rose to a greater height than when we possessed the better half of France, and had the kings of Scotland and France for our prisoners."

These great services were performed, too, entirely without compensation. If any doubt the correctness of his opinion, that public necessity justified the sacrifice of the crown demesnes, he proved its sincerity, by throwing into the public fund his own revenue also, amounting, it is said, to thirty thousand pounds per annum. This example reminds us of our own patriot and hero, who, in his official career, sought nothing but usefulness and honor.

In 1649, the year of the king's death, Vane was appointed, in conjunction with Sidney and others, to report a bill for the *reform* of Parliament. "The plan of the reform which was reported," was this: "The House was to consist of four hundred members; the small boroughs to be disfranchised; the elective privilege was to be secured equally to persons of all religious denominations; and the rights of the people were carefully guarded against corruption and oppression."

This was the plan, as subsequently modified, which was about to be finally voted on, when Cromwell, at one blow, put an end to bill and Parliament.

During the whole five years' protectorate of Cromwell which followed, Vane was in retirement, in disgrace, and, for some months, in imprisonment. Whatever may have been the patriotism and other merits of Cromwell, it is certain that he wished to establish a monarchy, and to make it hereditary in his family; that he could never live either with or without a Parliament; that he levied taxes without any other authority than the exigency of his position; that he threw Vane into prison for a bold, yet respectful remonstrance against his measures, and vainly endeavored to shake his resolution, by threatening to strip him of his property by vexatious litigation. When, therefore, the firm grasp of Oliver was relaxed by death, Vane was, by no means, inclined to leave the crown in the feeble hands of Richard Cromwell. The latter summoned a Parliament, and when he found it refractory, was about to follow the example of Charles and his father, by its dissolution. Vane, who was a member, spoke with his usual spirit and energy, and a bitterness, naturally engendered by the treatment which he had received. He reproached the English people with suffering "an idiot without courage, nay, without ambition, to have dominion in a country of liberty," and asked, whether he was fit to get obedience from a mighty nation, who could never make a footman obey him, and concluded by saying, "For my part, I declare, sir, it shall never be said, that I made such a man my master." This, with other indications, and the unambitious temper of Richard, led to his immediate abdication.



In the consequent interregnum, first a temporary "Committee of Safety," and afterwards a more permanent "Council of Government" were appointed; of both these bodies Vane was a member, and of the latter president.

At this period, as "Chairman of the Committee" appointed for the purpose, he reported a memorable bill for the settlement of the government. Its three leading positions were:

1st. "That the supreme power, delegated by the people to their *trustees*, ought to be in some *fundamentals* not dispensed with;" that is, a constitution ought to be drawn up and established, specifying the principles by which the successive trustees or representatives should be guided and restrained in the conduct of the government, and clearly stating those particulars in which they would not be permitted to legislate or act.

2d. That it is to be fixed in the constitution, "That it is destructive to the people's liberties to admit any earthly king, or single person, to the legislative or executive power of the nation."

3d. "That the supreme power is not entrusted to the people's trustees, to erect matters of faith and worship, so as to exercise compulsion therein."

Whatever we may think of the second, which forbids *unity* in the *executive* as well as *legislative* department, the first and third are the very corner-stones of our political fabric. The idea of a constitution, or fundamental law, setting limits to the power, not only of some, but of all departments of the government, seems to have been original with Vane, for it had been always held that king, lord, and commons were politically omnipotent, competent not only to pass ordinary statutes, but to establish a constitution. It was a noble discovery, for which all lovers of freedom, and more especially the people of these United States, are deeply indebted. As long as we preserve that constitutional barrier, which he suggested, to guard the rights of minorities, we shall stand and flourish; but the moment we break down that bulwark, we shall fall over the precipice of anarchy, and "fall like Lucifer, never to hope again." The name of this "Harry of England" should be "familiar in our mouths as household words," and

prove a spell to lay that wild spirit of disloyalty to the Constitution, which is the monster evil of our day.

But far the most important feature in the proposed scheme, was that provision, which secured liberty of soul as well as of body, and which is also embalmed in our institutions. In very early times some Roman Emperors, both Christian and heathen, a few Christian divines, and here and there a heathen philosopher, may have favored religious freedom; but the rays of light which then glimmered for awhile, were soon lost in the darkness of persecution and intolerance.

If this gloom was ever broken, it was only by the farthing candle of some obscure and oppressed sect, which served only to make the darkness more distinctly visible. It was far from being entirely dissipated by the glorious Reformation, although to us, complete religious liberty seems to be, not only the legitimate, but inevitable, consequence of its fundamental principle. It was reserved for Vane to become its first great practical advocate in England, as Roger Williams had been in America. Williams, indeed, had not unlimited power over the subject, for Charles would never have granted him a charter, under which he could persecute Episcopalians, however indifferent he may have been to the sufferings of Quakers and Anabaptists in Massachusetts. But Vane was not humbly soliciting a privilege from a monarch, but deliberately proposed, that the true sovereign of England, its people, should establish for itself a magna charta of religious liberty, embracing Jew and gentile, Christian and heathen. Cromwell's plan, although highly honorable to him, as far as it went, excluded Roman Catholics. Even Milton stopped at the same point, although his muse had paid a glowing tribute to the wisdom and piety of Vane.

"Vane, young in years, but in sage counsel old,  
Than whom a better Senator ne'er held  
The helm of Rome, when gowns, not arms, repell'd  
The fierce Epérot and the African bold;  
Whether to settle peace, or to unfold  
The drift of hollow States, hard to be spell'd;  
Then to advise how war may, best upheld,

Move by her two main nerves, iron and gold,  
In all her equipage ; besides to know  
Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,  
What severs each, thou hast learned, which few have done ;  
The bounds of either sword to thee we owe.  
Therefore on thy firm hand religion leans  
In peace, and reckons thee her eldest son."

Vane's principle was not *toleration*, which manifestly implies the right of granting, abridging, or entirely withdrawing conceded privileges, but *freedom*, coming directly from God to man, and therefore inalienable and indestructible. This alone entitles him to immortality. Yet such is the obscurity which has long covered the great men and great deeds of that period, such the prejudice created by royalist historians, even in America, that comparatively few have ever noticed this scheme of a great *practical* statesman ; while the fame of the essays on *toleration* by the *theorist* Locke, has reached every man of education on both continents.

The bright prospects which might have opened on England had it then heartily embraced this wise and noble constitution, were immediately shut out by the black cloud of the restoration, by the advent of what Macaulay has called "the golden age of the coward, the bigot, and the slave." As the violence of Cromwell had arrested a reform less thorough, so it was destined that the treachery of Monk, seconded, it may be, by the national wish, should prevent this fundamental change in the government of Britain.

It was not to have been expected that Vane, although no regicide, should be any favorite of Charles the Second. His active agency in the death of Strafford and Laud, his known ability, firmness, honesty, and republicanism, made him both feared and hated. Yet Charles had publicly and solemnly promised both Houses of Parliament, that, if he were prosecuted to conviction, he should be pardoned. He was, however, arrested, confined in the remote island of Scilly, for nearly two years, and at last brought to trial. At this great crisis, his virtues and genius shone forth with a lustre which surpassed any exhibition of them in his previous career. No man was ever a more glorious martyr, for he died, as he had lived,



in the unshrinking maintenance of great civil and religious principles. Indeed, religion had so completely leavened his whole character, that his every act was a religious act. Talk as his enemies may about his fanaticism and his unintelligible jargon, the extracts from his writings, as well as his uniform deportment, show that he had embraced the cardinal truths of Christianity, not only with his head but with his whole heart, and from them learned how to live and how to die.

He was denied counsel, he was denied witnesses ; the legal points, which, with signal ability, he made in his own defence, were not even considered ; he was basely insulted by his judges, yet he never lost, for a moment, his patient dignity, his serene presence of mind, his remarkable dexterity and capacity. He knew that his death was predetermined and resolved, in vindication of the great cause he had espoused, as well as of his own fame, that the infamy of the transaction should be exposed to the full blaze of day. Yet the judges, the jury, and the king, were content to brave the infamy, to secure revenge, and to free dissolute tyranny from a foe so able and deadly. He scorned to ask that mercy from Charles, which the king was already bound in honor to grant. Charles the First has been much censured for sacrificing his servant Strafford, after promising him, that " not a hair of his head should be touched." But that monarch had at least the excuse of being driven to it by a vast and justly excited majority of both Parliament and nation, while his bishops, and his conscience-keeping chancellor, advised him to bend to a storm, which soon swept away his throne and life. But Charles the Second was under no compulsion, except of his own base heart, and actually seemed eager for an opportunity to break his royal word. His conduct in this matter has left the darkest of the many spots on his fame, while that of Vane has given tenfold brilliancy and beauty to his already exalted reputation.

We have seen the last oration of Robert Emmet, printed on white satin, for circulation in the United States.

Notwithstanding the heroism and eloquence of that famous speech, there is something savage and boastful about it, which detracts from its taste and excellence. All the extracts which

we have seen from Vane's speeches at his trial, and from his address on the scaffold, are in perfect taste, because they blend the heroic firmness of a dying patriot with the gentle spirit of a Christian martyr. With all his brilliant qualities, Emmet had, we fear, imbibed the spirit of the French infidel school, which had then infected the whole moral atmosphere of Europe; Vane had learned his philosophy and courage on Calvary. If Emmet's speech merited satin, the speeches and prayers of the *fanatic* ought to be inscribed in gold.

Although he defended himself with a spirit and power which overwhelmed and confounded his persecutors and judges, yet he died praying that his enemies might be forgiven. His last words were rudely and basely drowned by those who feared him, even in death; but they could not hush "the still small voice" in the hearts of his murderers, and of his mourning countrymen, which told them that, in the death of this Christian hero, the glories of Marathon and Thermopylæ were eclipsed. A royalist, who stood by, was compelled to acknowledge, that "he died like a prince," while the weeping multitude invoked God's blessing on his head, and told him that "he never sat on any seat so glorious as that scaffold." We doubt not that he has long realized the truth of those touching words, in which he bade farewell to his family: "I have made it my business to acquaint myself with the society of heaven. Be not you troubled, for I am going home to my Father."

The leading maxim which he bequeathed as an invaluable legacy to his children was: "First resolve to suffer anything from men, rather than sin against God." We have no information how far, in the intervening period, his offspring acted out this noble principle, illustrated by his own shining example. But the following circumstances, stated by his biographer, prove that the influence of his blood and of his memory is not lost in his remote descendants.

It is common for the estate and titles of attainted persons to be forfeited, and their families consigned to infamy and poverty; but public sentiment, even in that servile period, compelled the government to remit that penalty in Vane's

case, and allow his children to inherit his estates and honors. His son, Sir Henry Vane, was sworn of William's privy council, after the revolution of 1688, when the Catholic James was driven from the English throne. When, one hundred and forty-four years later, in the reign of the fourth William, the Reform Bill passed the British Parliament, it was voted for by William Harry Vane, Marquis of Cleveland, although seven rotten boroughs, each said to be worth a thousand pounds per annum to him, were cut off by the bill. In this act we recognize the genuine spirit of the man, who, nearly two centuries before, first proposed reform, and who freely gave his large official income to his country in her hour of need.

The modern nobleman received an appropriate reward. The deadly hostility between the elder of the Vanes and Charles' favorite, Strafford, was partly owing to a circumstance which we have not yet mentioned. When Sir Thomas Wentworth was made Lord Strafford, he had also purposely obtained from the king the title of Baron Raby of Raby Castle, a favorite residence of Vane; at which the owner had entertained Charles, and which he had naturally hoped to associate with the baronial title, which he confidently expected. This was meant, understood, and resented, as a gratuitous insult. When, therefore, William IV. created the Marquis of Cleveland, Baron Raby of Raby Castle, and Duke of Cleveland, he doubtless meant it, not only as an honor to the descendant, but as an atonement to the ancestor.

Little remains to be said of Sir Harry Vane, the younger, as a statesman, a speaker, a writer, and a Christian. There are only two of his cotemporaries with whom he can be fairly compared, viz., John Hampden, and Oliver Cromwell. All things considered, we think he must be placed above either. We doubt not the ability, the address, the firmness, the patriotism, the great public services of Hampden; but we must recollect that he fell very early in the contest, before his administrative talent and purity of motive had undergone the fiery ordeal through which Vane's passed unscathed. We hope and believe, that the premature death of the former only shortened a career, which would have been brightening to the



very last ; but, as actual experiment is the only sure test of character, we must give still higher praise to one, who, starting with a reputation inferior to that of Hampden, only because he was younger, constantly raised it higher and higher, through a long career of danger, persecution, and temptation. The pilot who has actually shown the skill and courage to weather the storm, must bear off the palm from him who is only believed to possess those qualities.

Hampden tested a great principle, and performed a great service to his country, when he refused to pay ship-money ; yet, after all, he only risked royal favor, and not life. Vane, in defence of rights equally sacred and important, braved the Protector's sword and the headsman's axe. He was only twenty-eight years of age when he took his seat in the Long Parliament ; yet he at once took his stand among the greatest men of his day, and, by the confession of his bitterest detractors, kept it for twenty-two years of toil, difficulty and trial. There was indeed but one opinion of his genius among all who knew him, and although his motives and conduct have been aspersed, his public acts bear irrefragable testimony to his fidelity and consistency.

He never ruled the commonwealth, like Cromwell, nor ever had his prestige of military glory. It is likely that he did not equal him in the spirit of command, nor so perfectly understand the character and capacities of his countrymen. It may be, that he was too sanguine in believing the English of that day prepared for a republic, and that he would have acted more wisely in aiding Cromwell to establish a new constitutional dynasty. But in speculative ability, supported usually by great practical wisdom, in comprehensiveness of view, and in extent of information, he must have been vastly superior to the Protector. His two favorite principles of *constitutional government* and *universal religious freedom*, alone place him above all cotemporary statesmen. It would be an insult to his memory to compare his purity with that of his oppressor, Cromwell, who was once his coadjutor in the cause of liberty.

The specimens of Vane's eloquence, which have been preserved, and the testimony of his hearers, prove that he had

great speaking power. He was, from the first, one of the weightiest speakers in Parliament, and his defence upon his trial crowned his oratorical reputation.

Clarendon and Hume have represented his writings on religious subjects as unintelligible jargon, and Bishop Burnet gives the same account of his speeches at religious meetings. Having never seen any entire composition from his pen, we cannot assert that this charge is entirely groundless; but certainly there are no indications of its truth in Mr. Upham's specimens. Any exposition of evangelical doctrines would have seemed jargon to Hume, perhaps to Clarendon; and it is very likely that Vane occasionally entered into the abstruse speculations of that day, and did not always express himself with perfect clearness on those dark subjects. Calling no man master, and boldly following truth wherever he found it, he formed a creed acceptable to no sect, and which may have appeared crude and monstrous to Burnet. But Upham, who had once ignorantly called him a "religious fanatic," became, on the examination of his writings, his most ardent admirer and eulogist. Sir James McIntosh, too, no mean judge of style and matter, said, that among English writers, Vane was second only to Lord Bacon. Admitting this to be extravagant praise, we require nothing but the quotations in his biography to convince us that he had genius, learning, taste, and far-reaching wisdom, warmed and vivified by noble enthusiasm.

In regard to his religious opinions and conduct, it must be admitted, that not only Lord Clarendon, but Neale, Cotton Mather, Burnet, and even Baxter, speak unfavorably. But when we remember how intense is the *odium theologicum* in the minds of the best men, and that these men were not only opposed to him in other points, but especially could not grasp his all embracing principle of religious liberty, we may well suspect that they have not done him justice.

We cannot vouch for his entire orthodoxy; he may have been Calvinist or Arminian, he may have inclined to Origen's Universalism, or Mrs. Hutchinson's alleged Antinomianism, although it is hardly credible that he could have entertained at the same time two principles which appear to be diametrically opposed.

Waiving all doctrinal discussions, we cannot but see that in Upham's copious extracts, Sir Harry Vane sets forth the cardinal principles of the gospel in a way which must delight every true Christian. Above all, "his life was in the right," and his death the crowning glory of such a life. Take him, either as a statesman, a patriot, or a Christian, he was one of the brightest lights, if not the brightest light, of an age luminous with stars of the first magnitude.

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#### ARTICLE VII.—HACKETT ON ACTS.

THE excellences of this work, both of scholarship and composition, have been already justly characterized in this journal. See, especially, the October No. for 1858. We would not abate in the least the grateful praise there accorded to the critical skill of Prof. Hackett. His volume on the Acts is, without dispute, one of the ripest and ablest contributions of American scholarship to New Testament interpretation.

The mechanical part of the volume is worthy of the contents; of neat, clear type, strongly bound, marred by almost no typographical errors; a goodly book to look upon, goodly to handle. Such works, lying open on the minister's study-table, would fairly *allure* him to exegetical study.

We have but one exception to take to the material form of the volume, and that is the omission of the Greek text commented on. We protest, earnestly, against the current practice amongst critical commentators of giving us, in the manner of this volume, only *disjointed fragments* of the sacred original. Whoever can afford to purchase the commentary, can well afford the additional expense of having *the whole text* before his eye without the trouble of turning to a separate volume.

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\* A Commentary on the Original Text of the Acts of the Apostles. By Horatio B. Hackett, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Seminary. A new edition, revised and greatly enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1858.



The commentary before us gives evidence throughout of a critical and familiar acquaintance with the New Testament Greek, as well as with classical Greek, and also of a thorough and extended study of all the available means of explaining the book of the Acts. That perfection has been attained in the work, even with respect to "its predominant object," would not probably be claimed by the author himself. And it is the part of friendly, genial criticism, to point out whatever may seem to be errors in exegesis or interpretation. With respect to the volume in hand, it may be truly said there is very little occasion for the use of such friendly office. And yet, without having passed many portions of it under special and prolonged examination, we have detected what seem to us to be some slight errors both of exegesis and exposition.

Before noticing these passages, we feel constrained to make a remark or two with reference to an observation in the author's preface—namely, "No single commentary can be expected to answer all the purposes for which a commentary is needed." We fully agree with Professor Hackett in this view, and cannot object to its practical application in making his commentary a grammatical and philological one. *Mr. Ellicott* has been governed by the same principle of *division of labor* in his scholarly work on the Epistles of Paul. And the principle should be heeded by all workers in this department of Biblical study. The day has gone by, we hope, for attempts, by one man in one work, at critical, dogmatic, experimental and practical commentary.

Yet it does not follow that because a work is critical and grammatical, it should therefore be exsiccated and exhausted of all the generous juices of religious sentiment. We speak, we believe, the current opinion of those who have most intelligently and thankfully consulted Hackett on the Acts, when we say that the author seems to have put an undue force on himself in repressing the utterance of Christian emotion. This fact seems to be due, in part, to the author's intimacy with such models as De Wette's *Exegetisches Handbuch*. That the result is not the spontaneous product of his own nature, let his "Scripture Illustrations" bear witness—a book abound-

ing in warm and glowing passages; nay, let his remarks on the 20th verse of the 3d chap. of the book of Acts bear witness. More of this juiciness of expression we would have even in a commentary whose predominant object is "to determine by the rules of a just philology the meaning of the sacred writer."

As an instance of what we conceive to be a *misinterpretation* of some importance, we call attention to a remark on page 310, as follows: "They (the Ephesian disciples) may have received the rite of baptism *from John himself*, or from some one whom he had baptized, but who had not advanced beyond the point of knowledge at which John's ministry had left his disciples." Again, on the same page, "The reply of Paul is apparently thus: John indeed preached repentance and a Saviour to come (as you know); but the Messiah whom he announced has appeared in Jesus, and you are now to believe on him as John directed. Then they were baptized," &c. And again, on the same page: "Their prompt reception of the truth would tend to show that the defect in their former baptism related not so much to any positive error as to their ignorance in regard to the proper object of faith."

Now, if we understand Prof. Hackett in these extracts, baptism administered *even by John himself* might be vitiated by simple defect of knowledge concerning the subsequent events of the Christian history, although there was a readiness to receive these facts when competently testified of. Very few, we think, will be willing to accept this as even a probable explanation of this apparent anabaptism. For, if a repetition of the ordinance was thus rendered necessary in the case of these twelve disciples, it was equally necessary in the case of Apollos, mentioned in the preceding chapter, and in the case of hundreds more who had properly received the baptism of John at an early period, and had wandered beyond the boundaries of Palestine. But in no other instance have we a hint of a re-baptism. There must have been, therefore, a peculiarity in the administration of the rite in the case of the disciples. Both they and Apollos had received John's baptism as they supposed, but *they* had received it improperly, *he* properly, they out of time, he in time, like the apostles and the seventy.

We would suggest the following brief explanation, which seems to us to meet all the difficulties of the case very simply :

These disciples had been baptized not by John (otherwise the act would not have been repeated), but by some disciple or disciples of John, and that too, *subsequent to the putting forth of the new formula of baptism*, with its new significations. And *this* was the invalidating element in the transaction. *Up to the time* of the issuing of that formula requiring the act thenceforth to be solemnized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, John's baptism, that is, baptism on a profession of repentance and of faith in a Messiah to come, or a Messiah as come in Jesus of Nazareth, this baptism, whether administered by John or his disciples, was valid, and was never repeated. But *after* the issuing of that new formula, no person was suitably baptized, no person, in fact, was really *baptized*, except he was immersed on a profession of his faith in Christ, unto the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now, these Ephesian disciples had probably been immersed *subsequently* to the giving of this new formula significant of new facts, without the use of the formula, and without reference to the facts. Their immersion was, therefore, no baptism, any more than the same act would now be. It was an anachronism in the use of an ordinance.

As soon as these disciples heard from Paul all the facts of history connected with the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, and the inauguration of the dispensation of the Spirit amid Pentecostal scenes, and heard, moreover, that all this, for which they had been waiting, had taken place *long before their supposed baptism*, they perceived that they had never been baptized at all, and then and there they submitted themselves really to the ordinance.\*

As an instance of what seems to us an error in *criticism*, we would call attention to a remark on page 414, where we

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\* In these remarks it has been assumed that John's *disciples* were authorized baptizers, a point questioned by some, but generally held by writers on this subject.



find a statement and an application of the law of the present participle (Greek), the accuracy of which we cannot but question. The original passage concerning which the statement is made, is as follows: *Κακεῖ εὐρών ὁ ἑκατόνταρχος πλοῖον Ἀλεξανδρίνον πλέον εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, &c.* The remark of Prof. Hackett, to which we wish to call attention, is this, "The participle (*πλέον*), describes a *proximate future*, as in xxi. 2, 3, etc." Consequently, he would translate "a ship *about to sail*, or, *on the point of sailing*."

Now, we think that in this particular passage, whatever may be established in other instances, the present participle is not used for a proximate future. Mr. Blunt, in the very quotation that Prof. Hackett has given from him on v. 38, and to which he here refers us, renders it, and as we think correctly, "The ship *was sailing* into Italy." The ship may, indeed, have been about to sail from the port of Myra, where Paul and his companions embarked on it, but this was not the fact in the mind of Luke, and intended to be stated by him in the choice of the present participle. He merely advertises his readers that the ship was *in voyage* from Alexandria to Italy. On this voyage she *touched* at the port of Myra.

In support of the rendering which makes *πλέον* a proximate future, Prof. Hackett, and De Wette, whom Hackett seems in this instance to follow, quote Acts xxi. 2, 3. De Wette, however, quotes only v. 2. But this is by no means a satisfactory proof-passage. Verse 2 reads as follows: *Καὶ εὐρόντες πλοῖον διαπερῶν εἰς Φοινίκην, ἐπιβάντες ἀνήχθημεν.* The simple question before us is, does *διαπερῶν εἰς Φοινίκην* mean *about to go* into Phœnicia, or *sailing over unto* Phœnicia, or, more nautically expressed, bound for Phœnicia, implying thus that the ship was in voyage? Evidently, this was a merchant ship making her customary voyage from the West to the East, of whose accommodations Paul and his companions availed themselves as she touched at the port of Patara. And it was, doubtless, the fact of *the whole voyage* from the West to the East, that Luke had in mind when he wrote *διαπερῶν*. We should, therefore, adhere decidedly to the present in rendering this participle, as we should in all cases when an imperative necessity did not require a modified rendering.

The expression in the next verse, quoted by Prof. Hackett, *ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ἦν τὸ πλοῖον ἀποφορτιζόμενον τὸν γόμον*, is just as unsatisfactory a proof-passage as the other, since De Wette, Meyer, and others render it, "For thither (after the arrival), was the ship unloading her cargo."

As for the passages quoted from Matthew xxvi. 28, and Luke xxii. 19, we think that much would be lost from the glorious significancy of the Saviour's words, by rendering *ἐκχυνόμενον* and *διδόμενον* as proximate futures, "about to be shed," "about to be given." We greatly prefer the present, "is shed," "is given," as indicating that the passion was a fact then in progress and hastening to its consummation, or, at least, that it was present in the thoughts of the Divine speaker. The agony of Christ was life-long. The whole phenomenon of his self-sacrificing humiliation was signified, as *Alford* somewhere well says, by the "pouring and breaking."

The foregoing passages are all that our author refers to, and none of them are clear and satisfactory examples of the present participle used as a proximate future. And had they all been indisputably in point as illustrations of the law as stated by Prof. Hackett, they would not have proved that in Acts xxvii. 6, the present is used for the future.

We do well, then, to adhere to the common version, viz. : "The centurion found a ship of Alexandria *sailing* into Italy."

Since the preceding was written, the following remark of Winer has fallen under our notice. It is found in the 45th section of the last edition of his *N. T. Grammar*, where he is speaking of the frequency with which the present participle, in different relations, was formerly taken for a future, a practice which he characterizes as "*ungebühr*," improper. Quoting Acts xxi. 2, he translates, "*welches fuh, auf der fahrt begriffen war*," "which was sailing, was on the voyage."

Further on in the same section, he calls attention to Acts xxi. 3, and says, "It cannot, with Grotius, Volkenauer, and others, be translated, 'thither the ship *about to unlade*,' but it means, 'thither the ship *was unlading* its freight,' 'dorthin lud das Fahrzeug seine Fracht ab.'"

We have dwelt the longer on this point, because great liberties have been taken with the present participle in the New Testament by various translators and interpreters, and much erroneous interpretation has been the result. It has been somewhat common to take the present participle as standing for a proximate future not only, but for a remote future. Thus, for example, in 2 Pet. ii. 9, our version gives the future rendering to the present, and thereby abates the testimony of Scripture to an important truth, viz.: the consciousness of the wicked dead in their present disembodied state. Thus we have, "The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment *to be punished*," (κολαζομένους.) Here, as in almost all other examples, we extract a better sense, because the true one, by adhering to the present signification and reading, "The Lord knoweth how to keep the unjust *under punishment* unto the day of judgment."\* So *Beza*, *Piscator*, and others, as quoted by *Poole*. The ordinary but unsatisfactory expedient is to say that κολαζομένους is for κολασθησομένους.

Again, in 2 Pet. iii. 11, we have τούτον οὖν πάντων λυομένων, which our version gives, "Seeing then that all these things *shall be dissolved*," with which, as *Maurice* remarks, no scholar can be satisfied. *Winer* gives as the proper translation, "da dieses alles aufgelöst wird," *is dissolved*, and remarks, "according to its nature dissolution is appointed to it" (the present system of things); "the fate of dissolution even now inheres, as it were, in these things." By saying, "all these things are dissolving," Peter meant to startle the antinomianism of his day from its perilous slumbers to the moral preparations demanded. How much is the force of the apostle's admonition abated by throwing into the far future the whole process of the world's dissolution, and drawing off the attention from its present transitoriness.

We have marked some other points in this most admirable commentary which we intended to subject to a brief and friendly discussion. But the unexpected length to which we have been led already, prevents even a reference to them. We unite with many others in expressing the wish that the author may contribute many more volumes from his ripe scholarship to the treasures of New Testament exegesis and interpretation.

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\* Here the *Geneva* version is admirable, "The Lord knoweth to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment under punishment."



## ARTICLE VIII.—SHORTER BOOK NOTICES.

## I.

## NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL, BY DR. BUSHNELL.\*

THE object of this volume, as stated by its author, is, "*to find a legitimate place for the supernatural in the system of God, and show it as a necessary part of the Divine system.*" It aims to defend Christianity against the assaults of such writers as Theodore Parker and F. W. Newman. It is strongly marked with its author's peculiarities of thought and style—vigorous and glowing in imagery, but inconsequent in reasoning, and deficient in compactness and force. It is vastly superior to a similar attempt by the "author of the 'Plan of Salvation;'" but, in learning, logic, method and style, is decidedly inferior to Theodore Parker's "Discourse of Religion," to which it is chiefly intended to be a reply. It will undoubtedly prove both attractive and instructive to a certain class of readers; but it is very far from being a refutation of Mr. Parker's theory. Indeed, he makes no attempt to cope with the fundamental principles of that theory. We question if his philosophy would have enabled him to dispose of them if he had made the attempt. So, leaving Mr. Parker's foundation untouched, he builds over against him "an hypothesis for the matters in question;" an hypothesis which he thinks "gathers in, accommodates and assimilates all the facts of the subject." And a most curious discussion is his attempted construction of a basis for his hypothesis. It is simply a new theodicy, which, adopting "the doctrine of the Manichees with sufficient modifications," makes evil to be "only a condition privative that environs God from eternity, waiting to become a fact, and certain to become a fact whenever the opportunity is given;" a theodicy that ignores the existence of unfallen angels, and, exploding the personality of Satan, resolves him into "a bad possibility," that, "eternally existing," has, in the "world's creation," emerged into a bad actuality—which it is the problem of Jehovah's government to master! But we have not the space for an examination of the hypothesis itself. Suffice it to say, that the chapters containing it seem to be strung upon a thread not easily discoverable, suggesting to the curious reader certain questions about the author's logical processes, not strictly in keeping with the subject in hand.

To Dr. Bushnell as a writer of sermons, we would accord the highest praise; but as a Christian philosopher and apologist, we would rather not speak of him. A man who denies the existence of unfallen angels, virtually admits the eternity and omnipotence of moral evil, and advocates belief in the continuance of miraculous power in the church, cannot, to our mind, be safely intrusted with the superintendence and management of the defence of our common faith.

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\* NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL, AS TOGETHER CONSTITUTING THE ONE SYSTEM OF GOD. By Horace Bushnell. Second Edition. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1858.

## BUSHNELL'S SERMONS FOR THE NEW LIFE.\*

## ALEXANDER'S DISCOURSES.†

We put these two volumes together, because they are from the same publishing house, and were not far removed from each other in their appearance before the public, and because, in their most striking peculiarities, they are almost in contrast. The sermons of both authors are models of their kind. They may be taken as types of the best style of preaching in the two opposite schools of theology to which their authors belong. Dr. Bushnell evidently has the advantage in freshness of thought, and in glow of feeling and of imagery; but Dr. Alexander is the more elegant, exact, and scholarly. Dr. Bushnell delights rather in the analysis of moral states, and in digging about and disclosing the roots of the Christian life and duty; Dr. Alexander in vindicating the grounds of moral obligation, and in throwing the radiance of Christianity over the whole field of human life. The first treats Christianity subjectively; the other objectively. No matter what the doctrine or duty may be, Dr. B. proceeds at once to show its hidden connection with our spiritual life; Dr. A. to trace it back to the formal statement of objective truth or doctrine.

The volumes are, to a singular degree, the counterpart of each other. It has occurred to us, that the congregations of their respective authors could not do better than exchange orders for a couple of hundred of volumes for gratuitous distribution. We have no question about the mutual advantage that might be reaped by the mutual acquaintance.

Neither of the volumes is faultless in style, though Dr. Alexander's is, in every respect, more nearly so than Dr. Bushnell's. In the former you will rarely meet with such an inaccuracy as "the deed [the poor widow's contribution of the two mites], attracted the *eye* of Infinite Wisdom, which *penetrated* beyond the *ring* of the paltry pieces." In the latter, you are constantly reminded of his disregard of established forms of speech, by meeting with such expressions as "was resembled to"—"*beset* by so many defects"—"the working of his defects," "conquer the original love," &c., &c. He also persists in using "intelligent" for "intelligible."

## DR. TAYLOR'S LECTURES ON THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.‡

The Practical Sermons of Dr. Taylor were noticed in the January Number of this Review. Two volumes of his Theological Lectures have since appeared. They disclose to us the foundation of the New-Haven Theology, disclosing at great length the author's theory of Moral Government. It is exclusively upon a theory of that government, that, like Prof. Finney, he rests his whole system of theology. An examination of the theory we must reserve to another time and a separate article. Meanwhile, we would advise every one interested in theological speculations, especially theological students, to study the theory, and ascertain for themselves what kind of a theology its advocates must hold. It is not one which we think destined to prevail, or likely to be a blessing to our

\* SERMONS FOR THE NEW LIFE. By Horace Bushnell. Fourth Edition. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1859.

† DISCOURSES ON THE COMMON TOPICS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PRACTICE. By James W. Alexander, D. D. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1858.

‡ LECTURES ON THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. By Nathaniel W. Taylor, late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. 2 vols. New-York: Clark, Austin & Smith. 1859.

American churches. It is, nevertheless, a real power among us, and should be understood.

We have been surprised at the tediousness, awkwardness, inexactness, and diffuseness of Dr. Taylor's style. What Prof. Porter meant, when, in a prefatory note to the Practical Sermons, he spoke of "the precision of language and exactness of statement, which so characterized the Lectures," is a mystery to us. There has been one inexcusable negligence in the preparation of the Lectures for the press, and that is the provision of an alphabetical index. It is an imposition to compel the reader to wade through a sea of "contents," to find the author's view of some particular question.

#### ALBERT BARNES ON THE ATONEMENT.\*

This is a volume of 358 pages, devoted to an explanation and defence of the rectoral or governmental theory. The author agrees substantially with Beman, Finney, Taylor, and the lesser lights by whom that theory has been illuminated. He is, however, much more cautious in his statements than they, and adopts several principles belonging essentially to the theory of substitution. He very distinctly states that Christ is our substitute, though it is abundantly evident, from what is elsewhere said, that the substitution is not so much of Christ personally for us as of his sufferings for our punishment. Unlike Dr. Taylor, he also recognizes a ground of necessity for an atonement in the justice of God, though he finds so many other grounds as to come at last into agreement with Taylor and the other writers of the same school.

The author does not seem to be at all times so exact and clear in his distinctions, and precise in his statements, as his subject requires. For instance, in the *fifth* chapter, on "the probabilities that an atonement will be provided," he has not distinguished between probability *à priori* and the probability discoverable from analogy under the light of revelation. The two things are very wide asunder; but the author swings to and fro between them, with marvellous unconsciousness of any confusion of thought. It is vexatious in reading such a treatise to meet the ever recurring phrase, "in reference to," and similarly awkward and useless forms of expression.

We hope this volume will be extensively read; it will, doubtless, contribute to a better understanding of the doctrine discussed, and, we think, to the final overthrow of the theory held by the school of theologians to which the author belongs.

#### ARMSTRONG'S THEOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.†

This is an attempt to exhibit the "common faith" of Christians; to present a brief, systematic, but popular view of the theology of a common experience. The author has evidently written with care and not without preparation for his task. His object is, doubtless, a worthy one, but we cannot say we think him to have succeeded in its accomplishment. His own experience has evidently been that of an old-school theology; but in attempting to make this the theology of his new-school brethren he has occasionally fallen into a vagueness of expression that can hardly satisfy the clear-headed of any school. His task was most difficult on the doc-

\*THE ATONEMENT IN ITS RELATIONS TO LAWS AND MORAL GOVERNMENT. By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1858.

†THE THEOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE, designed as an exposition of the "Common Faith" of the Church of God. By Geo. D. Armstrong, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Norfolk, Va. New-York, C. Scribner.



trines of sin and of the atonement. His own convictions evidently could not be mastered; and with all his effort to be accommodating, he cannot have satisfied the brethren of the new school. The feat of riding in two boats at once is not yet accomplished. Dr. Armstrong is destined, we fear, to the fate of all who have hitherto attempted it. His volume will, doubtless, be read by his own congregation and personal friends, but outside of that circle its voice will hardly be heard. The book, in fact, even were it a success in its theological thesis, is yet too deficient in raciness and breadth to make it acceptable to readers generally.

#### CHRISTIAN MORALS: BY CHALLEN.\*

A very sensible and unpretending discussion and enforcement of the practical morality of the Gospel; a subject on which the Scriptures are copious and minute, but which too many members of churches are in danger of overlooking. The author dwells not on mere principles, but on their application to the common questions of duty in every one's every-day life. His plan is not so comprehensive, nor his method so philosophical, as they might well have been; but still he has prepared a short treatise which, in an age of sudden gains, of hurtful luxuries and lusts, and of doubtful morals, might find attentive and profited readers.

#### BAPTIST CHURCH DIRECTORY.†

This volume is happily conceived, and, as a whole, very well executed. It is comprehensive and minute enough for all the purposes contemplated. In all that pertains to our polity and practices it is just the book to put into the hands of our younger members. A general circulation and careful reading of it would greatly promote harmony and good order in our churches. We regret to find it recognizing and publishing the "New-Hampshire Confession of Faith," as containing the doctrines of our Baptist Churches. There are a great many ministers and churches throughout our country to whom these doctrines are by no means satisfactory. We have been unwilling that authors like Dr. Baird should refer to that Confession as our symbol, and regret that a book by a Baptist, destined to so wide a circulation as this, should extend the impression that it contains the Baptist faith.

#### SALVATION BY CHRIST.‡

Under a new name, these are the "University Sermons," first published about ten years ago, with the addition of six and the omission of the two on "The Revolutions in Europe." As thus enlarged, the design of the volume is not only to exhibit the leading "doctrines" of the Gospel, but many of its most important *duties* also. All these discourses are worthy of the author, displaying that familiarity with the fundamental principles of morals, that clearness of statement, pertinency of illustration, and calm but earnest persuasive power, which have long made his writings dis-

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\* CHRISTIAN MORALS. By James Challen, author of the "Gospel and its Elements," &c., &c. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son.

† THE BAPTIST CHURCH DIRECTORY: a Guide to the Doctrines and Discipline, &c., &c., of Baptist Churches, embracing a concise view of the questions of baptism and communion. By Ed. T. Hiscox, D. D., Pastor of Stanton-street Baptist Church. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1859.

‡ SALVATION BY CHRIST: a series of Discourses on some of the most important doctrines of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 12mo, pp. 386.

tinguished. Some of them seem to us as eloquent as anything ever written by him, except his *chef d'œuvre*, "The Moral Dignity of the Missionary Enterprise."

We would not needlessly find fault amid so much that is excellent, but must be permitted to say that the views of the Atonement and of the Work of the Holy Spirit here set forth, while in some respects new and striking, appear to us but a *partial* statement of those great doctrines. (See pp. 145, 147, 160, 232.)

In regard to church government also, if we understand the author, he is not only at variance with Baptists generally, but self-contradictory. He says: "The question, however, has been asked, what is the form of government which Christ has ordained for these various communities of Christians? I answer, I do not perceive in the New Testament any directions on this subject. I see there mention made of pastors, or religious teachers, who were to preach the word and be examples to the flock; and deacons, whose office it was to distribute the charities of the disciples. But how these were to be appointed, or what was to be the ruling authority, has not been authoritatively made known to us. *I see nothing in the New Testament which would prevent any community of Christians from adopting any form of church government which they may esteem most for their edification. The forms which have been adopted have in fact been very analogous to those which have obtained in civil society. All of these are allowable. Each one of them has various points of excellence,*" &c. (p. 321.)

We must enter our solemn protest against such sentiments, especially the remarks we have italicized. We do not believe that it is equally accordant with Christ's will, whether there are two or three or twenty orders of church officers; whether they are appointed by the church or by their predecessors in office; whether the church admit and exclude its members, and transact its own business, or all this be done by its officers; whether each church is independent, or under the control of a vast ecclesiastical organization; in short, whether republicanism or despotism, Prelacy, Presbyterianism, Methodism, or Congregationalism, "forms which have been adopted," be the established form of government. We have not so learned Christ. Matt. xviii. 17, where "*the church*" is made the ultimate court of appeal, is enough to decide most of these questions for us, and many Scriptures (such as 1 Cor. v. 7-13; Acts i. 26; vi. 1-6; 1 Cor. vi. 4; 2 Cor. viii. 19; 1 Cor. xvi. 13; Phil. ii. 25; iv. 18), show that each *church* had the right of choosing its own officers, and disciplining its own members without the interference of others.

But we need not argue the point. Dr. Wayland himself virtually admits it in other passages of the same discourse, as on p. 319: "By these [those who are already disciples], every one who wishes to come out from the world, and professes his faith in Christ, is to be received into the number of visible disciples." The power to *receive*, implies the power to *exclude*. Again: "It [a church] has nothing to do with any other association, nor has any other association anything to do with it. Its laws and its authority are all derived from Christ its head." (p. 320). Here is the grand doctrine of independence which at once overthrows all ecclesiastical despotism of every name.

W. —.

#### DAILY THOUGHTS.\*

An admirable little book for the Sabbath School and fireside. We would gladly purge our Sabbath School libraries of those reprints of

\* DAILY THOUGHTS FOR A CHILD. By Mrs. Thomas Geldart. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 18mo, pp. 170. 1859.

English Sunday School books which only reveal the vulgarity and vice of low life in England, and fill their places with volumes pure and instructive as this, which has just been published from a second London edition.

#### THE POWER OF PRAYER.\*

The *fifth* edition of this book is proof of interesting contents, and of skilful authorship. Its numerous incidents in illustration of the power of prayer will carry stimulus and encouragement to multitudes of praying hearts in the secluded districts and quiet homes of the country.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE.†

The appearance of the fourth edition of this book is evidence of its popularity and its mischief. It is spiritedly written, and with considerable show of learning and of philosophical method. A sort of halo is thrown around the subject by a style which, though not always transparent, is yet singularly elastic, copious, and vigorous. The book demands a thorough and searching analysis by some competent hand. We regret not to have received from Messrs. Gould & Lincoln a copy of Dr. Hovey's recent book on "The Impenitent Dead." We have no doubt of his competency to dispose of many of Mr. Hudson's principles and proofs in a way both summary and satisfactory.

#### THE SABBATH HYMN BOOK.‡

This is Dr. Wayland's Baptist edition of the Hymn Book, prepared by Professors Park & Phelps, with the aid of Lowell Mason. It is intended to be accompanied with tunes for congregational singing. We are not partial to Baptist editions of books; but regarding this simply as a collection of Hymns, it is in our deliberate judgment the best yet made. Its classification of the hymns, and its indices of subjects, texts, first lines, &c., are complete, and its variety, one would think, equal to every emergency.

#### WINES' COMMENTARIES.§

A third edition of this book is some evidence of its value. Though not an original investigator, Dr. Wines has yet done a good work for a large class of readers.

#### LIFE AT THREE SCORE.||

This is a sermon preached by Albert Barnes to his own congregation, on reaching his sixtieth year. It is intended to embody some of the les-

\* THE POWER OF PRAYER. Illustrated in the wonderful displays of Divine grace at the Fulton street and other meetings in New-York and elsewhere in 1857 and 1858. Fifth Edition. By Samuel Irenæus Prime. New-York: Charles Scribner.

† DEBT AND GRACE, AS RELATED TO THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE. By C. F. Hudson. Fourth Edition. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co

‡ THE SABBATH HYMN BOOK; for the Service of Song in the House of the Lord. Baptist Edition. New-York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co.

§ COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS: with an Introductory Essay on Civil Society and Government. By E. C. Wines, D. D., Prof. of Greek in Washington College, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien.

|| LIFE AT THREE-SCORE. A Sermon delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Nov. 28, 1858. By Albert Barnes. Phila.: Parry & McMillan.



sons taught by his life's experience, and will be of service to young men, of whatever profession, who are just entering on the active duties of life. Its views are eminently hopeful and encouraging to the young.

#### FAIRBAIRN'S HERMENEUTICAL MANUAL.\*

The name and reputation of the author of this work will give it currency. And its intrinsic merits will sustain, if it does not enhance, his well-established reputation as a biblical student and exegete. The feature of special excellence in this volume is, that it furnishes what the younger students of Scripture need, a specimen of the thorough and judicious *application* of some of the leading principles of sacred interpretation. It gives the student *real help* in introducing him to the successful *method* of investigating Scripture.

It is to be much regretted that, in a work so generally Catholic in its spirit, and intended for Catholic use, a work that, in most respects, is fully up to the most advanced scholarship, such antiquated criticism should be introduced as is found in the section that discusses "Baptizo." It is high time to cease doing such polemical violence to that much-abused word.

#### THE GREAT DAY OF ATONEMENT.†

This work has quite a romantic little history, as given in the preface.

Its *character* is sufficiently indicated in the title, which we have given in full. It is made up of prayers and pious meditations suggested by events that occurred, successively, during the last twenty-four hours of our Saviour's life.

Perhaps there has been too broad a distinction between the Protestant and Catholic communions in regard to the use of such devotional aids. The latter have, doubtless, an excess of this species of religious literature, even were it all unobjectionable in other respects. They are furnished with too small a proportion of didactic reading. Just as, also, in the Roman Catholic service the liturgical element is in excess as compared with the preaching and teaching element. But in most Protestant denominations there seems to be a tendency to the opposite extreme. It would be well, perhaps, if there were among them a larger demand for such meditative and devotional compositions as is this little work.

#### PAYSON'S WORKS.‡

About three fourths of the first of these volumes is taken up with an interesting Memoir of Dr. P. The remainder is occupied with Select Thoughts and pieces more or less in the form of Addresses and Sermons. The second and third volumes are filled with Sermons.

The Memoir has been so long before the public, that it is hardly necessary to say that it may be read with spiritual profit by all who are endeavoring to fulfil the Christian ministry. Read as it should be, it can hardly fail to awaken aspirations after the highest attainments in holiness, and the largest measure of usefulness.

\* "HERMENEUTICAL MANUAL; or, Introduction to the Exegetical Study of the New Testament. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Principal and Professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, Glasgow." 8vo. pp. 859. Phila. : Smith, English & Co. New-York : Sheldon & Blakeman. 1859.

† THE GREAT DAY OF ATONEMENT; or, Meditations and Prayers on the Last Twenty-Four Hours of the Sufferings and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Translated from the German of Charlotte Elizabeth Nebelin. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

‡ MEMOIRS, SELECT THOUGHTS, AND SERMONS OF THE REV. EDWARD PAYSON, D. D. Philadelphia : Wm. & Alfred Martien. 3 vols. 8vo. 1859.

The Sermons are remarkable for the liveliness of their style, and for their richness in evangelical sentiment. They can be read with advantage by all such students and ministers as know how to read original sermons without impairing their own power of original thinking.

#### LIFE AND LABORS OF DANIEL BAKER, D. D.\*

Dr. Baker was a Presbyterian minister, who was widely known as pastor and evangelist in the Southern States, especially in Texas, where he died near the close of 1857. He was evidently a man of glowing piety and great usefulness. A large circle of acquaintances will be eager to read a record of his life and labors. But it strikes us that the life, if worth writing at all, was worth writing in at least respectably good English.

#### FIRST THINGS.†

This volume is written, for the greater part, in Dr. Stow's best style and spirit. Quiet in tone, choice in language, and suggestive of thought, it is worthy of a permanent place in our Denominational and Christian literature. It will be no abatement of our warm recommendation of the volume if we say that the author intimates very decidedly his own opinions on various controverted subjects. In fact, there runs through the work, as through all the writer's productions, a polemical vein that every now and then comes into distinct notice. That is to say, the book has character, and a controversial character. And we take it that Dr. Stow cannot well write religiously without at least *insinuating* his own views of doctrine, polity, and measures. Both his recent publications were doubtless put forth with a distinct and conscious aim toward points held in discussion by the Christian world. And this feature of his books is, we repeat, no objection to them with us.

As examples of what we mean, take the following passages. On page 25, speaking of the "first prayer-meeting," Dr. Stow says: "The women pray, and with becoming simplicity and pertinency." He thus decides, in his own way, the much-debated point whether it is proper for females to take part in prayer audibly in Christian assemblies.

On page 248, the author, with controverted points of the present time in mind, says of the Antiochean missionaries: "The body of believers who had enjoyed their teachings, now send them abroad, *giving them no instructions, demanding of them no pledges*," which evidently is not history, but only inference, and inference due, probably, to opinions recently embraced by the writer.

On page 250 occurs this remark: "The outfit of these missionaries is small; no women accompany them." Besides that this, too, is not certain history, the remark *appears* to carry a censure of the prevailing present custom for missionaries to be accompanied by "women" ("*wives*" would have sounded more respectful). Now, if the author intends by this remark to censure the present custom of missionaries being accompanied by wives, our judgment would be at variance with his. Or, if he means to be understood as intimating that clerical celibacy was the habit of that age, we should disagree with him. Peter had a wife, and she seems to have accompanied him in his mission tours, 1 Peter v. 13. John had a wife, and even Paul says: "Have we not power to *lead about* a sister,

\* THE LIFE AND LABORS OF THE REV. DANIEL BAKER, D. D., Pastor and Evangelist. Prepared by his son, Rev. Wm. W. Baker, Pastor, Austin, Texas. Philadelphia: W. S. & Alfred Martien.

† FIRST THINGS; or the Development of Church Life. By Baron Stow, Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

a wife, as well as other apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord and Cephas?"

Once more, not to multiply quotations, on page 259 we read with surprise: "they formed no missionary societies, small or great, inside or outside of the churches. There were no combinations of churches, no delegations from churches, no constitutions, no boards of direction, no agents, local or itinerant. The churches singly, without any affiliation, did their own work," &c. Again, page 261: "The churches \* \* \* expended nothing upon machinery." Now all this, of which the public has had so much of late, is not history. It cannot be established. It is injurious inference. If it could become effective it would dissolve and destroy all our organized efforts of benevolence. There probably were "combinations of churches" in the age of the Apostles. Thus we read of "messengers of the churches;" and there certainly was what many are now-a-days pleased to call machinery. When *Titus, Gaius*, and another brother, were sent as *special collecting agents* to Corinth in behalf of a common benevolence, machinery was employed. They reached the object with the best means at their command, but that involved the employment of agencies.

On the whole, we have been much refreshed in reading Dr. Stow's volume, and we heartily commend it to the perusal of all thoughtful readers.

#### CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD.\*

It would be well for the moral impression of this book, if the latter portion of it could be read first. Many of the sentiments contained in that portion of it are excellent. They are, in fact, the common property of Christendom, inasmuch as no one thinks of calling them in question. Such, for example, are the propositions, that Christians ought to free themselves from the spirit of sect; that they ought to cultivate a higher degree of personal holiness; and that they should co-operate with all other Christians in everything not interdicted by the laws of Christ. These and other ideas spread over the last half of the volume, will find ready and universal assent, and the spirit breathed throughout the author's advocacy of them, will be refreshing to every reader.

Should the reader become inquisitive, and ask, where does the spirit of sect begin? What is the boundary line between the sectarian spirit and a Scriptural zeal for essential truth? At what point do the laws of Christ interdict co-operation with Christians of other denominations? he will have to go elsewhere than to this work for anything approaching a satisfactory answer. The veriest polemic of any communion may find shelter among the vague generalities of the discussion. Perhaps this difficulty is inherent in all such pleas for Christian brotherhood; and it may be necessary always to say, in substance, simply this, 'Cultivate, with all prayerful diligence, a spirit of Catholic, Christian charity, and then adhere inflexibly to the truth as you understand it.' This, we are glad to say, is the net result of the last portion of Dr. Stow's volume, as we have read it.

Of the first part of the work, so far as page 110, we will only say that the evils contemplated by the author are, unconsciously perhaps, but sadly, *exaggerated*. In the preaching and evangelical labors of Christians there is not so large a proportion of mere sectarian zeal as is therein set forth. And certainly the evil is not on the increase, at least as between us and other evangelical denominations. This fact is, indeed, recognized

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\* CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD. A Letter to the Hon Heman Lincoln. By Baron Stow, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.



by the author on a later page, 160. And this increasing agreement, at least as between ourselves and others, is due, we believe, to the steady and peaceful encroachments of Christian truth. It has not been gained, we would fain hope, by any relaxed guardianship of Scripture doctrine on our part, or any less full and earnest expression of opinion concerning the ordinances which we as a denomination hold to be sacred and binding. "Speaking the truth in love," or 'truthing in love,' as the author has well put it on page 161, is the very best recipe for promoting Christian union among all who love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and truth.

#### TERMS OF COMMUNION.\*

This is a brief, but thorough, Scriptural discussion of the Terms of Communion. If circulated, just now, among the churches of the north-east, as well as of the southwest, it might accomplish a valuable mission.

The following extracts commend themselves as highly just: "It will further appear, from what has been proved with respect to the independence of a church, that communion is the act of an individual church, and, consequently, that none has a *right* to the communion in any church but one of the members of *that church*." . . . "It is, therefore, rather aside from its appropriate design to celebrate the ordinance at associations, conventions, and other similar meetings of Christians." . . . "Still less proper is it to observe the ceremony *privately*, as at a sick bed." All this follows, of course, from the author's position that the ordinance is a *church* ordinance, a position that appears to be quite defensible. In only a few instances does the author seem to be at fault; *e. g.*, in a remark on page 39, where he represents the converts on the day of Pentecost as being "added" to the church *after* they were baptized. They were doubtless united to the visible body of believers at Jerusalem *by* baptism.

#### LOSING AND TAKING OF MANSOUL: PATTON.†

The "Holy War," is an illustration of the creative power and fruitfulness of Bunyan's mind. The witnessing of the single battle of Naseby, and of the siege and capture of the town of Leicester, furnished him the materials out of which his imagination constructed this brilliant allegory; a work that, considered simply as a work of art, many intelligent judges have placed higher than the "Pilgrim's Progress."

In the eleven lectures of the volume before us, Mr. Patton has availed himself of some of the more striking representations of this allegory on which to engraft thoughts concerning the loss, and recovery, and sanctification of the human soul.

His purpose is pursued with sobriety and earnestness, and with a good measure of success. The work may be commended to *such as need aid* in turning to profitable, practical meditation the figurative representations of truth by John Bunyan.

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\* TERMS OF COMMUNION (Prize Essay). By Elder J. M. C. Breaker, Beaufort, S. C. Southwest Publishing House, Nashville, Tenn. 1859.

† THE LOSING AND TAKING OF MANSOUL; or Lectures on the Holy War. By Alfred S. Patton, A. M. New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1859.

## II.

## TYPES OF GENESIS: BY JUKES.\*

A great and valuable truth underlies the conception of this book, viz.: the mystical character of the Old Testament narratives, or the fact that the events of the world's creation and history, as there given, are significant types of the religious life of the soul, and of the spiritual history of mankind.

This truth is by no means newly discovered or newly applied by the author. He is largely a compiler from ancient commentators, but he adds to what he thus borrows the charm of fresh thought.

It may be doubted whether many of the typical representations which he finds in Genesis are not undesigned, not to say fanciful coincidences, and whether his example may not be justly used to give force to the caution concerning this method of interpretation in the handling of Scriptures.

Nevertheless, the work may be so used as greatly to enrich the preacher's mind and to suggest to him many things that may be of service as striking illustrations of spiritual facts and truths. And we are the more free to say this from the conviction that the majority of our ministers have gone to the opposite extreme from the excessively spiritualizing process, and are coming to treat the Bible too dryly and rationalistically.\*

There is a hidden spiritual truth in the sacred text that cannot be revealed by the bare help of grammars and lexicons. There is a path of religious thought and meditation suggested by Scripture, "which the vulture's eye hath not seen, and which the lion's whelp never trod." There are mysteries of meaning in the adjustments of the Divine "handiwork" in creation, and of his movements in providence and grace as recorded in the Bible, which only the spiritual vision, sharpened by prayerful study, can discover.

In the direction indicated by these remarks the work before us is a valuable help. It will introduce the hitherto superficial students of Scripture to many startling novelties; and to such as have read with deeper insight, it will come with strengthening testimony. To both classes it will prove eminently suggestive. It might give a new impulse to *Biblical* preaching among us, if some American public house would place the work within reach of all our pastors. It would, we think, be extensively and eagerly read.

## LITERARY ATTRACTIONS OF THE BIBLE.†

The object proposed to be attained by this book is a high and worthy one, which is nothing less than to commend the Bible to such as are neglecting it through ignorance of its character and contents. Whether the means employed by the author are best adapted to the end admits of grave doubt. That means is to reproduce the matchless narratives of the Bible in the language of modern and current description; to paraphrase the condensed and energetic speeches of Stephen, Paul, and others; and, in general, to dress out the contents of Scripture on all matters of taste, and sentiment, and imagination, in a garb woven of modern and polite phrase-

\* THE TYPES OF GENESIS, briefly considered as revealing the development of human nature in the world within and without, and in the dispensations. By Andrew Jukes. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts. 1858.

† LITERARY ATTRACTIONS OF THE BIBLE. By Le Roy J. Holsey, D. D. New-York: Charles Scribner. Third edition.

ology. Hence, we have such subjects as "The Bards of the Bible," "The Eloquent Orators of the New Testament," "Representative Young Men of the Bible," &c., with a corresponding treatment in detail.

It is not, perhaps, surprising that in such an effort the style of the work should become somewhat agonistic and overstrained.

We are free to confess that this mode of commending the literary attractions of the Bible is not altogether after our taste. We agree fully with the author, in a remark of his preface, on the point of the evidence for the Divine inspiration of Scripture. "Perhaps the best evidence, after all, is to let the Bible speak for itself." We should profoundly pity the man who could not feel the unapproachable excellences of Scripture narrative, description, and poetry; but who would be led to appreciate them, as they are feebly reproduced in any human composition? To eulogize the Bible, or any part of it, is like an attempt to add lustre to a sunbeam, or to enhance the fragrance of the rose.

Having spoken thus freely of the *aim* and *method* of this volume, we feel bound to say that it has merits far beyond most volumes of its class that have come under our notice. In the first place, there is a perfect *chasteness* of sentiment, so far as we have observed, in all Mr. Halsey's female characters. There is, also, a moral, religious earnestness pervading the entire volume, which gives it an indisputable power over the reader. Its style is elevated, and, with the exception of the blemish noticed, excellent. The fact that, within a short time, it has reached a third edition, is proof of its popularity.

#### SAWYER'S NEW TESTAMENT.\*

Perhaps we should not err should we say that the chief *significancy* of this book, published on the basis of a subscription-list scattered widely over the country, and including names in different Christian denominations, is, that it is *symptomatic*. It is an indication of the condition of the religious mind, healthful or morbid, which we may rejoice at, or which we may regret, but which we cannot wisely neglect to recognize and consider. The obvious import of this wide-spread and somewhat blind encouragement of the issue before us is, that there is a demand, a demand that is becoming urgent and imperative, for the latest results, in popular form, of biblical research and criticism. In this view the work in question assumes an importance that it could not otherwise lay claim to. It cannot be regarded as the product, simply, of one mind laboring in seclusion and solitude. It must be esteemed as a growth, having roots in the thoughts and desires of multitudes of persons agreeing perhaps in no one thing besides this, of having for themselves, and giving to others the full benefits of the last two hundred and fifty years accumulation of Bible knowledge. The faults and defects of the translation may all be Mr. Sawyer's own; the translation itself is not exclusively his. It belongs to the history of the movements of the popular mind in this generation.

But, while the book is symptomatic of the condition of the public mind, it is at the same time a warning to those who may attempt to meet the demand thus manifested. And the grave lesson of that warning is, that all attempts to put the Holy Scriptures into the English tongue that shall transcend a careful and scholarly *Revision* of our common version; a revision that shall leave us the simple, strong, and now almost sacred Saxon of our old Bibles unchanged, except where fidelity to the original text requires the change; all attempts in short, at modernizing and Latinizing the English Scripture, will be mortifying failures.

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\* THE NEW TESTAMENT, TRANSLATED, ETC. By Leicester Ambrose Sawyer  
Boston: Jewett & Co. 1858.



It would be easy to point out many admirable renderings in this translation, where the deviation from the common version seems defensible, or at least tolerable. But it would be easier to point out deviations that are indefensible and intolerable. It would be easy to show, from the variety and apparent capriciousness of renderings given to the same words and constructions, that Mr. Sawyer did not bring to his task either well-settled canons of translation, or the exercise of an independent, scholarly, self-relying judgment.

#### OSBORNE'S PALESTINE.\*

ONE need now hardly go to Palestine to know its surface, soil, seasons, and productions. All these, and much besides, have been brought home, as traces of travel, by Missionaries and tourists, till they must have domesticated themselves, as familiar things, in the minds of most intelligent readers. What with hand-books, topographical surveys and books of general observation, almost everything of importance must have been gleaned from this field, a field of such wondrous interest to every Christian heart. During the few months past, there have come into our hands "*Murray's Hand-Book of Syria and Palestine*;" "*Vandevelde's Memoir and Maps*;" "*Barclay's City of the Great King*;" "*The Land and the Book*," by *Thompson*; and "*Osborne's Palestine, Past and Present*." By going back a few months farther, we might greatly enlarge this list.

There is a significancy in this extraordinary interest in the Holy Land: a significancy as connected with words of prophecy, and movements of Providence. There is wrapped up in the future of the Divine purposes a wonderful history for Palestine, and for the Hebrew people. The rapid multiplication of such works as we have named, and the eager interest with which they are read by Gentile Christendom, are among the many signs now visible that God is about to "set his hand again, *the second time*, to recover the remnant of his people, which shall be left, from Assyria, and from Egypt, and from Pathros, and from Cush, and from Elam, and from Shinar, and from Hamoth, and from the islands of the sea" \* \* \* "when he shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah, from the four corners of the earth." We hail the mighty movement, and pray that it may be hastened to its glorious consummation.

The volume before us is beautifully printed, and is richly illustrated with nearly seventy engravings, steel, chromographic, and wood.

The author's familiarity with natural science, gives special value to many of his observations.

The geographical appendix gives the latitude and longitude, made out from a comparison of authorities, of every place mentioned in the Old and New Testaments.

One of the most interesting and suggestive of the special discussions, is that contained in the 25th chapter, relating to the capability of the soils of Palestine, and the evidence thus given of the possibility of the former populousness of the country ascribed to it in the Bible. Besides this corroborating value of the chapter, it is interesting, when viewed in connection with the prophetic future of Palestine. That narrow, and not very long strip of land, will yet hold the six or seven millions of Jews now scattered over the earth; and then will be realized, in rich accomplishment, the prophecy of Amos, ix. 13-15, "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that the plowman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of

\* PALESTINE, PAST AND PRESENT, with Biblical, Literary, and Scientific Notices. By Rev. Henry S. Osborne, A. M. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1859.

grapes him that soweth seed, and the mountains shall drop sweet wine and all the hills shall melt. And I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit thereof. And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be pulled up out of their land which I have given them, saith the Lord." This picture of literal fruitfulness and abundance, will yet be made good in Palestine, when the Jews, converted to the faith of the Messiahship of Jesus, shall dwell therein, with contentment and prosperity.

The work before us, and other recent works on the Holy Land, ought to be in the hands of all pastors. Intimacy with these volumes would naturally lead to the more frequent *expositions of Scripture narratives*, and would give to those expositions freshness, reality, and life-likeness. By the aid of such volumes, our pastors should first make themselves, and then their people, *familiar* with the scenes amid which the Saviour lived, and taught, and died, and with almost every one of which some portion of the Bible is, by illustration or allusion, associated.

#### BROWN'S COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPELS.\*

This little volume may be recommended as truly a *multum in parvo*. In its preparation, research, judgment, and exegetical tact, have been brought to bear with unusual success. It gives us the *results* of the thorough study of the original text, and of all the sources of illustrating it, without any of the lumber of learning. No portion of it seems to have been written in haste or carelessness. We have scarcely ever found, within the same compass, so much excellence in a commentary designed for general use.

We learn that there was a demand for a second thousand in less than a month. Without subscribing to all the author's views, we are prepared to say that we should rejoice to know that a copy of the work had found its way into every family, and into the hands of every Sunday School teacher in our country.

#### ANNOTATED PARAGRAPH BIBLE.†

The giving of this extended title-page is a very good description of the volume itself. The volume achieves, very successfully, what has been so often attempted, a convenient, instructive, and attractive paragraph Old Testament. It is adorned with eight maps and plates of real value. It has an introduction to each book giving an excellent synopsis of the contents of that book. It contains, besides the comments on the text, several special notes, one, for example, on the chronology of the book of Genesis, in which the argument is given, in substance, for the chronology of the Septuagint, which is justly preferred by the Editor to the Hebrew chronology. We think, indeed, that there is good reason for believing

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\* THE FOUR GOSPELS, ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORIZED VERSION: with Original and Selected Parallel References and Marginal Readings, and an Original and Copious Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. David Brown, D. D., Aberdeen. Philadelphia: Wm. S. & A. Martien.

† THE ANNOTATED PARAGRAPH BIBLE: containing the Old and New Testaments according to the Authorized Version, arranged in Paragraphs and Parallelisms, with Explanatory Notes, Prefaces to the several Books, and an entirely new Selection of References to Parallel and Illustrative passages. The Old Testament. London: The Religious Tract Society. New-York: Sheldon & Co.

that even the chronology of the Septuagint, as arranged by Hales, is not long enough by some hundreds of years. We think that from the Creation to Christ nearly *six thousand* years elapsed.

The notes upon the texts, which are designed for popular use, are generally carefully prepared, judicious, and satisfactory, as respects their purpose. We do not agree, however, with the view given in the notes on some of the Messianic Psalms, e. g., the 16th and the 22d, that portions of those Psalms relate to Christ, and portions of them to David and the pious. We hold the *whole* of a Messianic Psalm to be Messianic.

One great advantage of this edition is the arrangement of the narrative portions in paragraphs, and the poetic portions in parallelisms. And altogether the volume may be recommended for popular use, and also for the ordinary use of the minister's study-table, as giving, in convenient and attractive form, one of the best helps for the intelligent reading of the Old Testament. It would be a hopeful sign of the increasing healthiness of the piety of our own churches if the volume should meet with an extensive sale. It is abundantly worthy of it.

#### CAREY'S BOOK OF JOB.\*

This is, in some respects, an interesting and valuable contribution to Old Testament interpretation.

The translation, which is given in large, clear type, occupies only a comparatively small space in the volume. This is preceded by dissertations on the historical verity of the book of Job; its age, place of composition, author, and theology; and on the various Hebrew readings. Then comes a copious analysis of the contents of the book. Under the text of the translation are arranged various readings from the collations of Kennicott and De Rossi.

The translation is supplemented by a large body of notes critical and exegetical, and by illustrations drawn from various antiquarian sources. The whole volume furnishes important help for studying the book of Job, of which any intelligent English reader can avail himself with but little embarrassment arising from ignorance of the original.

We cannot enter minutely into the merits of this work as a *version* of the book of Job. At some future time we may take occasion to make a careful comparison of this and some other recent translations, and to discuss some of the principles that should govern all translations of the books of the Bible intended for popular use. The subject is coming to assume magnitude and importance. We shall not shun to discuss it from time to time.

Of the present translation we will only say now, in the way of criticism, that it seems to us to lack both the *freedom* and the *precision* in rendering Hebrew terms which belong only to the practised hand. Hence, the version often strikes the ear oddly and unpleasantly, awakening instantly a sense of incongruousness, which is strengthened rather than obviated by critical examination of the passage.

Take, for example, the rendering of chap. i., verse 3, where for the word "substance" in our common version and in Conant's, Mr. Carey puts "stock." Now this substitution of an agricultural specific for a more general term, in this place, not only mars the beauty of the translation, but is unwarranted, or, at least, not required by the usage of the original word so rendered. Mr. Carey was led to adopt the word "stock," from the fact that most of the patriarch's wealth *consisted* of flocks and herds;

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\* THE BOOK OF JOB: Translated, Explained, and Illustrated. By the Rev. C. P. Carey, M. A. London: Wertheim, Macintosh & Hunt, 1858.



no sufficient reason, surely, for giving this specific limitation, in the version, to מַקְצֵה.

Again, in this same verse, for the terms "great household" of the common version, and "very many servants" of Prof. Conant, our author has, "a very large farm-service." One feels instinctively that this cannot be the most appropriate rendering of the original. And this instinctive decision is sustained by reasons drawn from the knowledge of ancient, oriental life. Job was not "a farmer," in the modern sense of that term. The whole picture of his life, as drawn in the narrative portions of the book, stands before us as, chiefly, of a nomadic one. And wherever elsewhere the word in question is employed, as in Gen. xxvi. 14, the same picture is presented, viz., not a life of agriculture on a fixed spot, but a nomadic mode of life. It is much the best to take the word צִבְיָה as Conant, as an abstract for a concrete, to signify the whole body of Job's servants, no inconsiderable portion of his wealth.

On the whole, this work lacks alike the freedom and precision of the skillful exegete and the practised hand. It manifests throughout a combination of constraint and license. It is both slavish and capricious. There is in many of its renderings a sort of *literal looseness* that often makes sad havoc of good taste and good idiom. Take the following examples: "I was at ease, but he *smashed me*," xvi. 12. "On (my) right hand a *brood of youngsters* riseth up," xxx. 12. "Wilt thou even *pull to pieces* my judgment?" xl. 8. "Would he not, even at sight of him, be *flung flat*?" xli. 9. On the subject of the crocodile, the author represents the Almighty as putting this question to Job: "Who would go into the *doubling of his muzzle*?" The author clings with singular partiality to the help of a little *corporal* sort of a word, which, one would think should break down under its burden of duty. To illustrate: "They *get* crushed like a moth." "And the pillars thereof *get* convulsed." "Who *got* tied up, and that, untimely." "And *get* exhilarated when evil hath found him." "And the clods *get* stuck together." We sincerely hope this brave little word will "*get*" emancipated from further service to our author.

We have not the space to pursue this subject further. But before dismissing the volume we wish to call attention to Mr. Carey's rendering of the interesting and important passage in chapter xix. 25-27. Mr. C. preserves the reference to *the resurrection*. And we think he is justified in this rendering. The question involved turns on the use of the preposition בְּ in the word בְּמִשְׁכָּתִי. Of this particle, in this connection, Dr. Conant says, "*the negative* sense is the proper one here." Accordingly, he renders, "and *without* my flesh I shall see God." He thus, reluctantly, no doubt, gives up the reference in this passage to the resurrection, and in this position he is sustained by high authority. Still, he remarks that, "from my flesh," i. e., "looking out from my flesh," &c., "is grammatically admissible." His objection to this is, "that it does not connect well with the *preceding member*." But, though this objection should be acknowledged to have weight, yet we think, decidedly, that the rendering that gives us the faith of the resurrection agrees *better* with the *whole passage*. We should be glad to discuss this point, and the points connected with it regarding *the ancient faith*. But at present we must desist.

Some other things in the volume before us have been marked for discussion. But we will dismiss them for the present with the single remark, that the author's constant rendering of יְהוָה by "The Eternal," is an innovation to which no Christian ear will patiently yield.

## III.

## SCHAFF'S HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.\*

Dr. Schaff is now distinctly recognized as possessing many of the highest qualifications for a church historian. Trained in the school of Neander, he seems to have been fully alive to the defects as well as to the great excellences of his master, capable of recognizing the true spirit of Christianity under every disguise, he is yet more cautious and watchful than Neander against a false sympathy, and is accordingly a safer guide amid the early records of the Church. He never, like Neander, merges the objective church in the subjective spirit of an age. Indeed, in his first volume on the "Apostolic Church" he was justly amenable to the charge of high Churchism. There is almost nothing of this in the present volume, which is the first of the regular history. To our mind the work comes nearer a model history than any yet given in the English language. The arrangement strikes us as clear and comprehensive; and the style as lucid, racy, graphic, and often elegant.

The practical spirit of our American life has evidently been of great service to the author in the use of his German learning. It is also clear that, while familiar with original sources, he has been at great pains to acquaint himself with English writers in the same department, whom the Germans have hitherto overlooked or ignored. With his many and rare qualifications, we are disposed to regard him as specially raised up to give to English readers a better history of the Church than we have yet had. We anticipate for the work a very wide circulation.

## MARSHMAN'S LIVES.\*

The enterprising house of Sheldon & Co. have done a very creditable thing in introducing this work to the notice of the American public.

Mr. Marshman's volumes are an admirable addition to our Missionary literature. Viewed as the history of a sublime enterprise in its experimental state, they are freighted with invaluable instruction to every Christian philanthropist, whatever may be his denominational affinities. The author, by virtue of his long residence in India, his intimacy with the Serampore Missionaries, though not himself a Missionary, possesses facilities for doing his work well. He has made admirable use of these facilities. No extraneous matter is introduced. The continuity of the story is not interrupted by exhortations. The analyses of characters blend two qualities rarely found united—humor and kindness. The style is clear, straightforward, unpretending, vigorous, and often piquant. The work is very apropos to the present juncture in the history of our denominational missions. Whoever wishes to avail himself of the historical light that may be shed on the questions which are distracting the peace of our American Antioch, by an acquaintance with the principles which guided the establishment and conduct of the first Christian Missions of modern times, and the results to which those principles led, cannot do better than to peruse these instructive volumes of Mr. Marshman.

[It is our intention to recur to the subject-matter of these volumes in a future number.]

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\* HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By Phillip Schaff, D D., From the Birth of Christ to the Reign of Constantine, A. D. 1-311. New-York: Charles Scribner.

† THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CAREY, MARSHMAN AND WARD, embracing the History of the Serampore Mission. By John Clark Marshman. 2 vols. 1859.

## MASSON'S LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN MILTON.\*

The appearance of such a work as this is a notable event. No period in English history has been more thoroughly investigated than that in which Milton lived, and yet Prof. Masson has opened new paths to even the best read—has disclosed new treasures along the most beaten tracks. There is no topic connected with Milton's ancestry, his early education and university life, or with the political, ecclesiastical, or literary history of his time, which has not been thoroughly re-examined and illumined by the learning and genius of this author. The *Life*, if completed on the scale of this first volume, will be a new, complete, and original history of one of the most important periods, as well as of one of the most remarkable men in English annals. Prof. Masson is evidently master alike of the learning, the enthusiasm, and the taste, requisite to his task.

## TRIALS OF A PUBLIC BENEFACTOR.†

One object of the author of this volume, is to establish the claims of Dr. W. T. G. Morton to having made the first application of anæsthetic agents to practical purposes; a labor apparently unnecessary, as all persons, out of Boston at least, acquainted with the history of remedial agents, accord to him this honor. Another object, is to secure for Dr. Morton, in his relation to this subject, the sympathy of the public. This object, notwithstanding some tediousness of detail and infelicity of expression, the author, we think, has attained.

## THE HISTORY OF THE BONAPARTE FAMILY‡

Has been for some years before the public, and for general readers is an instructive book.

## WILSON'S MEXICO.§

It happened to us before the appearance of Mr. Wilson's book, to devote the leisure time of a series of weeks to the subject of the Mexican Conquest, during a period of access to the two best libraries of our State. Our special object was to satisfy ourselves how far the histories of Cortez and Bernal Diaz could be fortified from collateral sources. We were surprised at the *abundant* "sources from which to collect and collate."

From these sources we became satisfied that not a material fact is stated by Cortez which does not meet most abundant corroboration; and that, it being once granted, which no one denies, that his despatches were written at the time they bear date, it is impossible that the great mass of facts

\* THE LIFE OF JOHN MILTON; Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical and Literary History of His Time. By David Masson, A. M., Prof. of English Literature in University College, London. (With Portraits and Specimens of his Handwriting at different Periods.) Vol. I., 1603—1639. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

† TRIALS OF A PUBLIC BENEFACTOR, as Illustrated in the Discovery of Etherization. By Nathan P. Rice, M. D. New-York: Pudney & Russell.

‡ THE NAPOLEON DYNASTY; or, the History of the Bonaparte Family. An entirely new work, by the Berkeley Men. With Twenty-two Authentic Portraits. New-York: Sheldon & Co.

§ A NEW HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO: in which Las Casas' denunciations of the popular historians of that war are fully vindicated. By Robert Anderson Wilson, Counsellor at Law, Author of *Mexico and its Religion*. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son.



stated by him should not be true. Most of this material lay unpublished for hundreds of years in the European archives. The "censorship of the Inquisition" did not reach it; lately it has come to light, a series of mislaid photographs of perished scenery. Of all these treasures Mr. Wilson professes his ignorance; but no part of them escaped Mr. Prescott, who mentions and characterizes them all, although he often disdains the display of citing them.

We have not space to follow Mr. Wilson through his book. Any one who will do so, and compare his citations with his authorities, and consult Mr. Prescott on the same topics, will be astounded at the author's audacity. Not a citation, not an engraving which he professes to republish, not an assertion that he makes, can be trusted, without recourse to the original. And even where Mr. Wilson has the merit of being probably correct, he has not the credit of being original. Mr. Prescott was the first to "vindicate Las Casas' denunciations of the popular historians" of the Mexican Conquest. Mr. Wilson gives out the idea that Mr. Prescott adopts the exaggerated numbers of the early writers. But he does not do so in a single instance. His careful conscientiousness led him to other results. When Cortez, on one occasion, estimates the Indian auxiliaries who flocked to his standard at 120,000 warriors, Mr. Prescott merely writes "flocked by thousands," and adds: "when the conquerors attempt anything like a precise numeration, it will be as safe to substitute 'a multitude,' 'a great force,' &c., trusting the amount to the reader's own imagination." *Conquest*, vol. ii., page 431, and note 16. He does not once vary from the opinion here expressed, and the very phrase, Falstaff's "men in buckram," applied by Mr. Wilson to one of these computations, p. 363, had been previously used for the same purpose by Mr. Prescott. *Conquest*, vol. ii., page 376-7, note 26. One only needs to run over Mr. Prescott's notes—the light labor of two hours—to see how groundless are these imputations upon him, and to be satisfied that *charity* demands the belief that Mr. Wilson has never read Prescott's *Conquest* carefully.

At page 519-20, Mr. Wilson speaks of "the lofty pyramid of hewn stone," which "previous historiographers" had described as existing at Cholula, and the absence of which dissipated all his faith in Hispano-American history. But who, before Mr. Wilson, ever mentioned this "pyramid of hewn stone?" Cortez did not, nor Bernal Diaz, nor Robertson, nor Humboldt, nor Prescott. This is *Mr. Wilson's* pyramid; he has, therefore, a right to demolish it, but deserves small credit for the exploit. So of the charge of cannibalism made against the Iroquois, which he imputes to Dr. Robertson, and indignantly repels. But that eminent historian does not make this charge, but classes the Iroquois among the nations who are not now cannibals, but in whose language probable traces of that custom are found. We cite these instances as cautionary to the reader to first satisfy himself of the origin of the fables which Mr. Wilson explodes, before much attention is given to the catastrophe.

#### THE EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA.\*

This is the first volume of a series contemplating "The *Biography* of the Monarchies of Continental Europe." Though not the result of original research, it is, nevertheless, a reliable, well-authenticated history. Marked by the same ease and grace of style that have characterized the previous works of the author, it is just the book for parents to place in the family library as a decoy for their sons and daughters from the seductions of lighter literature.

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\* THE EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA: its Rise and Present Power. By John S. C. Abbott. New-York: Mason & Brothers. 8vo, pp. 519. 1859.

## BEAUTIES OF RUSKIN.\*

With many of our readers Ruskin is already a household name. The modest "graduate of Oxford," whose new theories in art met with the usual cry of "heresy," survived the chastisements of the reviews, and converted his critics into admiring friends. A certain profound faith in the truth of his principles gave to him an assurance of utterance which compelled attention and commanded success. His plea is always for nature; and he inculcates a reverence for her and for the old masters only so far as they are faithful to her, with the simplicity, confidence and ardor of a single-minded worshipper. He strives by going back to first principles to bring those who have been fettered by forms, rules and masters, into the *liberty* of true art. Somewhat as Luther, believing the Gospel of Christ to repose neither in convent nor Vatican, but in the very Word of God, preached a pre-papal Christianity; Ruskin believing the evangel of art to repose neither in academies nor with old masters, but in the very bosom of nature, teaches the simple doctrines of Pre-Raphaelitism.

Along with a few conceits, a few extravagances, and a little indiscreet glow of feeling and fervor of style, Ruskin betrays in all that he writes a sincerity, a goodness, an earnestness and a truth, which win at once the confidence and respect of the reader; and as the student follows his guide up the mountains, down into the valleys, across the hills, through the woods, into ravines, over the meadows, along the banks of deep rivers, by the side of cascading brooks, and finds himself discovering beauties where he had never dreamed of them before, finding new revelations in the skies, on the earth, in creeping shadows, in old brown stumps, in the least as well as the largest of nature's works, he becomes conscious of a gratitude to his leader as to one who has endowed him with a new sense, or discovered for him a new world. Underneath, and pervading Ruskin's love and reverence for nature, is a deeper love and reverence for the God of Nature. A quiet undertone of religious feeling runs through all his works, investing them, for the Christian reader, with a charm rarely found in treatises on art. A thorough detestation of all shams, pretences, all mere seemings, is also so characteristic of them, that the moral feelings almost as much as the taste of the reader, are stimulated and refined.

We are not particularly in favor of culling the "beauties" of any author. In general, a writer who is worth studying at all, is worth possessing entire. But Mrs. Tuthill, who has shown an admirable judgment in these selections from Ruskin's works, says very reasonably in a prefatory note, that "being voluminous and expensive, they are beyond the means of many who could appreciate and highly enjoy them; moreover, some of the topics discussed are merely local (English), and not specially interesting to the American public."

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\* THE TRUE AND THE BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE, ART, MORALS, AND RELIGION. Selected from the works of John Ruskin, A. M., with a notice of the Author by Mrs. L. C. Tuthill. New-York: Wiley & Halstead. 12mo, pp. 452. 1859.

## Literary Intelligence.

SINCE the issue of the last number of the REVIEW, we have received the final instalment of the seventh edition of "*Tischendorf's New Testament*." It contains his prolegomena, and bears date Leipsic, 1859.

We hope ere long to procure a critical article on the basis of this and some other recent publications, on the present state of the Greek text of the New Testament. Meantime, we take occasion to say that this edition, the first part of which was published about three years ago, and the last part of which has just come to hand, is in the best style of recent typographical art in Germany, and is the fruit of great industry on the part of its distinguished editor. With the most unwearied and pains-taking diligence he has brought together, from every available source, means for the determining and settling of the text. In this particular no other edition of the Greek Testament can be compared with it. It furnishes ample material, in most cases, for the critical student to sit in judgment on the text which the editor himself has adopted. As that text will doubtless be largely used in our theological seminaries, and will be adopted as the basis of many critical commentaries, the critical apparatus by which it is formed ought to be made generally accessible. The whole work can be imported bound for eight dollars. A smaller edition containing the same text, most of the prolegomena, and a large selection of the authorities contained in the large work, can be furnished, unbound, for \$2 38. This is sufficient for all ordinary purposes of the New Testament student.

The New Testament portion of the "*Codex Vaticanus*," as published by Cardinal Mai, has been advertised as in press by several publishing houses in this country and in England. Of the *precise* character and value of this publication we have not been able to obtain satisfactory information. We shall spare no reasonable pains to procure for the readers of this Quarterly a just, critical estimate of the Cardinal's work. If only it were an accurate and faithful transcript of the original manuscript, what a treasure it would be for sacred criticism! And great will be its value even *now*, if the places where it deviates from the manuscript are reliably indicated. It is to be hoped that some enterprising publisher, who wishes to use his facilities for advancing the science of Biblical criticism, will ere long, give us an edition of "Cardinal Mai's Greek Testament," *with the various readings of all the collations hitherto made of the codex*, so far as they are procurable. This would be a work of great value, and would meet with a remunerative sale. It would go far, we think, with the materials already available, toward enabling us finally to settle the probable text of the New Testament.

In addition to the two abovenamed works, which may be had at a moderate sum, we are soon to have published, and rendered accessible at a reasonable price, the excellent critical commentaries of *Alford* and *Ellicott*, and also a translation of the last edition (the sixth), of "*Winer's Grammar of the New Testament Idioms*."

This last work will be an invaluable acquisition to all American students of the New Testament who are not familiar with the German language. It will be found by them to be a kind of thesaurus on the language and idioms of the New Testament. It will be almost a new lexicon to them. And in this last particular it will be a prize to all who are now limited to "*Robinson's Greek Lexicon*." Special explanations



will be found in Winer of more than 1,500 words and phrases of the New Testament.\*

The demand that leads to the publication of such works, in addition to the recent issue of "*Olshausen's*" and "*Eadie's Commentaries*," is a source of peculiar gratification to us as the lovers of good learning in the Christian ministry. It is evidence of an unusual interest, at the present time, among us in studies connected with New Testament criticism. We trust that this enthusiasm for thorough investigation may extend to the Old Testament as well. And we will express the hope that the ministry of our denomination at large, and especially that portion of it just entering on the great work of public pulpit teaching, may be nobly emulous of the younger ministry of other denominations in availing themselves of the seaccumulating helps to sacred exegesis and interpretation.

It has been known for some years that the author of a philosophical work called "*Fons Vitæ*," somewhat famous in the Middle Ages, was a Jew, not an Arabian, as had formerly been thought. The author has come down to us under the name of Avicbron, a corruption of Ibn Gebirol. The *Fons Vitæ* itself was known mainly through the quotations of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great. M. Munck, a distinguished Jewish Orientalist, found in the *Bibliothèque Imperiale*, a Hebrew work purporting to be a copy of the *Fons Vitæ* slightly abridged. In continuing his researches, he found a Latin translation of the work, which accorded so completely with the Hebrew manuscript and the citations of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, that M. Munck has been able to restore the original treatise with every reason to suppose that it is a correct version of the original Arabic. This edition of the Hebrew version with a literal rendering into French, has been published as the first part of a collection of metaphysical tracts, under the title of *Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*.

The author of the Hebrew version of the *Fons Vitæ*, is, by a Jewish philosopher, named Schem-Tob Ibn Falaquéra. In the introduction prefixed, he gives a full account of the author, whom he calls the learned Rabbi Solomon Ibn Gebirol. As Ibn Roschid was corrupted into Averroes, and Ibn Sina into Avicenna, and Ibn Badja into Avenpace, so the author of the *Fons Vitæ* appears as Avicbron. He was a distinguished Rabbi of the 11th century, greatly celebrated among the Jews as a poet and metaphysician.

The philosophy of the *Fons Vitæ* is an attempt to reconcile Providence, Creation, and Revelation, with a system of emanation similar to that of Plotinus, if not identical with it. The Jews are ordinarily said, to have had little influence upon philosophical opinion. But this new publication adds to the chain of evidence, showing that they were inferior only to the Arabs in science at a time when Spain was the centre of intellectual activity in Europe. They compiled the astronomical tables for Alphonso, and furnished physicians to all the European courts, and often to the Popes. The influence of the Cabbala upon Spinoza is thought by some to have been greater than that of Descartes. This system of Theosophic pantheism, supposed by M. Munck to have been compiled about the time of the Christian era, from the writings of a school which during the captivity drew its inspiration from the Zend Avesta, had a wide influence during the sixteenth century. Reuchlin, Steny, More, and many others who might be mentioned, were students of the Cabbala. We have drawn the foregoing facts from *The Journal of the Institute*.

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\* Since the foregoing was written the first volume of the work has appeared from the publishing house of Smith & English, Philadelphia.

The unjust and indiscriminate prejudice against the scholastic philosophy is now passing away. Amid much that is arid and worthless there may be found in the scholastic writers abundance of the profoundest and acutest thinking. M. Charles Jourdain has lately issued two volumes on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which give a careful and lucid account of the philosophical opinions which underlie the vast theological structure of the "Angel" of the schools. This work will be found an excellent guide to those students who are desirous of studying such portions of the scholastic writings as will repay the labor. M. Cacheux has also just announced another work on the same subject. M. Jourdain's book was crowned by the Institute of Paris, and is enriched by copious citations, ample historical learning, and a full synopsis of opinions.

We see that Mansel's Bampton Lectures are announced for republication by Messrs. Gould & Lincoln. The *Prolegomena Logica*, and the article *Metaphysics* in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* have given Mr. Mansel a high position among philosophical writers. These lectures will be found a most valuable addition to theological literature. The lectures are accompanied by copious and learned notes, which are perhaps equal in value with the text. It is a gratifying fact that a man of so much vigor and learning has risen up in Oxford, where Rationalism and Puseyism seem to be conspiring with equal vigor for the overthrow of sound theological thinking.

Dr. Latham has just published a work in two volumes on *Descriptive Ethnology*. We do not see that any American house has announced it for republication. Though a clumsy bookmaker, Dr. Latham has immense industry in collecting facts, and is also one of the most active contributors to ethnological science in all its departments. He has announced also, an introduction to *Comparative Philology*, which is soon to be issued.

The University Lectures of Sir William Hamilton, on *Metaphysics and Logic*, are now just ready for publication under the editorial supervision of Messrs. Mansel & Veitch, his literary executors. These lectures are announced in the United States by Messrs. Gould & Lincoln. This publication is looked for with great interest by scholars engaged in philosophical studies. The opinions of the distinguished author have been hitherto gathered from fragmentary essays and notes, scarcely presenting his doctrines in a reliable and connected form.

A new interest seems to be excited of late in the works of Bacon. The new and elaborate edition of Spedding and his fellow-laborers, is in progress and will soon be completed. This will be likely to take the place of the edition of Basil Montagu, which has become scarce and dear. M. Remusat has lately published an elaborate treatise on Bacon; Dr. Kuno Fischer, of Heidelberg, has also written on the same subject with much learning and ability. It cannot but be profitable for the Germans to come more into contact with the mind and methods of Bacon. This work has been translated into English, and has been some time before the public, but it may not have come under the eye of some of our readers.

Messrs. Sheldon & Co. have announced for republication Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*. This is a work of ample learning, written with such elegance and skill that it is adapted to excite the interest of the general reader. It throws a flood of light upon some of the darkest and thorniest tracts in the history of religious thought. It proves the identity in methods between the old Pagan and Catholic mystics, and the New England Transcendentalists.

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A new *Evangelical Church Gazette*, "*Neu Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*," under the auspices of the German Branch of the Evangelical Alli-

ance, and edited by Prof. H. Mesner, made its appearance at Berlin at the beginning of the present year. The old Church Gazette, edited by Hengstenberg, and once so earnest in advocating the union of the Southern and Reformed Churches, now both assails the Reformed Church, and denounces the Evangelical Alliance as a union with the "Sectarians from England and America." The new Gazette is vastly more liberal, and yet is not without its tincture of illiberality.

It professes to be the organ of the German Branch of the Evangelical Alliance, and yet fails to act on the principles of that body. The Alliance embraces the Baptists as much as any other sect, but the Church Gazette does not. The call for its publication, signed by seventy-three names of ecclesiastical dignitaries, professors, ministers, and laymen, throughout Germany and Switzerland, has not the name of a single Baptist, though Baptists took a prominent part in the organization of the German Branch of the Evangelical Alliance, and one of their number, Mr. Lehman, pastor of the Baptist Church in Berlin, was one of the editors of a former paper, now superseded by the larger and more ably edited New Church Gazette.

It should also be known that Dr. Hoffman, formerly Inspector of the Missionary Seminary at Basle, now one of the chief dignitaries of the "United Evangelical Church of Prussia," in an article in this Gazette, entitled, "Survey of the Protestant World," takes special pains to ignore the existence of the Baptists, not even recognizing them when speaking of Hamburg, where their efforts have been so far reaching, and so well known to the public. Though giving credit to all other sects, he is careful not to name the Baptists. The Methodists, who have had some success in Bremen, are very favorably noticed, because it is not expected that they will form a distinct organization in Germany, but will give new impulse and life to the national church. Whenever an allusion to the Baptists is unavoidable, it is yet with a coldness which but too clearly indicates the feeling towards them. But all this is contrary to the principles and spirit of the Alliance, which had far better lose the support of a few ecclesiastical dignitaries than the affection and confidence of the great brotherhood of Christians.

It would be both wiser and more honorable for the editors of the New Church Gazette to carry out the true spirit and letter of the Alliance.

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#### BOOKS RECEIVED TOO LATE FOR NOTICE.

SPURGEON'S SERMONS. Fifth Series. Sheldon & Co.

PRECIOUS STONES OF THE HEAVENLY FOUNDATIONS. Sheldon & Co.

TRUTH IS EVERYTHING, by Mrs. Geldart. Sheldon & Co.

LECTURES IN METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC. By Sir Wm. Hamilton. Gould & Lincoln.

STATE OF THE IMPENITENT DEAD. By A. Hovey. Gould & Lincoln.

THE PILLAR OF FIRE; or, Israel in Bondage. By J. Ingraham. Pudney & Russell.

FRANK ELLIOTT; or, Wells in the Desert. By Jos. Challen. Jos. Challen & Son.

THE METHODIST. By Miriam Fletcher. Derby & Jackson.

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#### ANNOUNCEMENTS.

GILL'S COMMENTARY. Sheldon & Co.

FIFTY YEARS AMONG THE BAPTISTS. By D. Benedict. Sheldon & Co.